Ambivalent globalizers, vicarious cosmopolitans: South Korean "geese-dad" academics by Lee-Chung, Sangsook
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
©  2014 SANGSOOK LEE-CHUNG 
  
 
 
 
AMBIVALENT GLOBALIZERS, VICARIOUS COSMOPOLITANS: 
SOUTH KOREAN “GEESE-DAD” ACADEMICS 
 
 
 
 
 
 
BY 
 
SANGSOOK LEE-CHUNG 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
DISSERTATION 
 
Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements 
for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in East Asian Languages and Cultures 
in the Graduate College of the 
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, 2014 
 
 
 
 
 
Urbana, Illinois 
 
 
Doctoral Committee: 
 
 Professor Nancy Abelmann, Chair 
 Professor Poshek Fu 
 Assistant Professor Jungwon Kim 
 Associate Professor Robert Tierney 
 
 
ii 
 
ABSTRACT 
This dissertation examines the shifting subjectivities of contemporary South Korean 
professors, the most prominent, symbolic group of South Korean intellectuals, focusing on the 
experiences of “geese-dad” professors who respond to the challenges of globalization in both 
private and public realms. I explore how these professors engage in the globalization process 
both through raising their children abroad and through their university roles as campus 
globalizers. Through ethnographic field research (2009-2010) on twenty eight Seoul-based 
geese-dad professors, I identify the transformative (cosmopolitan) qualities of their transnational 
experiences and argue that their experiences reflect the larger landscape in which South Koreans 
are creatively responding to the challenge of globalization and unwittingly training as 
cosmopolitans in the process.  
These geese-dad professors are ambivalent about raising their children abroad. In this 
vein, they often mask their privilege and motivations through the rhetoric of inevitability. They 
are at once proud of being competent fathers with a pioneering spirit, but also critical of 
themselves as self-wounded intellectuals whose practices are often seen as individualistic efforts 
at social reproduction -- efforts at odds with the social ideals of critical, respectable, and 
nationalist intellectuals.  I demonstrate, however, that this seemingly apparent contradiction itself 
is also unstable. Their experiences in fact challenge longstanding South Korean binaries of 
private/public, individualistic/collectivistic, national/global -- binaries that are increasingly 
blurred today.  
Despite this ambivalence, these fathers in fact vicariously nurture their own desires for 
cosmopolitan and autonomous liberal subjectivity through their children’s study abroad 
experiences. Moreover, many of these professors undergo a paradigm shift in their thinking 
iii 
 
about the nation and the global as they negotiate the process of raising their children abroad. 
Further, these transformations also affect and are affected by the roles that they play as agents in 
the imperative to globalize their universities. They emerge as both cynical consumers of and 
critical players in globalization projects in South Korean higher education. In the midst, they also 
develop new ideas about the role of professors and their responsibility as intellectuals in South 
Korean society. Still, they are caught between the nostalgia for the yesteryear professor who 
enjoyed the aura of respectable, privileged intellectuals and the new ideals of autonomous 
professionals who are unrestrained by traditionally imagined collective identity. 
This study thus not only analyzes the veritable transformation of the ethos of the 
professoriate in South Korea’s aggressively globalizing society and higher education sector, but 
also offers a rich window on larger cultural and social struggles and paradigm shifts in South 
Korea. Further, my study offers a broader window on intellectuals’ struggles in a transforming 
East Asia and developing countries; even more broadly it offers a portrait of how South Koreans 
today carve out lives in the face of globalization. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
The sociological imagination enables its possessor to understand the larger historical 
scene in terms of its meaning for the inner life and the external career of a variety of 
individuals. […] [It] enables us to grasp history and biography and the relations between 
the two with society (Mills 1959, 5-6). 
 
Illustration I: On a cold day at the beginning of March, 2010, I am in the midst of my 
fieldwork in Seoul, meeting up with old friends of mine who graduated from the same 
department in the same university — for South Koreans this sort of consociate is marked with its 
own name, taehak kwa tongch’ang. It was a regular monthly lunch meeting that I was returning 
to after a number of years of study abroad in the U.S. I felt apologetic, both for not having joined 
them earlier in my fieldwork and for having been only sporadically in touch with many of them 
over the years. After the initial delight at seeing each other, I quickly became aware of, and was 
surprised by the fact that, all five of us gathered there shared the experience of having educated 
our children in the U.S., although our children’s paths were all somewhat different: whether for 
study abroad before college (early study abroad/ESA/chogi yuhak), or in “geese family” (kirŏgi 
kajok)
1
 arrangements, or just for college study abroad. Further it was pretty clear that all of us 
enjoyed middle or upper middle class lives with professional husbands: doctors, professors, or 
corporate executives or high-level managers. This encounter alone brought home the extent to 
which education in the U.S. (and more broadly transnational education abroad) had become a 
typical and ideal path for children in the South Korean middle class. At the time of this gathering, 
                                                 
1
 “Geese family (kirŏgi kajok)” originally refers to “wild geese family,” which means the transnational-split family 
for children’s pre-college education abroad. However, in this study I use “geese” as the abbreviation for “wild geese.” 
“Kirŏgi (wild geese) are iconic birds in Korea: The birds are known for natural devotion to their spouses and 
offspring. And these geese families are thought as one of symbolic examples of Korean parent’s absolute 
unconditional devotion to their children, especially sacrificing themselves to give their children more advantages. 
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most of my friends’ children were already college students in the U.S. in step with many of their 
class and generation. 
Illustration II: After lunch, my friends looked for a coffee shop to continue our 
conversation. The first coffee shop we stepped inside was already full, so we set out to find 
another one. But the next coffee shop was similarly crowded. One of my friends urged us to stay 
there, insisting that it would be much the same no matter where we went. After we gathered 
chairs to squeeze in, I was surprised to look around and see that nearly all the customers in the 
coffee shop were middle-aged women sitting in small groups. I could not help asking my friends, 
“Why are there so many serious-looking middle-aged women (simgakhae poinŭn ajummadŭl) 
gathered here?” My friends laughed, “You don’t know anything about this, do you?” And a 
friend jokingly let me know that these days children’s educational success depends on the 
“strength of mothers’ information, fathers’ indifference, and grandfathers’ wealth.” My friends 
continued that the coffee shops in the neighborhood in which we were gathered are famous 
Kangnam
2
 spots for the exchange of educational information about college entrance exams or 
(early) study abroad. It was only then that I realized that I was in the vortex of the so-called 
“educational fever” of Kangnam – even as some of the mothers gathered there were from other 
Seoul locales. 
The mothers in these coffee shops were using their social networks to collect and check 
more educational information for their children — to control their children’s educational path 
and thus to ensure their social reproduction. Their “concerns both about getting it right and doing 
the right thing are engendered and reinforced within social networks” (Ball 2003, 171). As many 
                                                 
2
 Kangnam is the specific area in south side of Han River (Han’gang) where is considered as a privileged residential 
space for the rich and upper-middle class in Seoul. It is frequently said that the residence of Kangnam itself has 
become a “status symbol” (Hong 2010, 123). Mothers in Kangnam are also often symbolized as aggressive 
“manager mothers” of their children’s education. For more information of “manager mothers,” see Park (2006); and 
especially for the spatial stratification for education, see Park’s chapter four. 
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scholars have noted, South Korean mothers have become “educational manager mothers.” 
Indeed, mothers’ cultural and social resources as well as economic abilities have become more 
and more important into the present; it is particularly appreciated that mothers must be skilled at 
mobilizing social networks to collect and evaluate information (Park 2006). There I was, in my 
own peer group, and all around me I could see just these practices. 
After parting from my friends, I found myself struggling with my own complex, mixed 
feelings as a mother. I was torn about how to understand or even evaluate my own position as a 
“geese” mother who had left two sons back in the U.S. for my own one-year-long field research. 
During my fieldwork, my younger son was a junior in high school, a period appreciated as 
critical for taking major exams for college application; South Koreans would easily recognize 
this as a critical moment and indeed there are terms to denote “(college entrance) exam-taker.” 
My older son who was an undergraduate at the same university where I was pursuing my 
advanced degree had agreed to stay home with his younger brother and commute to school (i.e., 
to help with his brother). Meanwhile, there I was -- living with my husband, who had been a 
geese dad for years, so as to conduct field research. I couldn’t help but periodically ask myself, 
‘While other mothers are enthusiastically doing their best by exerting enormous energy for their 
children to succeed in the college entrance exams, what am I doing?’ or ‘While other mothers are 
sitting up late with their children as they study for exams, how can I not even prepare meals for 
my sons for an entire year?’ In fact, these were issues that had been bothering me long before my 
research in Seoul had begun. But in Seoul I was truly confused, unsure whether I should be 
happy, thankful, proud, or sorry that my life had taken a turn away from those of the women at 
the coffee shop; Was I, I worried, a negligent, selfish mother sacrificing her duty for the sake of 
her own study? 
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Nonetheless, at the same time, even as this direct witnessing of the vividness and 
intensity of the South Koreans’ parental desires for children’s educational success evoked such 
complicated feelings in me, I became more confident in the significance of my study: its 
examination of what propels geese families or early study abroad; and of what kinds of 
individual and social meanings are being fashioned through this practice. I wanted to know that 
if it could be valid to simply encapsulate these parental desires of bringing up their children 
abroad in the three words, “excessive educational zeal,” which have been so easily vilified as a 
social ill or an extreme instrumental familism. Moreover, this practice was regarded as more 
likely mothers’ projects because of the explicitness -- as seen above -- of mothers’ role, but I was 
increasingly interested in fathers’ active role undergirding this transnational practice – a role that 
came to life through my field research in which I interviewed geese dads. I came to think that the 
scene that I just illustrated above might not explain the entire phenomenon. I was actually in the 
midst of a process of recognizing and thus becoming more confident that there was more to all of 
this than mothers. Somehow I found solace in this line of thinking for the remainder of my field 
research period — aware that I was observing a veritable historical juncture for Korean families 
and society. Although my research interlocutors were men and settled professors, I easily 
imagined that my own complicated ruminations perhaps echoed their own mixed feelings as 
professors and university employees, on the one hand, and as fathers who had removed their 
children from the South Korean educational system, on the other hand. 
 
I.  “History and Biography”: Why “Geese-dad” Professors at This Historical Juncture? 
Broadly, this dissertation examines the shifting subjectivities of contemporary South 
Korean professors -- the most prominent, symbolic group of South Korean intellectuals – in the 
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face of globalization. I focus on the experiences of “geese-dad” professors, in the midst of their 
response to the acute challenges of globalization in both the private and the public realm. “Geese 
dads (kirŏgi appa)” are fathers who sent their young children and wives abroad (mostly to 
English-speaking Western countries) for pre-college education, while they remain alone in South 
Korea to financially support this venture. This trend emerged as a popular middle-class 
educational strategy to raise children as global citizens through the mastery of English and the 
acquisition of Western education, beginning in the mid-1990s. I take geese-dad professors’ 
position to be unique, but also to reflect the larger landscape in which South Koreans are 
creatively responding to globalization and also unwittingly training as cosmopolitans. These 
professors are also unique because of their seemingly active geese dad’s role which is against the 
general images of “passive” and “pathetic” geese dads in the phenomenon -- and “indifferent” 
South Korean fathers in general -- who are often under their wives’ control when dealing with 
children’s education. 
I began my dissertation project with my personal intellectual curiosity of geese-dad 
professors, while observing many geese-dad professors and seeing my husband’s struggles as a 
father. As myself a geese mother who had to continuously make small and big quotidian, often 
unexpected, decisions (often in consultation with my husband) and sometimes felt challenged by 
my/our decision makings while raising my children in the U.S., I was interested in how these 
geese-dad professors perceived their own private practice of educating/raising their children 
abroad, separated from their families. I was curious to know if their motivations for this practice 
only reflected the father-side parental desires of class reproduction as was generally thought and 
if there was a correlation between this transnational practice and their own study abroad 
experiences. I also wondered if it would be possible to sustain geese-dad lives up to ten years -- 
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in some cases -- only for instrumental reasons, in the context of considerable public discourse 
about and often critique of the geese-family phenomenon. I asked: Is there no other effective way 
to achieve their goals rather than this practice? Are the returns the ones that they anticipated from 
the outset? Do they have any regrets? Especially, how do they navigate the possible tension and 
ambivalence of being both an active geese dad and a socially respectable professor and negotiate 
their roles while they manage their daily lives, continuously making micro decisions for the 
family abroad? At the same time, most importantly, I thought that their practices as geese dads 
could not be fully comprehended without an understanding of their personal-life-experiences and 
the lager socio-cultural context surrounding them; their practices might reflect ongoing struggles 
and the changing ethos of the South Korean professor/intellectual community. 
This line of thinking then pushed me to ask further: What are the inner landscapes of 
South Korean intellectuals today, at this 21st century historical juncture, in which powerful 
neoliberal, globalizing forces meet South Koreans’ escalating desires for freedom, autonomy, 
and a developed democracy after the democratization?  South Korea was at the critical juncture: 
that is, South Koreans yearned foremost for a society that could nurture its citizens’ desires for 
the equal opportunity of every individual to successfully achieve their liberal dream, and 
cosmopolitan yearnings – desires born in the aftermath of the long winter of authoritarian 
regimes, the democratization of 1987, and the Economic Crises in 1997 and 2008 and following 
neoliberal regimes. I asked this question since these geese-dad professors were faced with an 
especially vexed moment in which intellectuals’ private lives had become ever more public 
through the visibility of their children’s early study abroad and their geese-family practices; 
some observers and media sources had charged that this transnational educational strategy was 
foremost an individualistic/selfish effort at social reproduction, forsaking the efforts for 
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collective wellbeing. At the same moment that they were accused of this instrumental 
cosmopolitanism, however, these professors were also called upon to aid in the globalization 
efforts of their universities, efforts that were part and parcel of the profound neoliberal 
transformation of higher education in South Korea, in step with global trends. 
Furthermore, there had been another discourse surrounding South Korean intellectuals. 
As I discuss in chapter two, entering a new century, many critical voices had asked whether 
South Korean intellectuals -- privileged people who had enjoyed honor, respect, money, and 
power -- were in fact really contributing to Korean society today. On the one hand, these critics 
proclaimed the “death” of the yesteryear intellectuals who were able to contribute “conscious 
and visible fundamental notions of a society” (Eyerman 1994); other critics had aggressively 
called for “new intellectuals” (sin-chisigin) who could both adapt well to and actively create 
added value for a knowledge-based global economy, particularly after the Economic Crisis in 
1997 (Chŏn 2006, D. Kim 2000; Kyunghyang Shinmun T’ŭkpyŏlch’wijaetim 2008; Shin 2003). 
It was in the context of this conversation that so-called geese-dads professors became an issue. 
This transnational educational strategy has become especially popular among professors who 
themselves have studied abroad, mainly in the U.S., i.e., professors who are more likely to 
compose the mainstream of South Korean academics/intellectuals. Among professors, a popular 
joke goes that a certain department in an elite university holds faculty meetings in the U.S. 
during summer and winter breaks because they are all there visiting their children there. It is 
clear that geese-dad professors, in some sense ridiculing themselves with this joke, are indeed 
ambivalent about the very widespread strategy of sending their children and wives abroad for 
pre-college education. 
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I asked, then: Why do these professors struggle over this strategy? Do geese-dad 
professors necessarily betray the tradition or mission of intellectuals by sending their families 
abroad in this way? What are the implications of these struggles for both individuals and the 
society? Having asked these questions, based on 10 months of ethnographic field research in 
Seoul metropolitan area in South Korea, I investigated the experiences of geese-dad professors, 
focusing on their engagement in the globalization process both through their children’s 
transnational education and their university roles as campus globalizers. 
Indeed, in sum, these geese-dad professors were ambivalent about this practice of raising 
their children abroad. They were both proud of being competent fathers with pioneering spirits 
executing personalized globalization project for their children, but also somewhat critical of 
themselves for being self-wounded intellectuals whose practices were often seen as 
individualistic efforts at social reproduction. It is so because their transnational strategy for their 
children is at odds with the social ideals of critical, respectable, and often nationalist intellectuals 
– who are often thought as more “authentic intellectuals,” who care more about collective 
wellbeing.  However, in this dissertation, I show that this seemingly apparent contradiction itself 
is also unstable and the longstanding private/public, individualistic/collectivistic, national/global 
binaries may not hold control today in South Korea. Despite the ambivalence and struggles, I 
found, these fathers in fact vicariously nurtured their own desires for cosmopolitan and 
autonomous liberal subjectivities through their children’s study abroad experiences. Moreover, 
many of these professors underwent a paradigm shift in their thinking about the nation and the 
global while continuously adjusting themselves as fathers through this process of raising their 
children abroad. Whatever their initial motivations were, many of these fathers kept transforming. 
Further, these transformations also affected and were affected by the roles that these geese-dad 
9 
 
professors played as agents in the imperative to globalize their universities. They were both a 
cynical consumer and a critical player of globalization projects in South Korean higher education. 
I thus analyze the veritable transformation of the ethos of the professoriate in South Korea’s 
aggressively globalizing society and higher education sector. 
My study is founded on what C. Wright Mills (1959) called the “sociological imagination” 
which allows us “to understand the larger historical scene in terms of its meaning for the inner 
life and the external career of variety of individuals” by enabling us “to grasp history and 
biography and the relations between the two within society” (5-6). This study also began from 
“the urge to know the social and historical meaning of the individual in the society and in the 
period in which he has his quality and his being” (7). Therefore, in this study I delve into the 
inner landscape of individuals to understand both the ultimate social meaning that my informants 
produce through their biographies and the impact of the larger society on these individuals. 
To comprehend changing subjectivities of these geese-dad professors as South Korean 
intellectuals, I also consider, as one of basic theoretical frameworks, that the intellectual occupies 
an “emergent role” (Eyerman 1994, ix). That is, the role of intellectual is not fixed, but 
constructed and constantly reinvented in parallel with various historical, social, and cultural 
contexts through the actions of individuals of various intellectual generations (Boggs 1993; 
Eyerman 1994, Gramsci 1987, 1998; Hall 2003). With this perspective, I argue that South 
Korean intellectuals indeed have a unique history and distinctive tradition and legacy; their 
identities and roles have formed and continuously shifted in accordance with different historical 
contexts and historical specificities. It is from this perspective that I explore how contemporary 
South Korean intellectuals navigate and in some cases reinvent their tradition in the face of 
globalization at this historical juncture. 
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As I discuss in detail in chapter two, defining the “intellectual” is difficult. Although 
intellectuals (chisigin) are defined neither by class nor by occupation, I suggest in this study that 
the professor community in particular is a focal community of intellectuals in South Korea and 
works symbolically as an important reference group in a country which still sustains a strong 
Confucian-inspired legacy of respecting and valuing scholarship and scholars. Although I 
appreciate that professors are a heterogeneous group, nonetheless I claim that broadly they are 
held up as middle-class exemplars; they are imagined to be paragons of social consciousnesses, 
modernity, and high-culture (Chŏn 2006; Chŏng 1992; Etzioni-Halevy 1985; Eyerman 1994; 
Hong 2010; Kang 2001; Melzer, Weinberger and Zinman 2003; Rieff 1969; Said 1994). In this 
regard, my study on geese-dad professors as a symbolic subset of contemporary intellectuals 
shows not only ongoing shifts of ethos and paradigms among South Korean intellectual 
community, but also offers a rich window on larger cultural and social struggles in South Korea 
by providing vivid examples of shifting subjectivities and negotiation of the global-local. 
Diverting from most of scholarship on Korean intellectuals to date that focuses exclusively on 
ideology or historical biography, as the first ethnography with in-depth interviews of the private 
lives of contemporary South Korean intellectuals, this study contributes a unique and dynamic 
ethnographic reading of contemporary intellectuals who have long been imagined as a static 
collective, often with the image of nation-building nationalist intellectuals. Further, my study 
offers a broader window on intellectuals’ struggles in a transforming East Asia and even more 
broadly in developing countries in the face of globalization. 
Thus my work is situated at the intersection of globalization, transnational studies, and 
interdisciplinary ethnographic studies of contemporary South Korea. As Jonathan Friedman 
pointed out already in 1990s, global studies and especially globalization studies had become 
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somewhat of a “bandwagon” and the global “second nature” to many (1994, 1). There also have 
been vigorous debates on nation-states and cultural citizenship in our transnational world as well 
as on assimilation effects and local forms of resistance against the destructive effects of 
globalization with increasing transnational mobility of people from the end of 1980s (Appadurai 
1996; Basch et al. 1994; Bauman 1998, Beck 2000; Cheah and Robbins 1998; Friedman 1994; 
Held and McGrew 2003; Jameson and Miyoshi 1998; Ong 1999; Smith 1995). This study 
contributes not only a case study of the micro-processes of globalization in a specific local 
context by showing that how globalization challenges individuals’ lives and transforms their 
subjectivities in a society, but also an example of current scholarly debates on the transforming 
meaning and life of nationalism in the era of globalization. In addition, this research also adds a 
critical perspective to understanding of the effect of globalization on higher education as it shows 
how professors in South Korea experience the changes in their profession in the face of 
globalization and respond to their role as agents of internationalization in their universities in 
particular (Currie and Newson 1998; Sidhu 2006; Slaughter and Rhoades 2004). 
As briefly aforementioned, my study locates the recent development of geese-dad 
professors and the question of what it means to be an “ideal” intellectual in a changing world in 
the context of South Korea’s mid-1990s rapid democratization and globalization processes, and 
escalating neoliberal social and economic reforms, especially after the Economic Crisis (Kang 
2000; D. Kim. 2000; S. Kim 2000; Shin 2003). Most research to date on “geese families” in 
South Korea, however, has tended to focus on familial crisis, namely on the financial and 
psychological effects on family members, and tended to problematize geese families as the 
practice of giving up family values and integrity for instrumental purposes (Ch’oe 2005; Kim 
2009; S. Kim 2006; Kim and Chang 2004; Kim and Kim 2009; Ŏm 2002). As the phenomenon 
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has drawn more attention, there has been scholarship considering familial and social 
reproduction desires, relating these to the impact of globalization and the Economic Crisis; yet 
nearly uniform in this literature is the critique of the fetishism of English and the educational 
crisis (Cho 2002; Cho 2004; Cho and et al. 2007; Chung 2008; Finch and Kim 2012; Kim 2010; 
Kim and Yoon 2005; Lee and Koo 2006; O 2008; Son 2005; Yi 2008; Yi and Paek 2004). More 
recently, a few scholars have begun to look into South Korean cosmopolitan desires through this 
geese-family phenomenon (Abelmann and Kang 2014; Abelmann, Newendorp, and Lee-Chung 
2014; Ahn 2009; Lee 2010). 
Scholars generally have agreed with that the commonly shared motivations of ESA/geese 
family strategy (transnational split families for education in other East Asian countries as well, 
e.g., in the cases of the “astronaut” or “parachute kids” syndrome of Hong Kong and Taiwan) are 
most likely to converge into the parental desires of social reproduction or upward class mobility 
with their children’s acquisition of symbolic and cultural capital, English/foreign languages in 
particular (Ahn 2009; Cho 2002; Cho 2004; Cho and et al. 2007; Chung 2008; Finch and Kim 
2012; Huang and Yeoh 2005; Kim 2010; Kim and Yun 2005; Lee and Koo 2006; Ley and 
Kobayashi 2005; Mitchell 2004; O 2008; Ong 1999; Skeldon 1994; Son 2005; Waters 2003, 
2005; Yi 2008; Yi and Yu 2008). Because the neoliberal transformation in the shock of aftermath 
of the Economic Crisis almost coincides with the liberal humanist project of democratic 
individual freedom and rights at the post-authoritarian historical moment after democratization in 
South Korea (Shin 2011; Song 2010), the desire toward ESA/geese family was often uniformly 
thought of as parental education zeal, originating from social reproduction intention. In fact, the 
experience of the Economic Crisis, along with widespread discontent at educational system, was 
the most important impetus driving many South Korean parents to seek ESA because of intense 
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anxiety about their children’s future. After being shocked by the sudden collapse of economy, 
which was accompanied with unemployment, downward class mobility, and widening gap in 
wealth, and experiencing the hope of rosy future of democratized developed country shattered, it 
looks as if South Korean people -- the middle class in particular -- found themselves in a vortex 
of seemingly eternal competition, destined to make endless efforts to not fall behind in this 
neoliberal transformation especially with the state-leading rhetoric of globalization (segyehwa) 
and strong emphasis on competitiveness in global economy. Consequently, the interpretation of 
ESA/geese family practice as foremost a social reproduction effort seems quite reasonable. And 
it is undeniable as I delineated the intensity of South Korean parental efforts for their children’s 
future at the beginning of this chapter. Indeed, I began my study with this sort of approach. 
However, I argue that this interpretation does not encompass all the meanings of ESA/geese 
family phenomenon and fails to grasp both the transformative power of individuals’ transnational 
experiences and their ongoing longer-term effects. 
 
II. My Parallel Transformative Intellectual Journey  
I turn now to the ways in which my thinking about and perspectives on this dissertation 
project have transformed over the course of my field research. I think to share this transformation 
because of the way in which it parallels the transformative quality of my informants’ experiences. 
As aforementioned, my research on geese-dad professors began with my intellectual curiosity 
about how geese-dad professors manage the tension and ambivalence of being both: intellectuals 
who are asked to be socially responsible subjects (i.e., for both their university and the nation) 
and fathers who are mobilizing seemingly highly individualistic instrumental social 
reproduction/mobility strategies through educational migration. This means, I confess, that my 
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research was founded in the general, often value-ridden, social critique of the geese family (and 
its presumed accompanying educational zeal) as an individualistic/selfish strategy. Hence, I 
initially approached the topic with the perspectives of social reproduction and hegemony of the 
Establishment, drawing on Bourdieu, Althusser, and Gramsci’s theories. In this sense, my study 
probably could become another critique of the geese-family phenomenon, mostly critiquing both 
neoliberal regimes undergirding the phenomenon and intellectuals who integrate and follow this 
trend in order to sustain their cultural hegemony and class status. Of course, I do not ignore these 
issues and I still draw on those theories -- for example, Bourdieu’s reproduction theory and 
habitus -- since these geese-dad professors are mostly typical members of the middle class and 
also struggle with parental desires for children’s success like most South Korean parents in this 
rapidly changing social environment regardless of how they define “success” itself. 
However, what I found during my field research reached beyond these aspects: some of 
these geese-dad professors’ experiences went beyond the issue of intellectuals’ struggle for 
hegemony. Rather, I came to think that their experiences revealed certain paradigm shifts – ones 
that the individuals themselves were not always aware of. The more I conducted interviews with 
geese-dad professors, the more the transformative quality of geese-dad experiences stood out. 
The transformation happened when these fathers began to become aware that they were actually 
navigating uncharted water – a unfamiliar territory – of raising their children abroad, in contrast 
to their expectations and the confidence that they had enjoyed at the outset as “better prepared” 
fathers who themselves had studied abroad (mostly in host countries of children’s ESA). What 
they overlooked was that their young children would also develop their own aspirations and their 
own thinking about their lives for having grown up in foreign countries. These fathers were often 
baffled by their children’s post-national thinking in particular and came to realize that the 
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children did not have same references at all. Whether they started this transnational family 
project with an intention of social reproduction or not, through the quotidian struggles and 
micro-decisions of raising children abroad as fathers, I came to see that these professors 
themselves were adjusting and transforming in this process as fathers -- and even changing their 
own paradigm as South Korean intellectuals. Naturally, my interview questions had to be 
adjusted and expanded in order to learn more about whether those transformations exert an 
influence on or play a role in their professional lives. 
In this process, I came to realize that it was best to treat and understand their practices as 
revealing cultural phenomenon rather than objects of social critique. I realized the importance of 
asking how it was that what had begun as the fringe cultural practice for a few (for mostly the 
rich) had become a mainstream cultural phenomenon of the middle class. Over time I became 
critical of the prevailing analytical lens that could only apply a monolithic neoliberal framework 
to the geese-family phenomenon (i.e., considering individuals’ desire as only promoted and 
governed by state-leading neoliberal governmentality) while overlooking South Koreans’ 
yearning for cosmopolitan liberal selfhood with individual freedom and autonomy. Clearly, it 
seems that the South Korean state has controlled its citizens’ cosmopolitan liberal desires for its 
sake. On the one hand, it has mobilized globalization (segyehwa) discourses toward its citizens, 
often promoting “flexible citizenship” (Ong 1999), in order to raise its global competitiveness 
especially after the Economic Crisis; at the same time, however, the state has demanded loyalty 
from its citizens by both engineering neoliberal governmentality and emphasizing a sense of 
national belonging and responsibilities in the face of globalization. However, as I discuss in 
chapter four, it seems that some citizens like my informants are developing their own ideas about 
cosmopolitan and liberal selves, sometimes unwittingly. By “liberal,” I do not mean liberal 
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political system or economy, but rather based on philosophical liberal principles of liberty, 
individuality, dignity, equality, tolerance etc., more specifically I mean to refer to the notion of a 
“liberal” self with freedom and autonomy (Appiah 2005). Moreover, some of my informants 
revealed their thought that national identity could no longer represent a curb on the freedom and 
autonomy of individuals anymore in this globalizing world. They yearned, especially for their 
children, for the freedom to be able to identify themselves as they want; to choose their own way 
of life; and the right to decide what is good or bad for themselves. 
Based on Foucauldian notions of governmentality, many scholars have repeatedly 
discussed the relations between modern liberal technologies of the self and neoliberal 
governmentality in contemporary societies (Foucault 1988, 1991; Hoffman 2006, 2010; Rofel 
2006; Song 2010; Yan 2003). As Jesook Song (2010) points out, “It is historically inaccurate to 
assume that liberalism is inherently more benign than neoliberalism” (133). Indeed it is difficult 
to discern between liberal and neoliberal attempts, and people’s yearning for a liberal self could 
be often exploited/appropriated by neoliberal regimes, as Song discusses in her study that single 
South Korean women, who pursue independent liberal selves, become “engineers of optimizing 
Korean neoliberal markets without being aware of the connection between the liberal ethos and 
the neoliberal market” (133-134). Especially, in South Korean case, it is much harder to 
distinguish one from another since the liberal humanist project after the democratization was 
rapidly replaced by the strong neoliberal transformation after the Economic Crisis, even before 
the emergence of South Koreans’ yearning for liberal self and democratic society with individual 
freedom, right, and autonomy which only started to spring up after the democratization but was 
not yet achieved. However, why is it not possible to interpret conversely: that is, instead of 
thinking that the liberal subjectivity is appropriated by neoliberal capitalism and people passively 
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or unwittingly assimilate to it, some people, at least, try to resist – wittingly or unwittingly -- 
neoliberal regimes, pursuing the liberal subjectivity?  Is this a too naïve trial? What I want to 
emphasize here is that whether my informants’ practices were born in liberal or neoliberal 
motivations, some of them were actually transforming. 
In fact it is a difficult, if not impossible, task to separate those two (liberal vs. neoliberal) 
elements from my informants’ accounts, although it seems like that my informants were also torn 
between neoliberal ethos of the society in general and their profession and their personal liberal 
yearning for their children and themselves. Yet, in this study I try to show that there is something 
more than the desire just to meet the neoliberal demands in their transnational educational 
practice. And I especially pay attention to the accompanying transformative quality of the 
practice while exploring what makes my informants willing to go beyond their existing 
paradigms, based on their own accounts. Some might make choices and actions assimilating to 
neoliberal logics, but some might resist to it, often seeking for alternative way of living for their 
children although sometimes they looked as if seemingly identical. However, even if it does not 
happen to the all of my informants, the “transformation” itself that they showed in the process is 
too significant to be ignored. Ralph W. Emerson puts it, “Society is a wave. The wave moves 
onward, but the water of which it is composed does not. The same particle does not rise from the 
valley to the ridge. Its unity is only phenomenal” (1993(1841), 37). Seemingly the identical does 
not mean the actual identical, but each particle makes the wave. Also this finding may be applied 
to understand other transnational cultural practices which are getting increasingly common in 
South Korea, among young people in particular, such as study abroad, backpacking abroad, and 
the practice of working holidays, etc. This approach may be useful more broadly in order to 
comprehend possible ongoing or future socio-cultural changes in South Korean society. And 
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further I wonder to what extent growing transnational experiences of people and their 
transformative qualities have potentiality as an impetus to bring the changes in individuals and 
society. 
Therefore, in this study, I set it as an ultimate goal in a broader sense to find a clue of that 
potentiality through the experiences of geese-dad professors’ engagement of global processes. If 
one keeps the fact in mind that intellectuals are the people who lead social ethos and also whose 
paradigms are hardly changed by others, witnessing their paradigm shifts may signify the 
possibility of changes to come in the society. In addition to the deeper understanding of 
subjectivities of South Korean intellectuals today, I hope this study contributes to better 
comprehension of transnational cultural phenomenon occurring in South Korean society these 
days, paying more attention to the process that South Koreans develop their cosmopolitan liberal 
yearning and its eventual effects on their thought and patterns of behavior. 
 
III. Methodologies and Positioning as a Researcher 
For this study, I conducted 10 months of ethnographic field research from September 
2009 to June 2010 in South Korea. My field research included twenty eight in-depth oral 
interviews with geese-dad professors, participant observation, textual research, and media and 
public discourse analysis. My field research focused on Seoul-based professors: Seoul is South 
Korea’s capital and largest city and arguably represents one of the world’s greatest cases of the 
centralization of cultural, social, educational, and political resources in a single city; thus in a 
sense, becoming Seoul-based professors often signify their established status in South Korean 
academic community and society in general. The 28 informants primarily are/were geese dad 
professors at the time of the interviews, who sent their own children abroad for pre-college 
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education and who also studied abroad themselves primarily in the United States (except for one 
who studied abroad in England and one in Canada). Seven fathers have already completed their 
geese-dad lives (I paid attention to the fact that there might be differences between the accounts of 
fathers who already finished the family project and those who are still doing it); most fathers have 
sent their children abroad in 2000s, except five fathers in 1990s; and most of their children 
resided in foreign countries at the time of interviews. The duration of most family separation 
ranged from four months to close to 10 years -- with one informant’s separation from family 
reached 17 years. They are employed by twelve universities -- from top-tier to lower-tier 
universities -- in the Seoul metropolitan area, except one who works at a provincial national 
university. My research subjects represent seven academic areas: humanities (7), social sciences 
(7), natural sciences, (5) engineering (5), business (2), and one in education and one in sciences 
of sports. They ranged in age from the early 40s to the early 60s at the time of interview, and in 
academic position from newly hired assistant professors to four deans. 
My informant pool has a few exceptions in light of my initial plan that targeted Seoul-
based geese-dad professors who had studied abroad: more accurately speaking, it included five 
professors who were not geese dads but sent only their children abroad for pre-college education 
(i.e., their wives remained in South Korea) and one geese-dad professor who works at a 
provincial national university. I included them because they rather gave me an opportunity to 
compare them to my standard informant pool and I found that their motivations or patterns of 
practices were not much different from the other geese-dad professors. Yet, among those five 
who sent only their children abroad, one professor who himself had not studied abroad provided 
me with the critical opportunity to compare the cases between fathers who had studied abroad 
and who had not, as I introduce in chapter three. 
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The face-to-face in-depth oral interviews were conducted in Korean taking two hours on 
average and consisted of semi-structured open-ended questions. Most interviews were carried out 
in participants’ offices, although a few were held at conference rooms, participant’s home, and 
coffee shops at their request. One interview was conducted in a college town in the U.S. when 
the geese dad visited his family. I digitally recorded all the interviews with the consents of the 
interviewees, later transcribed them in Korean, and finally translated into English. Thus all the 
translations in this dissertation are my own unless otherwise noted. Participants were assured of 
their anonymity, and pseudonyms have been used throughout. In addition to pseudonyms, for 
their anonymity I try to avoid revealing specific university names or disciplines by using broader 
indication, e.g., Professor Kim (humanities, 49) in a top-tier university. 
I contacted my informants using my personal networks as well as snowball sampling in 
which the researcher asks participants to recommend other individuals. Although I tried to 
compose my informant pool in as an inclusive manner as possible, I should acknowledge the 
possible limitation that they might have allowed for the interview because they were somewhat 
satisfied with or had more positive feelings on their own transnational educational projects for 
children. Also, despite the fact that this study is related to the geese-family phenomenon; that 
mothers usually play more roles as an educational manager closely keeping track of children than 
fathers as I illustrated at the beginning of this chapter; so mothers usually accompany with their 
children when they go abroad, in this study I do not deal with the gender (with an omission of 
mothers’ role and perception) and familial issues in-depth.3 I focus more on the discussion of my 
informants’ shifting subjectivities as fathers and also professors/intellectuals while they engage 
with the geese-family phenomenon and their university roles as campus globalizers – I hope I 
can discuss those issues that I could not deal with in this dissertation in-depth in my future study. 
                                                 
3
 See Ahn’s dissertation (2009) for the recent scholarly discussion focusing on geese mothers’ practices in English. 
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I used in-depth oral interviews as my primary fieldwork method because I was convinced 
that the interview format would constitute a powerful and feasible research method for my 
research. I envisioned that the interview format would allow my research subjects to express 
their inner thoughts about being geese dads that might otherwise be difficult to express given the 
social ambivalence about the practice, and some interviewees seemed to grasp the situation “as 
an exceptional opportunity offered to them to testify, to make themselves heard”  (Bourdieu 
1993b, 615). Indeed, after the interview, one of my informants appreciated that he could learn 
more about himself by organizing and expressing his own thought through the interview: of what 
he actually thought and felt about his own experiences as a geese-dad professor and some aspects 
that he could not fully realize before they were uttered as his words during the interview. During 
the interviews I especially paid close attention to apparent contradictions both within single 
speech acts and over time, contradictions that were often lost on the interviewees themselves 
(Strauss 2005). I also paid attention to “implicitness” and “assumptions” in their accounts in 
order to understand the social meanings that they produce through their words (Fairclough 2003). 
In order to avoid the “dangers of misinterpretation” of my informants’ accounts while 
doing this study, I tried to be aware of the possible performative aspect of interviews or cover-up 
rhetoric/masking of interviewees since interviewees as well as the researchers can feel anxious 
about “making private words public” through interviews (Bourdieu1993a, 1). In a sense, this 
aspect is what I worried the most before I conducted the interviews since my informants are not 
only highly intelligent people but also very well connected professionals in particular so that the 
interview led many of my informants to worry about the confidentiality. 
Here, I feel obliged to introduce my position as a researcher to help the reader to better 
understand the kind of subjective lens that has informed this study and how I built rapport with 
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my informants. Ravinder Sidhu notes, “How researchers receive, interpret, and transmit the 
findings of their work is mediated by individual histories and positioning” (2006, xviii). 
Moreover, the importance of positioning and establishing a rapport with informants is an issue of 
trust between researcher and research subjects. Researchers have often expressed concern over 
how researchers should overcome their research fallacy and dilemmas including ethical issues, 
generated from the different positions between researchers and their research subjects in terms of 
race, gender, and class (Duneier 1999; Twine 2000; Stacey 1991; Yan 2008). Mostly they worry 
about the researcher’s exploitation of research subjects, caused by unequal relationship between 
researcher and research subjects. With self-awareness to avoid danger of ethical pitfall, it is 
important to build the trust between a researcher and research subjects for a successful 
ethnographic research. 
However, unlike the research utilizing participant observation as a primary method, 
which a researcher can gradually build up a rapport with informants with repeated contacts 
during relatively longer period, one-time interviews like mine usually do not allow enough time 
to build rapport with informants. So before starting my fieldwork, although it may sound funny, 
in addition to the basic concerns about recruiting interviewees, I especially worried about 
unequal relationship between a researcher (me) and research subjects (my informants) in a 
different way:  what if I would be controlled or manipulated by my own informants with their 
ability to control the conversational situation and their language skills because, above of all, my 
informants were all well-established “professors” who were highly intelligent and I was a 
graduate “student”? What if they would test me or evaluate my performance as an interviewer as 
I am conducting an interview, especially, when my informants themselves are social scientists? 
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In a sense, it is a kind of the reversal hierarchical situation between researcher and research 
subjects! With my somewhat shy personality, I felt a bit intimidated and uneasy as a researcher. 
Yet, I found myself in a unique position as a researcher and it helped me to overcome 
those anxieties during the interviews: despite my gender difference, we actually had a great deal 
in common. Their stories are almost mine, my husband’s, and my family’s story. I am one of 
those geese mothers in same generation as most of my informants; I study abroad to attain a PhD 
degree in the U.S. as my informants once did; and as an academic, I am aspiring to be a professor 
and ultimately to live as an intellectual. As the researcher who shares some degree of similar 
experiences with my informants, I am part of the world being studied/those who are studied and 
not a detached observer/researcher (Yan 2008). During interviews, it seemed my informants 
gradually knew that I understood what they said, what they felt, and what they meant. Sometimes, 
I was surprised by my informants’ very earnest answers that I had really hoped for but did not 
imagine could be realized. From time to time, it was indeed a challenge to keep a firm objective 
position as a researcher while I shared their experiences and emotions and oftentimes could 
empathize with them. This presents some limits but also at the same time some advantages. A 
strength also can be a weakness, as a coin always has two sides. My own similar, familiar 
experience and understanding of informants and also my concerns over their privacy sometimes 
hindered my ability to delve into some issues with greater depth and in greater detail. Because I 
thought that I already knew about it or I should not ask about it, I sometimes missed some details. 
Yet, overall, I believe that my subject position allows me insight and helps me to examine and 
interpret the people/the world that I study by bringing me more closely “into the heart of” their 
world (Geertz 1973, 18). 
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While writing this dissertation, I especially try to be aware of “how a topic or theme is 
named and developed can implicitly privilege some voices and perspectives and exclude others” 
(Emerson, Fretz, and Shaw1995, 173-4). As I already mentioned above, my research has evolved 
based on the data that I got from the interviews and I have tried to maintain objective scholarship 
and to be fair to the people in this study. As Bourdieu puts it, the worst way of reading text 
would no doubt be “the moralizing reading” (1977b, X).  I hope my readers also understand that 
I have zero intention to either moralize or justify/celebrate their stories (their ideas and practices) 
through this study. 
 
IV. Overview of Contents/Chapter Outline 
The structure of this dissertation is as follow. Chapter 2 discusses the legacy of South 
Korean intellectuals through historicizing how collective identities have been formed and 
transformed through different historical contexts. It also examines the socio-cultural location of 
contemporary South Korean intellectuals, more specifically professors, at this historical juncture 
of the 21
st
 century in terms of with what kinds of challenges that they have faced over last two 
decades; what has made possible the emergence of geese-dad professors. In this chapter, I try to 
establish the basis for understanding why I identify both professors with intellectuals and a group 
of geese-dad professors with a symbolic subset of South Korean intellectuals in this study, while 
offering the context of the emergence of “geese-dad” professors and giving a brief account why 
the phenomenon is out of ordinary in light of the tradition of South Korean intellectuals. 
Chapter 3 examines professoriate geese families’ normative course of early study abroad 
and geese-dad professors’ own accounts of their educational strategy.  I suggest that, with the 
significant advantages they have, professoriate geese families have been at the forefront of the 
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geese-family phenomenon -- their example has served as a veritable template for this trend. 
However, many of these professors tend to differentiate their own “geese-family making” from 
that of others -- a tendency that, I argue, works to mask their own privilege and efforts for social 
reproduction. They consider their own “geese-family making” and their practical advantages in 
its execution as an “inevitable” and “natural” outcome of their own study-abroad experiences 
rather than a privilege that elites enjoy. It is clear that the father’s own study-abroad experience 
and occupation as a professor function as the source of this sense of inevitability and privilege; 
and these are the most significant cultural capitals that allow them to make their family project 
possible and relatively more successful from start to finish. Geese-dad professors have thus 
emerged as ambivalent figures: as simultaneously competent fathers who can be proud of their 
pioneering spirit and as self-wounded intellectuals whose practices with an individualistic social 
reproduction strategy seemingly run against the social imaginary of respectable professors. 
Chapter 4 explores how these professors go through the experiences of “personalized 
globalization,” raising their children abroad and how new meanings are being fashioned in this 
process. Their “geese-family making” was something larger than mere familial social 
reproduction through the accrual of cultural capital or the making of flexible citizens who can 
survive the changing global political economy. I found that many of these professors undergo a 
paradigm shift in their thinking about the nation and the global via their experiences of raising 
children abroad. Their thinking develops as they negotiate the gap between the ideals and reality 
of nurturing and identifying with their children abroad. These fathers are often baffled by their 
children’s post national thinking in particular and torn between their own nationalist sentiment 
and cosmopolitan desire for children to live a meaningful life as well-rounded, competent 
cosmopolitans. However, I argue that these fathers also vicariously nurture their own desires for 
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cosmopolitan and autonomous liberal subjectivities through the adventurous globalization 
project of their children. 
Chapter 5 looks at these geese-dad professors’ role as campus globalizers. I argue that the 
professors also experience ambivalence about the impact of globalization on their profession. 
South Korean universities have striven for arguably one of the world’s most aggressive state-
mobilized globalization programs for universities and they demand professors to play a role as 
agents in the imperative to globalize their universities. Faculty, especially those with 
international pasts, such as these geese-dad professors, are mobilized to activate their own 
international networks and skills in the service of the internationalization and capitalization of 
higher education. Although most of these geese-dad professors, who often feel that they cannot 
go against the current, play critical roles as campus globalizers by actively contributing to the 
internationalization of their own universities, they nonetheless struggle with ambivalent feelings 
about the intense neoliberal demands imposed in their profession and the uniform directions of 
internationalization from both their institutions and the state. How they perceive, embrace, or 
resist their newly given role as campus globalizers is varied, but for some professors the 
reluctance came from their perception that the internationalization of higher education operates 
according to a very centralized metric-driven instrumentalism, focusing on competitions and 
showiness, rather than by the cosmopolitan ideals of genuine internationalization. 
Chapter 6 concludes with a discussion of the identity crisis that these professors are going 
through in transforming South Korea today. I suggest that the professors develop new ideas 
about the role of professors and their responsibilities as intellectuals in South Korean society. As 
I introduce through the chapters, they struggle to negotiate the challenges they face as fathers and 
professors especially in the face of globalization. While the society still considers and expects 
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them to act as a group of intellectuals, who are supposed to be paragons of social 
consciousnesses and play a leadership role in their society, based on traditional paradigm; many 
of these professors instead define their role more as that of a professional. Nonetheless, they are 
not free from those expectations and responsibilities. I argue that they are caught between 
nostalgia for the professor who enjoys the aura of respectable, privileged intellectuals and new 
ideals of the autonomous professionals who are unrestrained by collective identity and freely 
pursues their individual academic excellence and personal goals, while contributing to the 
society with their professional knowledge, which would in turn allow them new 
authority/hegemony. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
CAUGHT IN BETWEEN: THE LEGACY OF SOUTH KOREAN INTELLECTUALS AND 
THE EMERGENCE OF “GEESE-DAD” PROFESSORS 
Examining the path of education for their children chosen by elite university professors in 
humanities or social sciences with U.S. doctorate would bring very intriguing results. 
Majority of them raise their children in the U.S. There is even a joke that a certain 
department in a university has faculty meetings in the U.S. during [summer or winter] 
breaks because they all end up visiting the U.S. to see their children every break. Asking 
professors about a mission of intellectuals sounds rather ludicrous in this context. The so-
called mission more appropriately serves the geese dads. (Kyunghyang Shinmun Team of 
reporters for special coverage 2008, 76) 
 
In 2007, Kyunghyang Shinmun (Kyŏnghyang Sinmun), a daily news paper in South 
Korea, published a special feature series on South Korean intellectuals, “20 years after 
Democratization, the Death of the Intellectual (Minjuhwa 20nyŏn, chisigin ŭi chugŭm).”4 The 
series asked whether South Korean intellectuals -- privileged people who enjoyed honor/respect, 
money, and power — were in fact really contributing to society. Further, the series proclaimed 
the “death” of intellectuals in South Korean society. In particular, it problematized intellectuals’ 
-- in fact mostly professors’ -- pursuit of power and politics after democratization, captured by 
the neologism “polifessor (polipesŏ).”  Although there had been sporadic criticism of 
intellectuals, this series drew enormous attention both inside and outside of the intellectual 
community, especially because of its timely publication, coinciding perfectly with the various 
moves of intellectuals in the on-going presidential election at that time.
5
 
Meanwhile, another move of a certain group of professors, in a different vein, was 
drawing attention within the professor community. Becoming a so-called “geese-dad” has 
                                                 
4
 This series of seventeen feature articles was originally published in Kyunghyang Shinmun from April to July 2007, 
but later they were published in book form, which I use here. See Kyunghyang Shinmun Tŭkpyŏlch’wijaetim (Team 
of reporters for special coverage) (2008). 
5
 This tendency has not changed much even after the election; rather Koreans find similar moves of professors again 
in 2012, the year of another presidential election. Quite a number of professors campaigned in each camp for 
presidential candidates. 
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become a newly developing trend within the professor community. This educational strategy of 
Korean professors to send their young children and wives to Western countries for education 
while they stay alone in South Korea has become especially popular among the professors who 
themselves studied abroad. The excerpt above is a professor’s comment on the commonness of 
geese-dad professors these days, cited in one of the Kyunghyang Shinmun feature articles I 
mentioned above. When this professor told the story above to the reporter, who had asked him 
about the mission of intellectuals, he had called it a “heartbreaking story” (kasŭm ap’ŭn iyagi). 
His comments clearly reveal the professor community’s self-deprecating, ambivalent sentiments 
about geese-dad professors. Yet, certain questions immediately arise. What is the rationale 
behind this criticism? Why do geese-dad professors necessarily betray the mission of 
intellectuals? Which actions of geese-dad professors are presumed to run against intellectuals’ 
mission? Further, we can ask: what is then the expected mission of South Korean intellectuals 
today? How do intellectuals themselves perceive these expectations? Are their subjectivities 
extending beyond existing paradigms? What are the implications of these struggles to both 
individuals and the society? These are the questions I engage in this dissertation. 
Regardless of how thorough these journalistic analyses were and whether the ongoing 
criticism of professors (as a prominent subset of South Korea intellectuals) was convincing, they 
certainly presented contemporary South Korean intellectuals with painful critiques.  Further, they 
also suggested that something must be going on inside of South Korean intellectual community.  
The death of intellectuals, however, is certainly not novel ground. In the West, volumes 
of writing about the intellectual proclaimed his or her death decades ago. Today in the West the 
death of the intellectual has become something of a platitude, and it seems that the “intellectual” 
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himself no longer draws the special attention of the public.
6
 For South Korea, I ask, why does the 
intellectual matter now and why is his death still fresh? What makes some or many contemporary 
South Koreans believe or at least suspect the death of intellectuals? And in so proclaiming, what 
kind of images of the authentic intellectual do they draw in their mind? What are the “imagined” 
identities and the social-cultural location of South Korean intellectuals in their society? And 
what are intellectuals’ self-perceptions? 
I suggest that South Korean intellectuals face challenges in figuring out their new 
location in a changing society at this historical juncture. In this chapter, I first explore how the 
collective/imagined identities and legacies of South Korean intellectuals have been formed and 
transformed through different historical contexts. I next examine the social context that has 
challenged the socio-cultural location of contemporary South Korean intellectuals over the last 
two decades and that has made possible the emergence of “geese-dad” professors. At the same 
time, I discuss why I identify professors with intellectuals and consider a certain group of geese-
dad professors (my informants) as a symbolic subset of South Korean intellectuals. I also ask 
how intellectuals’ individual/personal “geese-family” practice can be perceived and interpreted 
in different ways in light of South Korean intellectuals’ legacies. 
 
I. The Intellectual’s Emergent Role 
I contend that the intellectual occupies an “emergent role” (Eyerman 1994, ix).  That is, 
the role of the intellectual is not fixed but constructed and constantly reinvented in parallel with 
various historical, social, and cultural contexts “through the actions of individuals of various 
                                                 
 
6
 Jean-Franҫois Lyotard, in his article “Tombeau de l’intellectuel” (The Fall of the Intellectual), argues that 
intellectuals do not exist anymore in the postmodern condition (1993). For more discussions on intellectuals in the 
postmodern era, see also Zygmunt Bauman (1987). There have been many discussions of intellectuals’ death or 
disappearance: see Régis Debray (2001); Frank Furedi (2004); Melzer, Weinberger, and Zinman (2003).   
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intellectual generations” (x).7 With this perspective, I argue that South Korean intellectuals, 
indeed, have a unique history and distinctive tradition; their identities and roles have formed and 
continuously shifted in accordance with different historical contexts and historical specificities. 
Before introducing the distinctiveness of the South Korean intellectual tradition and how it has 
been molded, it is necessary to look at the general definitions of the intellectual, especially those 
which have influenced the South Korean intellectuals’ identities – on defining who is an 
“authentic” intellectual, although they mainly originate from Western societies. 
 
A. Who is an Intellectual? 
 “There has been no major revolution in modern history without intellectuals; conversely 
there has been no major counterrevolutionary movement without intellectuals (Said 1994, 10).” 
Who, then, are intellectuals? 
Ever since the term “intellectuals” as a new social identity first appeared in the Dreyfus 
Affair
8
 in France at the end of 19
th
 century, defining the term has been challenging. Many 
scholars have thus tended to characterize the term as controversial, vague, and inconsistent 
because there are so many different intellectual functions and complex meanings. Indeed, it is 
hard to observe objective or pre-existing boundaries of the activities and category of intellectuals 
(Barber 1998; Bauman 1987; Nettle 1969).  One can just grasp the vague idea that intellectuals 
“actually deal with and often conflate” knowledge, the different types of ideas and symbols 
                                                 
7
 Also see Carl Boggs (1993); Antonio Gramsci (1987, 5-23; 1998, 210-6). 
8
 The Dreyfus Affair as a political scandal broke out in France in 1894, when Alfred Dreyfus, a Jewish officer in the 
French Army, was convicted of espionage for Germany. The incident polarized French politics and society (and 
other European countries) in two: people took sides either for or against Dreyfus although it eventually turned out to 
be a false accusation a few years later.  During the incident, Emile Zola, a famous French writer, played the role of 
the main defender of Dreyfus by refuting the evidence of the charge as forged by anti-Semitic officers and also 
calling upon justice and human rights. In the aftermath of the Dreyfus Affair, ‘intellectuals” became a term in 
popular use. Also, the French intellectual tradition was molded after Zola (Eyerman 1994, 53-63). 
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(Barber 1998, 5). Thus, not only is it nearly impossible to review all the definitions of and views 
on intellectuals that have been made, but it is also beyond both my capability and the purpose of 
this chapter. More importantly, as Zigmunt Bauman points out, the category of intellectuals can 
never be “definitionally self-sufficient” (1987, 18). Still, looking into a few of the definitions 
here, which have been generally regarded as influential perspectives of classical/traditional role 
of intellectuals and also have had strong impacts on South Korean intellectuals’ consciousness, 
provides some meaningful insights into the nature and function of intellectuals for future 
discussion in this study. 
To define intellectuals, some scholars, Lewis Coser and Edward Shils among them, take 
the phenomenological approach that emphasizes the natural qualities of intellectuals as gifted 
individuals of unusual quality (Eyerman 1994; Shils 1969). However, many more others take a 
structural approach in defining intellectuals by considering social structure and function at the 
same time. For instance, Antonio Gramsci thinks that intellectuals are historically and 
generationally formed. According to him, everyone could be an intellectual from the viewpoint 
of human potential, but who actually becomes an intellectual depends only on social conditions. 
In his view, intellectuals are not just elites or leaders of a movement, but people who use their 
minds and cultural heritage to make judgments and act politically. He formulated the new 
concept of the “organic intellectual” who works consciously to develop/organize the cultural and 
political capacities of his or her own class (Eyerman, 82-3; Gramsci 1987, 5-23). In the 1980s in 
particular South Korean intellectuals were strongly influenced by Gramsci’s notion of the 
“organic intellectual.” 
Especially in the European intellectual tradition, being an intellectual also means taking 
social responsibility and political stances in addition to engaging in creative mental activities. 
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Julien Benda, Karl Manheim, and Jean-Paul Sartre all call upon intellectuals to act in specific 
ways. In the 1920s Benda (1928) attacked his contemporary intellectuals (“clerks” in his term) 
who abandoned intellectuals’ moral responsibility and universal values, succumbing to the cult 
of nationalism and political passions. Manheim, with utopian vision, developed the notion of the 
“free-floating intelligentsia” armed with self-consciousness, that is, “a social stratum relatively 
free of economic class interests, capable of acting as a creative political force in modern society,” 
and “providing society with an interpretation of itself” as its salient social task (Eyerman 1994, 
87-91).  According to Manheim, the new intelligentsia transcends partisan knowledge and class 
interests (Barber1998, 19). Sartre, on the other hand, created the role of the “resistance-
intellectual” by taking an active stand on politics as he attempted to maintain his intellectual 
activities for freedom through writings and also with spoken words based upon intellectual 
reflection and conviction under foreign occupation. Sartre recreated the classic role of actively 
engaged and critical intellectuals in post-war society and became a role model in the “movement 
intellectual” tradition (Eyerman 173-5; Sartre 2007). Sartre, in particular, had a huge impact on 
the formation of critical intellectuals in South Korea in the 1960s. Many South Korean 
intellectuals in their specific historical context admired him as a symbol of intellectuals and, 
from then on, the role of critical intellectuals has been seen as a predominant characteristic of the 
South Korean intellectual tradition as I examine below. 
However, Michel Foucault (1991b, 68-70) interprets intellectuals more politically and 
devalues intellectual authority. He claims that discourses of knowledge are in fact expressions of 
power relations and embodiments of power. Thus intellectuals and their discourses of knowledge 
are not politically pure. According to Foucault, “the universal intellectual” like Sartre, who spoke 
for a universal and abstract idea of human rights mostly through writing, is no longer a 
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politically acceptable role. Rather Foucault argues that “the specific intellectual” who uses 
specialized knowledge for a social purpose is the appropriate example for our time. Foucault’s 
post-modern notion of intellectuals will give some insights later when I discuss contemporary 
South Korean intellectuals in chapter six. 
In the U.S., functionalist Talcott Parsons (1969) tried to define the intellectual as a role in 
a particular social system. In his view, the intellectual is a person who “put[s] cultural 
considerations above [the] social in defining the commitments by virtue of which his primary 
role and position are significant as contributions to valued outcomes of his action” (3-4). In this 
respect, an intellectual is distinguished from organization executive or official expert whose 
work remains confined to institutions. 
Edward Said (1994) also developed his own definition of the “true intellectuals” although 
it seems that his notion of intellectuals shares features of the ideas of Manheim, Benda, and 
Sartre. According to him, the true intellectual is the critical and totally independent dissenter who 
speaks truth to power, and so becomes exile and marginal. Intellectuals are people who confront 
orthodoxy and dogma and cannot easily be co-opted by governments or corporations. Said’s 
notion of the intellectual is, in short, the “pure ideologist,” and it is somewhat “utopian” 
definition of the intellectual (Barber 1998, 16-21). It seems that, to a great extent, the image of 
an “authentic” intellectual in South Korean imagination is close to Said’s notion of the 
intellectual. In some sense, the Kyunghyang Shinmun news articles that I mentioned in the 
beginning of this chapter are illustrations of an effort to redefine the “true” or “pure” intellectuals 
in South Korean society and the struggle to find out in which way intellectuals can play a 
contributing role for society at this moment. 
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The literature on intellectuals is endless, yet it seems that contrary to the 
phenomenological approach that focuses on individual quality and thus has difficulty saying 
anything about intellectuals as a group, the structural approach sees intellectuals as a general 
social category with particular political behavior and social roles and provides a more persuasive 
perspective. Instead of taking one side of these two positions, Ron Eyerman (1994) attempts to 
develop “a processual conception of intellectuals which is sensitive to both phenomenological 
and structural points of view.” He argues that “the idea of the intellectual itself has a history” and 
“how we understand the term intellectual depends to a great extent upon the cultural traditions 
alive in a society and the reasons for this” (3). As one of main theoretical frameworks of my 
research on South Korean intellectuals, I adopt Eyeman’s approach that is “sensitive to historical 
and cultural context” and that views the intellectual “as part of an historical process in which 
human actors reinvent cultural traditions in different context” (3-4).  I do so because I believe 
that applying his approach allows for “a perspective on intellectuals that takes into account the 
historically structured constraints on the possibilities of action and the desires of individuals and 
collectives to redefine and reinterpret those constraints” (3). With this approach, I first examine 
how socio-political and cultural changes of South Korea of certain time-periods have 
transformed South Korean intellectuals’ identities and tasks, and how certain types of collective 
identities have emerged at particular moments. I start by describing how the tradition of state-
engaging intellectuals in pre-modern Korea was drastically altered by the experiences of 
Japanese colonialism and how, since then, South Koreans have struggled to reinvent new 
intellectual traditions in a conflict-ridden contentious society while trying to redefine the role of 
“true” and “pure” intellectuals in each given historical context. 
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II. Literati, the Prototype of Korean Intellectuals Today 
Through the discussions above, we now understand that intellectuals are defined by 
neither a class nor an occupation. Rather, they are a social category of people performing the task 
of making fundamental notions of a society conscious and visible, as many intellectuals 
themselves argue. Their collective identity forms around other kinds of interests than those 
related to social position or social status, although it is true that some particular occupational 
groups like writers, professors, scholars, journalists, and artists are more likely understood as 
intellectuals in practice (Bauman 1987, 1-2, 21; Eyerman 1994, 6). Then, what has the social 
category of intellectuals meant in Korean society? Where did it originate from? Who are the ones 
who have been most likely to perform this role? 
Even though the idea of intellectuals is a relatively modern concept or a “rather late 
arising Western phenomenon” (Melzer, Weinberger, and Zinman 2003, xi), I prudently suggest 
that one can still identify people who performed intellectuals’ tasks in traditional Korean society. 
Although the colonial experience severed Korean modern intellectuals from this tradition, in the 
pre-modern Chosŏn period (1392-1910), literati (sadaebu or sŏnbi) in general performed roles 
similar to those of modern intellectuals, as both scholars and government officials, without any 
conflict. There certainly was the stipulation that they should be inheritors of yangban
9
 status in 
order to be literati, unlike modern intellectuals who are not limited by social status. Chosŏn 
literati, as elites, strove to become capable politicians and also idealistic moral men with 
excellent scholarly achievements. They followed Neo-Confucian ideals and practiced the Neo-
                                                 
9
 Yangban literally means “the members of the ‘two orders’ of officialdom who served as civil or military officials” 
(Eckert et al. 1990, 108). As many scholars point out, it has been a difficult problem clarifying which specific 
criteria determined the membership of yangban. However, yangban were at the top of the social pyramid as a ruling 
class and they were the people who inherited their status and prestige like land, wealth, education, and public office 
from their forebears. As elites of Chosŏn, they constituted not more than ten percent of the total population (Eckert 
et al. 1990; Deuchler 1992; Kawashima 2002; Palais1991). 
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Confucian righteousness and politics in the public sphere while also attempting to become kunja 
(moral men) who kept their integrity in their personal lives. To them, ideally, the world should 
be a harmonious unity, in which the public and private realms could not be separated by different 
standards. They had “the spiritual duty of providing leadership in society by promoting and 
observing the rules of propriety and rectification of names” (Sangbaek Yi, cited in Kawashima 
2002, 6-7). They were not only political elites who shared power as officials, but also intellectual 
social elites (7). Although literati ideally pursued becoming government-official scholars, some 
did indeed become bureaucrats as a government official while others preferred to remain 
Confucian scholars without official appointments (Chŏng 2000; Eckert et al. 1990, 98, 108-9; Ha 
1998, 535-42; Kawashima 2002). Here, one might ask: how could a bureaucrat be considered an 
intellectual? In order to answer, first it is necessary to pay attention to the characteristics of 
literati. 
There was a difference between Korean intellectuals and Western intellectuals in pre-
modern society in terms of intellectuals’ social meaning and status, although the modern 
category of intellectuals was not yet fully defined. While Chosŏn intellectuals, literati, in general 
played leadership roles as social, cultural, and political powerhouses and moral exemplars in 
society, Western intellectuals, on the other hand, were foremost functionaries (Bauman 1987, 21-
37; Chŏn 2006, 43-44; Eckert et al. 1990, 108-109; Ha 1998, 534). In pre-modern Western 
society, according to Mannheim, intellectuals served one patron after another, i.e., serving first 
the church, then the state, and finally being able to make a living with knowledge on the 
marketplace with the advent of modern education and the development of a collective social 
consciousness (Eyerman 1994, 89). Even within East Asia, there were differences in the role of 
the literati among countries. For example, the pre-modern Chinese bureaucracy was “an 
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instrument of the emperor who called himself the Son of Heaven” as an absolute ruler. Therefore, 
in China, the emperor controlled and ultimately replaced the independent-minded aristocrats with 
able bureaucrats, who were loyal to the throne through civil and military examinations 
(Kawashima 2002, 25). 
In contrast, a king in Chosŏn was “subject to the moral and ethical standards of the 
Confucian kingship,” and, to yangban literati, the king was “first among equals, who deserved 
loyalty as long as he was good and benevolent” (Kawashima 2002, 22-25). Because kings were 
expected to be accountable for their moral action and the people’s welfare, the Censorate became 
a powerful organ maintaining checks and balance against the king, and kings were also subjected 
to daily loyal lectures by prominent scholar officials (Ch’oe 1975; Chŏng 2000; Haboush 1985; 
Kawashima 2002).
10
 Chosŏn literati were thus in no way simple bureaucrats or functionaries who 
could be controlled exclusively by the king. When we consider that French intellectuals who 
consolidated the new social identity of intellectuals around both moral and political 
responsibility after the Dreyfus Affair (1894-1906), Chosŏn literati’s characteristics share 
similarities with these modern/Western intellectuals from the beginning, except for the fact that 
Chosŏn literati were at the center of politics. 
In addition, Chosŏn literati, as scholar-officials, were neither merely scholars who 
pursued theoretical scholarship and knowledge, nor just bureaucrats. Chosŏn literati emphasized 
the importance of ethical living in accordance with Neo-Confucian doctrines and valued its 
realization in action. Governing others after moral training of oneself (sugi ch’iin chi hak 修己治
人之學) was emphasized: that is, they recognized the importance of the study of government 
(kyŏngse chi hak  經世之學), but that it should be derived from the study of one’s own 
improvement (wigi chi hak 爲己之學) (Kawashima 39; Ha 536-538). “[A] substantial number of 
                                                 
10
 See also Palais (1991) for the politics of the yangban elite; Haboush (1988) for Chosŏn Kingship. 
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the elite of early Chosŏn took a stern moral stance against what they saw as a political ethos of 
unbridled ambition and unprincipled pursuit of personal gain” (Eckert et al. 1990, 133). For 
instance, many literati adhered to high moral standards at the risk of their life when they thought 
King Sejo’s usurpation (1455) threatened Neo-Confucian moral principles. Sometimes their 
commitment to principle brought about literati purges (sahwa).
11
 In general, Confucian literati 
were largely respected as the basis of governance, and especially after the mid-sixteenth century, 
the local literati in private academies (sŏwŏn) in rural areas also actively promoted their 
ideological visions and engaged in public activities through petitions, sometimes challenging 
royal authority (Koo 2007; Yi 1987).
12
 To a great degree, their actions paralleled those of 
modern critical intellectuals. 
On the other hand, by passing the Civil Examination, a scholar could become a 
government official, who played a central social and political role in society; their role as state 
officials also honored and rewarded their families. Their roles as both scholars and government 
officials were successfully combined in the intellectual’s role according to Neo-Confucian 
ideals.
13
 Although I am not totally convinced by the argument that “‘yangban’ intellectuals in 
                                                 
11
 For literati purges in Chosŏn, see Edward W. Wagner (1974). Literati, sarim scholars, often took a risk to lose 
their lives or to be exiled with an unyielding spirit of adhering to their Neo-Confucian political ideals and 
challenging the king or leading powers/the old guard. Although, regarding to the literati purges in Chosŏn, some 
scholars point out the shallowness of the issues raised by sarim scholars, to render a historical judgment, which is 
based on Neo-Confucian moral principles and great righteousness and clarification of names, was “the burning 
intellectual duty of the young scholars who were more and more deeply exposed to Chu Hsi’s historicism” (Park 
1978, 12; Chŏng 2000; Yi 1999).    
12
 In particular, Jeong-Woo Koo, in his article (2007), explores an East Asian parallel to the European public sphere 
and civil society by studying Confucian private academies and petitions of the Confucian literati in Chosŏn Korea 
from the 16
th
 to the19
th
 centuries. The literati petitions usually consisted of six major categories: remonstrating, 
impeaching, argumentative, public policy, requesting, and advocating petitions. Koo argues that private academies 
“as the organizational core of nascent civil society” led to “the emergence of the public sphere in Chosŏn Korea” 
(383). For the relations between the state and private academies, also see Ch’oe (1999). 
13
 This tradition, however, caused problems in late Chosŏn society when certain yangban families monopolized 
government posts. Many marginalized local elites were frustrated as the bureaucratic positions at the center were 
limited despite the growing numbers of yangban. The accumulated discontent of those yangban resulted not just 
from social, political, and economic limitation, but as scholars in Chosŏn history generally agree, it might also have 
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modern Korea represent the educated middle class that comprises a majority of Koreans today” 
(Kawashima 2002, 23), one can say that the tradition of literati as the ideal and prototype of 
intellectuals and the respect for scholars and officials as social elites still remains very strong in 
South Korean society today. 
Nevertheless, modern Korean intellectuals have been separated from this Chosŏn literati 
intellectual tradition because of Japanese colonization. If World War I and its aftermath radically 
altered the condition of the intellectual in Western societies (Eyerman 1994), the experience of 
colonialism drastically changed the condition of Korean intellectuals. 
 
III. The Legacy of Korean Intellectuals in a Conflict-ridden Society  
The role of the intellectual is constantly reinvented in different historical, social, and 
cultural contexts; indeed the role of Korean intellectuals has been constantly reinvented. 
Although the first modern intellectuals were more likely to emerge from the literati class, they 
could not keep the tradition of Chosŏn intellectuals engaged in the state in the face of Japanese 
colonialism. The Japanese colonial legacy, which created conditions for the separation of the 
nation and the state, not only severed modern intellectuals from the role of traditional 
intellectuals engaged in the state, but also created a strong division among intellectuals in terms 
of how to achieve national independence and resist colonial power. Even after liberation, 
because of the issue of collaboration and the newly formed anti-statist tradition in particular, the 
South Korean intellectual community has been divided, battling over who will play the role of 
“pure/authentic” intellectuals while they rebuild a modern nation under the  master narrative of 
nationalism. The differences among intellectuals often stemmed from how to interpret the 
                                                                                                                                                             
resulted from their frustration as intellectuals who were facing the reality that they were failing to successfully 
integrate their lives as both a scholar and government official according to the Neo-Confucian ideal. 
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relationship between knowledge and power and how to engage in reality. Whether they were 
called resistant intellectuals or critical intellectuals, nationalist intellectuals who positioned 
themselves against authoritarian regimes (including the colonial regime) were considered more 
“authentic” until democratization in 1987, even if they might have been outnumbered by state-
engaging functionary intellectuals. 
    
A. Korean Intellectuals, “the Principal Bearers of Nationalism” 
The first formation of modern intellectuals in Korea appeared at the end of the 19
th
 
century, when the country was threatened by imperial Japan and foreign powers. In contrast to 
Benda’s criticism of intellectuals’ abandonment of universal values and succumbing to the cult 
of nationalism and political passions, the ideology of nationalism, which was incited through 
threat of foreign imperial powers, became “the fulcrum of a new political consciousness” and 
“the most potent ideology” (Koo 1993, 238). At the same time, Korean intellectuals became “the 
principal bearers of nationalism” from this time on in Korea (238). 
Korean intellectuals in this period tried to re-imagine and fashion national identity as an 
effort to preserve the country. As Henry Em (1999) and Andre Schmid (2002) discuss in their 
studies, writing national history in particular was one of the most effective ways for intellectuals 
to produce knowledge about the nation and it became an important part of the patriotic 
enlightenment movement. Influenced by geopolitical shifts, some intellectuals in Korea struggled 
to search for a new identity for the nation. The shift in attitudes toward and understandings of 
China and Japan was an integral part of Korean self-knowledge. Rethinking Korea and 
reconfiguring the nation meant first reevaluating China according to new knowledge and notions 
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of civilization; Korean intellectuals tried to proclaim their cultural independence by de-centering 
China. 
At the same time, regional identity increasingly began to place Japan at the center of the 
East through Pan-Asian ideology. Korean self-knowledge during this period could not be 
separated from the Japanese production of knowledge about Korea. Not only did Japan emerge 
as a new model of the civilized country, but Korean intellectuals also often borrowed Western 
knowledge that was translated by Japanese in their nationalist discourse (Schmid 2002; Em 
2013). Later, when imperial Japanese also co-opted and employed certain types of cultural 
representations from the Korean nationalist and enlightenment (munmyŏng kaehwa) discourse, 
nationalist strategy shifted to the celebration of national uniqueness and authenticity of the 
minjok (nation), stressing its unity and continuity and moving away from state-centered 
definitions of the nation and toward a separation of state and nation. Historians like Sin Ch’aeho 
and Pak Ŭnsik were at the forefront of producing this spiritual knowledge of the nation. This 
approach became the origin and basis of later cultural nationalism in the 1920s and1930s 
(Robinson 1988; Schmid 2002; Shin and Robinson 1999; Sŏ and et al. 2004). As a result, the 
minjok and nationalist paradigm came to hold hegemonic status throughout the post-colonial 
period. Moreover, as the states in both South and North Korea became the dominant producer of 
national knowledge in post-colonial Korea, nationalism has become the unchallenged “master 
narrative” in both Koreas (Armstrong 2003; Shin 1998). 
 
B. The Legacy of Division within Intellectuals  
As many scholars have pointed out, modern Korea and contemporary South Korea have 
gone through incredible upheavals and social changes; the origin of many of these problems can 
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be found in the experience of Japanese colonialism (1910-45). The three variables of colonialism, 
nationalism, and modernity have interacted in complex ways to shape the consciousness of 
Korean intellectuals (Shin and Robinson 1999). Above all, colonial experiences left behind 
tremendous trauma and affected every aspect of South Korean society: not only politics, 
economy, culture, and scholarship, but also South Koreans’ very ideas about intellectuals 
themselves. Because of the colonial legacy of separating nation from state, the anti-statist 
tradition became a deeply ingrained South Korean intellectual orientation (Koo 1993, 235-7). 
Regaining national political independence became an ultimate goal for Korean 
intellectuals and the resistance against colonial power itself was seen as the legitimate role of 
intellectuals. Coercive Japanese rule and the intense anti-Japanese struggles among Koreans 
created a widening gap between the state and society. And as a result, the Chosŏn period 
tradition of intellectuals who were engaged in the state was not maintained. It seems that being 
and living as an intellectual in South Korean society has long been challenging because South 
Korea has been such a “conflict-ridden contentious society”; as Hagen Koo points out, at the 
core of the conflict-ridden contentious society has been the relationship between the state and 
society (231). Not only has the South Korean intellectuals’ role been continuously affected by 
the dynamics of state-society relations, but also this image of intellectuals as dissidents has 
become a salient characteristic of South Korean intellectuals. 
Korean nationalist intellectuals in the colonial period had the dual role of “the creation of 
a new national identity” and “the creation of a political program of institutional reform to 
maintain and strengthen political independence for the collectivity” (Robinson 1988, 12-13). 
However, among Korean intellectuals, nationalism was not a monolithic idea. Rather, different 
political ideologies -- that is, the different conceptions of nation, different approaches to political 
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tactics, and different positions on elite-mass relations -- divided nationalist intellectuals into two 
groups: cultural nationalists and radical nationalists (K. Kim 2006, 153; Chŏn 2004; Robinson 
1988). Especially the ideological schism between them in the period of 1920-1925 shaped the 
rest of nationalist movement in the colonial period, deeply affected the Korean society after 
liberation, and consequently led to the long standing issue of intellectuals’ “collaboration” in 
Korean society, with a tendency to label cultural nationalist intellectuals as collaborators 
(Robinson 1988). Indeed, collaboration has become “the original sin of Korean society” (De 
Ceuster 2001, 207). 
The cultural nationalist movement failed because of its elitism, which regarded a small 
group of intellectuals as the core of a nation, and the gradualist view, which sought national 
development through cultural, educational and economic movements within limits of colonial 
rule (Robinson 1988).  Under the influence of Western liberalism and social Darwinism, cultural 
nationalist intellectuals such as Yun Ch’iho and Yi Kwangsu tried to separate the state from the 
nation in order to legitimize their apolitical approach, more emphasizing “moral values and 
spiritual integrity” (K. Kim 153-4; Robinson 1988).14  On the other hand, radical nationalists, 
often socialists, criticized cultural nationalism “for its lack of an independent ideal and the 
leadership-mass interaction” (154). Contrary to cultural nationalists, radical nationalists were 
more interested in Marxism and the Russian revolution than Western liberalism; they identified 
the national contradiction with the class contradiction and viewed the Korean masses as the 
embodiment of the nation and the core of the future nation. However, they, too, not only failed to 
                                                 
14
 Yet, “class identity might contest with national identity when the intellectuals’ moral leadership was undermined 
by their economic interests” (K. Kim 2006, 155). Because of the fact that most cultural nationalists came from the 
yangban or landlord class, which was stripped of their traditional status and now totally dependent on the colonial 
government for their landholdings, their elitist stance, and their chances for advancement in colonial society while 
avoiding Japanese jails, they lost moral authority and their actions became an object of distrust and suspicion, often 
being named “collaborators” (Koo 1993, 234; K. Kim 154; Robinson 1988; Wells 1990). 
45 
 
form a mass-base movement but also were severely oppressed by Japanese authority because of 
its radical revolutionary stance (Robinson 1988). 
In addition, it was in fact during the Japanese-colonial period that the concept of 
“intellectuals” was introduced through the term “intelligentsia” that had its roots in Russia.15 
After the Russian socialist revolution, socialist ideas of the intelligentsia were rapidly diffused 
among young Koreans through study abroad students in Japan. Many young Koreans in the 
colonial period were inclined to socialist ideology and aspired to become intelligentsia, and the 
term connoted a progressive nationalist and more often socialist combatant at the frontier of new 
era. Although the term intelligentsia was used only among a relatively small population during 
this period and was also often understood as broadly as intellectuals, nonetheless being called an 
intelligentsia (intelli
16
 or chisigin in Korean) meant that one was considered  a “resistant” 
intellectual, especially resistant against Japanese colonial rule, and aspiring for the independence 
of the country (Kang 2001, 186-8). It seems that this colonial historical context also left the 
legacy of division among Korean intellectuals, even as they all acted under the umbrella of 
nationalism. There has been a residual tendency to consider resistant intellectuals as superior or 
the more authentic of the nationalist intellectuals in Korean society. 
The political situation after liberation (1945) made this schism among Korean 
intellectuals more visible. The problems that Korean intellectuals have faced can be summarized 
                                                 
15
 Originally, intelligentsia referred to “a small group within the tiny Russian bourgeoisie which began to assume a 
collective identity during the reign of Peter the Great. The cornerstone of this identity was an education in and an 
orientation towards European culture, especially its science and its technology.” Yet, from “the beginning, the 
intelligentsia connoted more than a modern cultural orientation: bound up with the idea was a sense of mission, the 
desire and even the obligation to carry enlightenment into the darkness.” Later, the intelligentsia put real alternative 
ideas into practice and its alternative cultural orientation became politically radical. The notion of the intelligentsia 
came to convey the general idea that the intellectual is and should be in perpetual dissent, and it has attracted 
aspiring intellectuals (Eyerman 1994, 21-23).   
16
 “Intelli (intelri)” originally meant intelligentsia or intellectuals, which corresponds to the Korean term “chisigin,” 
which was not yet a fully developed concept at that time. However, later, intelli was sometimes pejoratively used by 
the masses, referring to men who were explicitly seeking a Western-life style; it was similar to the word “New 
women” (sin yŏsŏng) for women.  
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into three issues: nationalism (unification), democracy, and class conflict (Choi 1993). With the 
sudden end of Japanese colonialism, Korean elites could not handle the new situation because 
the ideological conflicts were too severe. The nation was divided into South and North Korea 
under a trusteeship that was put into place in the interest of superpowers. A geographical 
boundary between two occupation forces (the United States and the Soviet Union) also came to 
“signify an ideological boundary dividing Korean society” (Pongu Kim, cited in De Ceuster 
2001, 209). Intellectuals had to make a choice between two political, ideological systems and 
participate in the task of rebuilding the nation at the same time. Intellectuals had to reach their 
own decision as to which ideology to hold on to. 
While resistant, socialist intellectuals reigned in the North, and in the South the 
conservative, reactionary regime of Syngman Rhee supported by the U.S. occupation forces 
reigned. As Hagen Koo points out, 
With this development, both the colonial apparatus of coercion and the people who allied 
themselves with colonial masters and gained status under colonial rule were revived, in 
direct contradiction to the masses’ pent-up grievances and desire for radical change. 
Consequently, the state and society became alienated from one another again, and as 
before, the ruling power’s lack of legitimacy was the most sensitive element in state-
society relation and a focal point of political consciousness among Korean intellectuals 
(1993, 239-40).  
 
In South Korea, with more than a quarter of government officials who had a colonial career 
during the First Republic and without immediate legal justice against collaborators, “the task of 
uprooting the remnants of Japanese colonialism fell in due course on the shoulders of historians” 
and intellectuals (De Ceuster 2001, 214). Moreover, following the end of the Korean War (1950-
1953), as Koen De Ceuster puts it, 
Collaboration became a taboo subject that did not fit well with the task of national 
reconstruction in the wake of this devastating fratricidal war. Political manhandling made 
certain that historians would not venture into this forbidden land, but would keep 
scrupulously to the boundaries set by the authoritarian state and the master narrative it 
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produced. Not until political developments created a more liberal atmosphere did 
historians begin to probe this thorny issue (214).   
 
Furthermore, intellectuals who remained in the South also had to deal with their own traumas 
surrounding collaboration and the division inside of the intellectual community. 
South Korean intellectuals in this period (1950s) were often described as elitist, but also 
passive and “escapist intellectuals” (Kang 2001, 193). The subsequent impact of the Korean War 
was such that the Rhee regime decided to focus on national recovery, which shaped all state 
organizations and ideologies as well as the dominant patterns of state-society relations. After the 
Korean War, the anti-communist state system was consolidated by a master narrative of the 
resisting nation, which effectively banned the issue of collaboration. Anti-communist ideology 
became the foundation of the Korean political and social system and an ideological framework of 
capitalist industrialization; anti-communism effectively legitimized undemocratic systems (Choi 
1993). With the Cold War ideology and the impact of the Korean War having never officially 
ended, the Rhee regime destroyed progressive forces and the leftist elements in Korean society, 
consolidated democracy under the hegemonic anti-communist ideology and the logic of survival, 
and oppressed opposition groups. As Koo notes, “[T]he war brought this ideological conflict to 
the level of daily experiences, to the level of individual psyches and social relationships” (1993, 
240-1). As resistance or criticism of the regime was regarded as a threat to the political system 
and nation, for a while it seemed that intellectuals became passive. Thus the differentiation 
between the intelligentsia and the intellectual had almost disappeared. However, the 
geographical division still remains “a powerful reminder of the failed attempt at national unity 
and has been a source of constant challenges to the authority of the South Korean government” 
(De Ceuster, 216).  Intellectuals looked passive more than ever before; however, “the 
intellectuals have not really forgiven the ‘original sin’ of the Rhee regime: its reactionary 
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character, its revival of the colonial structure, and its over-reliance on the United States for 
power maintenance” (Koo, 242). 
 
C. The Formation of Critical Intellectuals 
Nonetheless, after liberation, intellectuals (chisigin) began drawing more public attention 
as a meaningful social category and social exemplars as the social function of knowledge was 
emphasized and more people pursued higher education. In the colonial period when the 
opportunity of higher education was very limited, the actual intellectual community was quite 
small, and thus the term “intellectuals” was not widely used among the public. The 4.19 (Sailgu, 
April 19
th
) Student Movement in 1960 brought a huge change in intellectual society: there was a 
new formation of critical intellectuals (pip’anjŏk chisigin). Throughout the event, educated 
members of South Korea, young students -- the new national society’s first generation – and 
professors, took to the streets to protest against electoral abuses perpetrated by the Syngman 
Rhee administration and gave voice to collective concerns about Korea’s historical course; it 
resulted in President Rhee’s resignation (C. Kim 2007). After 4.19, professors notably emerged 
as intellectuals, being considered a group which had the most critical consciousness.
17
 Sartre’s 
notion of intellectuals had an especially large impact on South Korean intellectuals. Under his 
influence, intellectuals like Song Kŏnho, one of the leading intellectuals of the time, emphasized 
intellectuals’ critical engagement with reality and called for their further participation in history 
(Kang 2001, 203-209). This first generation of critical intellectuals was often called the 
generation of the 4.19. In particular, the journal Sasang’gye (The World of Thought: 1953-1970), 
published by Chang Chunha, contributed to the formation of this critical intellectual generation 
                                                 
17
 For example, in 1965, Hong Sŭngjik argued that professors had the most critical political consciousness among 
the South Korean population, based on his empirical survey on the political consciousness of professors (Kang 2001, 
203-4). 
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as a cultural medium. The issues of democratization, social justice, unification, and 
industrialization became serious social issues and the critical role and function of intellectuals 
was emphasized. In particular, there were strong controversies between mainstream intellectuals 
who upheld Rostow’s economic development/modernization theory and critical intellectuals who 
advocated for unification (Chŏng 1992; Chŏng 2004, 167-9; C. Kim 1991; M. Kim 2007; Yi 
2003). Although these intellectuals still showed some elitist characteristics and their initial 
efforts at democracy were soon frustrated by the 5.16 (Oillyuk, May 16
th
) Military Coup in 1961, 
the formation of a critical intellectual group in this period played an important role in 
establishing the collective identity of South Korean intellectuals. 
As the military regime again reestablished “the strong state--weak society relationship,” 
using the powerful instrument of coercion and ideological weapons of anti-communism and 
nationalism, and at the same time creating a “developmental state” (Koo 1993, 242), there was a 
strengthening of the collective identity of critical intellectuals. The military regime suppressed 
resistant forces and also blocked the debate over unification. From the beginning, the Park 
Chung Hee regime faced strong opposition from civil society, especially from intellectuals and 
students. This was because the Park regime was afflicted by a critical weakness: “its illegitimate 
birth stemming from the usurpation of power from democratic government by force, its harsh 
repression of civil right, and the close ties it developed with Japan in order to pursue export-
oriented industrialization” (243). In addition, the issue of distributive and economic justice, 
related to rapid economic development, became a political and intellectual issue. South Korean 
critical intellectuals now had a common enemy: a military authoritarian regime that suppressed 
civil society in the name of anti-communism, for national security and the ideology of economic 
development. Acknowledging a common enemy facilitated the formation of a group identity 
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among critical intellectuals. Moreover, these intellectuals thought they could achieve the goals of 
democratization and modernization through the construction of civil society first, so they gave 
themselves the role of building that civil society (Chŏng 1992, 287-8; Kang 2001, 205; Koo 
1993, 243). 
A crucial aspect that we should be aware of in order to understand the South Korean 
intellectual community and its reorganization during this period is the change of the relationship 
between power and knowledge after the 5.16 Coup. This period (1960s) brought strong tension 
among South Korean intellectuals about how they viewed their role as intellectuals in society and 
how they should engage in politics and society. For the sake of legitimacy, it was necessary for 
the Park regime (1961-79) to mobilize intellectuals and their knowledge -- especially the 
academic community, which, as I have reviewed, had been traditionally the source of political 
authority in South Korean society -- in order to create ideologies, formulate policies, and activate 
modernization projects. A large number of intellectuals in fact participated in modernization 
projects as “an intelligentsia for modernization” (Kang 2001, 200-3). 
As a result, during the period of Park regime, the intellectual community was again 
polarized into two groups. First were the functional intellectuals, who participated in the state’s 
economic development and modernization projects, offering knowledge as experts or 
bureaucrats/technocrats and consequently contributing to establishing the regime’s political 
legitimacy. Second were the critical intellectuals, who stood against the authoritarian state with 
anti-hegemonic minjung (common people/mass) ideology,
18
 challenging the status quo with their 
critical minds (Chŏng 2004, 7-8, 167-176; Kang 2001; Lee 2007). The articulation between 
                                                 
18
 According to Namhee Lee (2007), minjung signifies people “who are oppressed in the sociopolitical system but 
who are capable of rising up against it” (5). From the view of critical intellectuals, not only are they the common 
people as opposed to elites and leaders, but they are also supposed to be “the true subject of historical development 
and capable of social change” (2). Minjung ideology had become more influential especially in 1970-80s. 
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power and intellectuals, especially professors, was accelerated as economic development drove 
forward under the name of progress. Accordingly, the perspective that identifies intellectuals’ 
roles with function and professionalism became extensively accepted. 
Another significant factor in this story, which is especially relevant to  my informants 
who studied abroad in the U.S. in this historical, social, and cultural context, is that intellectuals 
who studied abroad in the U.S. became a conspicuous majority of mainstream elites, especially 
those in the military and academia since the 1960s. From the Korean War until 1967, the number 
of Korean students who studied abroad in the U.S. was about 10,000, including around 3,000 
people who participated in short-term training or education in the U.S. The majority of these 
people became power elites and also pro-American. According to one study, 51% of Seoul 
National University professors in the mid-1960s had study-abroad experience in the U.S., and the 
scholars who studied abroad in the U.S. had already become a majority in the academia by the 
end of the 1960s (Chŏng 2004, 162-6). When bureaucrats had study-abroad experience, their 
work tended to be related to the fields of policy, administration, or state ideology. It is not 
difficult to say that they were more likely to be pro-American and anti-communist (Chŏng 2004; 
C. Kim 1991). Increasingly, earning a degree from the U.S. was becoming a guaranteed way to 
reach success in South Korean society. In academia, in particular, the power and influence of the 
U.S. doctoral degree was evident.
19
 It can be argued that intellectuals who studied abroad in the 
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 According to a more recent statistic, in 2002, among professors who got a doctoral degree from foreign countries, 
two thirds (66.3%) of professors at large and 79.4% of Seoul National University professors had earned their 
degrees at U.S. institutions (P. Yi 2002). Other statistics also show how much South Korea society, especially 
academia, favors U.S. degrees over those from South Korea or other foreign countries. For example, according to 
Kyosu Sinmun (Professoriate Newspaper), among new faculty members recruited in the field of social sciences in 
the country’s top three universities (Seoul National University, Yonsei University, and Korea University) in 2005, 
80% received their doctoral degrees from the U.S. institutions (J. Kim 2011a, 110).  
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U.S. still constitute the majority of elites and exert influence not only on higher education but on 
South Korean society at large.
20
 
In the 1970s, despite increasing articulation between intellectuals and power and strong 
state repression, the
 
 second-generation critical intellectuals, who emphasized the importance of 
intellectuals’ connection to the masses , fiercely criticized economic inequality, opposed the 
authoritarian Restoration (Yusin) system (1972), demanded democratization, and raised the issue 
of unification (nationalism). Journals such as Ch’angjak kwa Pip’yŏng (Creation and Criticism) 
and Munhak kwa Chisŏng (Literature and Intelligence) as well as underground publications 
played an important role in the resistance movements, raising consciousness and offering room 
for discussion (Yi 2003, 204-212). As Eyerman puts it, “social movements are places not only 
where legitimate and legitimated intellectual labourers can seek and gain recognition in new 
areas and arenas but also where ‘intellectual’ can be made” (1994, 11).  This is the period in 
which many critical/movement intellectuals, writers, journalists, and professors along with 
students, were expelled from their jobs and schools. 
There was a clear demarcation between the progressive intellectual movement and the 
conservative intellectual movement in the 1980s. After the assassination of President Park (1979) 
and the breakdown of democratization in 1980 by the Chun Doo Hwan military regime, South 
Korean intellectuals, in general, still regarded their critical role against the government as the 
most important social role of intellectuals, and become more progressive and radical. Progressive 
intellectuals grew even more attached to nationalism, unification, and radical theories and 
Marxist ideology than before and also actively adopted Gramsci’s concept of “organic 
                                                 
20
 One of the most recent examples that clearly show this tendency is the presidential transition team of South 
Korean President-elect Park Geun-hye. When she selected her transition team in January 2013, 18 out 24 appointees 
had foreign degrees and 17 among 18 studied in the U.S. (Hankyoreh January 7, 2013) Available online at 
http://www.hani.co.kr/arti/politics/bluehouse/568636.html. 
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intellectuals” along with class consciousness (Kang 2001, 239; Chŏn 2006, 54-57).  Particularly, 
after the Kwangju Democratization Movement (1980), which demonstrated both the violence of 
the ruling power and the potential of the masses, students on college campuses discussed 
Marxism and socialist revolution (Chŏng 1992, 291-2). Yet, on the other hand, many 
intellectuals also newly engaged in the new regime, which sought brains for knowledge and 
ideology for the regime. In the mid-1980s, however, criticisms against critical intellectuals 
started to appear; the criticisms pointed out that critical intellectuals always used the logic of 
“black and white,” and that they were too “radical” (Kang 2001, 235-6). 
The tension between the two different intellectual orientations of intellectuals’ 
involvement existed through another military regime until and even after democratization in 
1987. Political legitimacy remained a powerful issue. The Chun regime, like the Park regime, 
also pursued economic growth and continuously mobilized intellectuals for the sake of the 
regime’s legitimacy. “[I]deological and cultural hegemony was, by and large, in the hands of the 
intellectuals” with the absence of bourgeois hegemony in South Korea (Koo 1993, 245). Shils’ 
remarks below are suggestive of South Korean intellectuals in this period: 
It is practically given by the nature of the intellectuals’ orientation that there should be 
some tension between the intellectuals and the value-orientations embodied in the actual 
institutions of any society. […] Rather it is the rejection by intellectuals of the inherited 
and prevailing values of those intellectuals who are already incorporated in ongoing 
social institutions. This intra-intellectual alienation or dissensus is a crucial part of the 
intellectual heritage of any society. Furthermore it supplies the important function of 
moulding and guiding the alienative tendencies which exist in any society (1969, 30-1)  
 
In this period, the Korean intellectual community was highly politicized and also polarized in 
terms of how to engage with reality. 
 
 
54 
 
IV. Another Challenge: Shifting Role of Intellectuals 
South Korean intellectuals soon had to face new internal and external challenges. There 
were two main historical events that were instrumental in breaking intellectuals’ old frameworks 
of ideological orientation: democratization in 1987 and the Economic Crisis in 1997. These 
events hit the South Korean intellectual community hard. First, the democratization after 1987
21
 
and the collapse of socialist countries at the end of 1980s in particular brought enormous changes 
to South Korean intellectual society, freeing South Korean intellectuals from the master 
narratives of nationalism (unification) and modernization. The heat of ideological debates at the 
end of 1980s cooled down a bit and previous sources of social conflict were also somewhat 
reduced. Above all, the “question about political legitimacy and the nationality aspect of political 
power are no longer burning issues and are no longer powerful enough to politicize broad 
segments of society” (Koo 1993, 247). Rather, intellectuals had to find new roles and goals to fit 
the old/traditional framework of intellectuals for a rapidly changing society. 
In the face of changes, it seems that the intellectual community became more 
differentiated and sectarian. After 1987, ideological differentiation became more pervasive 
because the common goal or enemy had disappeared. Unlike in the past, intellectuals had no 
clear common goal of democratization and thus began to differentiate from one another 
according to ideology. It became more important to offer concrete alternatives or plans to 
overcome social problems than to try to reach abstract common goals. Progressive intellectuals, 
                                                 
21
 The year of 1987 was a major turning point for South Korean democracy. Massive demonstrations finally led to 
the surrender of the Chun Doo Hwan military regime and to open, direct presidential elections. Until then, South 
Koreans’ democratic freedoms had been constantly limited by authoritarian governments in the name of national 
security and economic development. Although Rho Tae woo won the presidency with a mere plurality in the 1987 
elections, public expressions of suppressed desires for freedom, human rights, and economic equity and justice were 
explosive (including aggressive labor movements).  In 1992, Kim Young Sam was elected and became the first 
civilian president (1993-8); Later, Kim Dae Jung, who had been sentenced to death and barred from active politics 
under the Chun regime, eventually became president (1998-2003), making for the first peaceful regime change  in 
post-war South Korea (See, Robinson 2007, 167-181; Eckert and et al. 1990, 347-418). 
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in particular, faced a huge ideological challenge with the collapse of Eastern European socialist 
countries. Consequently, some intellectuals became embarrassed about their attachment to 
socialist ideology and questioned whether the socialist ideal could be an alternative for South 
Korean society. Yet, their concern over minjung and unification had not vanished (Kang 2001, 
240, 256-7). 
On the other hand, diverse voices emerged from outside of the progressive intellectual 
community as well. The changes in the political and social environment after democratization as 
well as the changes in Eastern Europe opened up free spaces for speculation in intellectual 
community. There were reflections about and criticisms of the progressive intellectuals; their 
ideology-oriented tendencies and especially their strong attachment to Marxism were discussed. 
For instance, Chŏng Subok called for intellectual self-criticism and pointed out that there were 
still core unsolved issues in South Korean society: unification, democracy, and class conflict. He 
went on to argue that there were three new responsibilities for intellectuals in a new era: to 
mitigate their rigid orientation toward ideology, to overcome sectarianism, and to help actualize 
various social groups’ demands in the social system (Kang 2001, 259-61; Chŏng 1992; Yim 
2005, 95, 294-6). Many critics emphasized that the immediate empirical reality in this particular 
historical context was more important and necessary than obsolete ideologies. 
For a long time, ever since the colonial period, (South) Korean intellectuals have been 
struggling with the task of modernization under the political situation of strong state, weak 
society. Democratization, equality, a unified nation, and industrialization are all tasks related to 
modernization. Their usual mode of action in dealing with these tasks has been resistance to 
power. At the same time, as Koo (1993, 244) notes, intellectuals have long been bound to 
nationalist ideology: 
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[N]ationalism played a dual, somewhat contradictory role in South Korea. On the one 
hand, it served as the state’ ideology to mobilize people for economic development as 
well as to suppress the sectional interests of society; on the other hand, it was used by 
civil society as a means of multi-class social mobilization against the authoritarian state.  
 
Gi-Wook Shin also compares the different interpretations of nation and national identity used 
both by the Park government (1961-1979) and minjung activists (1980s). These two discourses 
naturally differ in their rhetoric on national identity: the former stresses the “unity” of the nation 
and “modernization of the fatherland,” whereas the latter highlights national “unification,” 
“liberation,” and “democratization” (1998, 160). 
After democratization in 1987, South Korean society experienced many changes. The 
year 1987 was “a turning point in which the locus of the critical driving energy shifted to the 
civil society from the state” and the era of civil society came in Korea (Lee 1993, 359).  As Koo 
points out, the essential idea at the base of civil society is “the Western liberal principle of ‘free, 
self-determining, autonomous individuality with equal right to social justice and to attainment of 
satisfaction” (1993, 238). The transition to civil society also revealed the necessity of 
democratization of both the members and the system of civil society.  Intellectuals’ role also 
changed as the relationship between state and society changed.  The idea of civil society also 
made the rigid differentiation between intellectuals inside and outside of the political system 
meaningless (Yim 2005, 107). 
Since the post-1987 transition to democracy, the increasing openness of the political 
system has allowed many intellectuals to participate in real politics beyond social movements or 
scholastic activities. The dynamics and sentiments inside the intellectual community have also 
changed.  Now, intellectuals’ involvement in politics and the political system are not utterly 
denounced, although they are not entirely welcomed either. As the clear common goal of 
democratization has disappeared and the relation between power and intellectuals has changed 
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from rivalry to relations of multiple dimensions, they are increasingly seeking for an individual 
intellectual subjectivity rather than a collective one. They are no longer bound by an image of 
resistance, which a highly politicized society imposed on intellectuals. Even inside the 
progressive intellectual community, there is “an intra-intellectual differentiation” according to 
the extent of their individual orientation toward reform or revolution (Yim 2005, 114-6). 
For a better understanding of the shifting role of intellectuals and their relationship with 
the state and social movements, we should first of all pay attention to both the changing social 
circumstances that intellectuals are faced with and take a look at the inside of the knowledge 
structure. Yim Hyŏnjin (2005) once tried to explain the factors that affect contemporary South 
Korean intellectuals’ role and location. First, due to democratization, the most obvious object of 
their criticism disappeared and meta-narratives became invalid. As a result, intellectuals have 
become increasingly liberated from meta-narratives. Second, a trend of “professionalization” 
changed the knowledge structure. Society demands for intellectuals to intervene in society with 
professional knowledge rather than mere criticism and abstract discourse. Third, due to 
“informationization,” the relation between knowledge and society has changed; accordingly, the 
structure of the reproduction of intellectuals is also changing. In addition, the characteristics of 
social problems with which contemporary society is faced have been changed by globalization, 
accompanied with “time-space distanciation” and “time-space compression” (Yim, 101-2). 
Furthermore, the Economic Crisis of 1997 (the IMF kyŏngje wigi),22 the rapidly changing 
competitive global environment, and the idea of global citizenship pose even greater challenges 
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 In 1997, South Korea was hit by a full-scale financial crisis and had to ask the IMF (International Monetary Fund) 
for a bailout. It was a part of the Asian Financial Crisis, but the effect was especially profound in South Korea.  For 
South Koreans, it was a traumatic experience of national humiliation with subsequent economic downturn and 
massive layoffs. As the Crisis revealed deep structural problems in the financial sector in South Korea, the 
government had to accelerate its financial reform and market liberalization.  
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to South Korean intellectuals. Globalization, which generally means the reorganization of 
capitalism through information and knowledge, is now one of the most important factors 
affecting South Korean intellectuals and South Korean society in general since the 1990s. South 
Korean intellectuals are not excluded from the effects of globalization. The pressure on their 
labor comes from market pressure as growing neoliberal tendencies demand competitiveness in 
the global environment; I discuss this more in chapter five. More and more intellectual labor has 
become controlled by external forces. The market for intellectual labor that forms intellectual 
space and the norms of the role of the intellectual has also changed. The changes in the function 
of South Korean intellectuals, professors in particular, are intricately related to the process of 
globalization, and intellectuals with “global consciousness,” which recognizes that issues in 
social and cultural affairs can be analyzed successfully in a framework of crossing borders, have 
to respond to each of the changes caused by globalization (Manning 2003, 163). As I examine in 
subsequent chapters, these changing environments, in fact, not only change the role of South 
Korean intellectuals but also critically affect their subjectivities in both the private and public 
sphere. 
Nothing could teach South Koreans better about globalization and its formidable power 
than the ramifications of the Economic Crisis in 1997-2001, and the crisis greatly hurt the self-
respect of South Korean intellectuals. Coincidentally, the Economic Crisis came right after the 
government announced its emphasis on the necessity of globalization and joined the OECD 
(Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development) in 1996. After experiencing the 
Crisis, which relegated South Korea “from being an economic miracle to an economic fiasco” in 
1997 (Kim and Finch 2003, 120), Koreans acutely recognized global interconnectedness and the 
necessity of quickly responding to it. At the same time, the crisis has left “a residue of 
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uncertainty that has permanently altered the assumptions that South Koreans had about their 
economy” (120). South Korean intellectuals were deeply frustrated and embarrassed by the fact 
that they failed to provide society with advice and guidance about the future, and it gave them a 
sense of crisis. The Crisis was not just an economic crisis; rather it was considered a total crisis 
of South Korean modernization. Not only was this crisis related to the social system, but it was 
also seen as a problem of knowledge of survival in a competitive neoliberalizing world (Cho 
2000; Chŏn 2006; Etzioni-Halevy 1985; Held and McGrew 2003; Yim 2005, 111-112). 
Under the new order of the world economy, “knowledge generation and technological 
capacity are key tools for competition between firms, organizations of all kinds, and ultimately, 
countries” (Castelle 2003, 220). South Koreans, particularly intellectuals, who experienced the 
shock of the Economic Crisis, become aware of not only their insecurity, but also of the fact that 
only the one “with capacity to generate exceptional value added in any market enjoys the chance 
to shop around the globe — and to be shopped around, as well. […] the market for the most 
valuable labor is indeed becoming globalized” (323). In the global labor market, the highly 
skilled are afforded high mobility and wages. The state cannot guarantee anything for the future 
of the people and suddenly the responsibility is solely placed upon individuals. Intellectuals, 
those in academia in particular, were not excluded from these enormous effects of globalization. 
Further, as a select group who were supposed to create knowledge, they were held responsible 
for reducing the knowledge gap that caused the crisis. 
Into the 21
st
 century, the question of the “ideal” intellectual for a changing world has 
been a matter of public debate in South Korea. Under South Korea’s aggressive globalization 
strategy, knowledge, information, cultural creativity, and productivity have been especially 
emphasized as central to competitive strength. While the discourse of the “new intellectuals (sin 
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jisigin-ron),” who actively create added value using their knowledge and bring renovation with 
new ideas, has focused on the “knowledge-based economy (chisik kiban kyŏngje),” the 
traditional idea of the intellectual that performs the task of “making conscious and visible the 
fundamental notions of a society” has been clearly weakened (Chŏn 2006; Eyeman 1995, 6; D. 
Kim 2000; Shin 2003). It seems that at this moment South Korean intellectuals are torn between 
the opposing claims: those who mourn the “death” of intellectuals and want to keep the aura and 
traditional roles of authentic intellectuals, and those who stress the necessity of transformation 
into “new intellectuals” who can spearhead the survival of society in a knowledge-based 
economy, trying to figure out their location in a changing society in addition to grappling with 
the challenges that individuals face in a globalizing world. 
 
V. The Emergence of “Geese-dad” Professors 
As shown above, South Korean society has faced the double pressures of democratization 
inside and globalization outside since the 1990s. The Korean state, which had, through the 90s, 
been a developmental state, was no longer a competent, effective, or adaptable state  in the era of 
globalization, but rather a vulnerable and insecure one (S. Kim 2000). This crisis was completely 
recognized — even if it might not have been completely comprehended -- by South Koreans. 
The sense of crisis intensely penetrated people on an individual level, especially through the 
Economic Crisis of 1997. 
Among new socio-cultural phenomena, which appeared in response to the sense of crisis 
in radically changing social, economical, and political circumstances, this study pays attention to 
the geese-family (kirŏgi kajok) phenomenon, a transnational-split family for so-called early study 
abroad (chogi yuhak), in which the involvement of a certain group of intellectuals’ families 
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stands out conspicuously. On the one hand, this phenomenon powerfully demonstrates South 
Koreans’ general struggles toward neoliberal competition, individualization, and survival in a 
global economy after the Economic Crisis. On the other hand, it also can be understood as the 
dramatic emergence of the expression of South Koreans’ personal desires for the liberal 
principles of freedom and self-determining autonomous individuality after democratization. 
After the Economic Crisis, the liberal principle, which has been derailed by the nation’s 
compressed modernity and authoritarian socio-political circumstances, is on the verge of being 
derailed again by neoliberal rhetoric and forces. Not only does this phenomenon, in general, 
clearly show how the South Korean middle class, which is considered the backbone of society, 
reacts to the impact of globalization and its concomitant neoliberalization, but professoriate 
“geese-family making,” in particular, also fascinatingly and empirically reveals how South 
Korean intellectuals respond to their own sense of crisis in a changing world and make new 
meanings at the individual level at this historical juncture. 
Through this section, by briefly examining how the unprecedented phenomenon of geese 
family has emerged and developed, I tried to lay the groundwork for the following chapters’ 
discussions of professoriate geese-family making and its meaning. At the same time, I also 
consider whether the emergence of “geese-dad” professors is out of the ordinary in light of the 
tradition of South Korean intellectuals that I examined in this chapter. 
  
A. The “Geese-family” Phenomenon 
The geese-family phenomenon has been increasingly visible since the mid-1990s as a 
particular form of early study abroad (hereafter ESA), a middle-class and upper-middle-class 
educational strategy to raise children as global citizens through the mastery of English and the 
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acquisition of well-rounded Western education and credentials. The most prevalent geese-family 
pattern is that of a mother and her pre-college children who study abroad in English speaking 
countries such as the United States, the United Kingdom, Australia, Canada, and New Zealand 
while the father of the family remains in South Korea and provides financial support. For many 
families, becoming a geese family is considered the best way to take full advantage of ESA 
(Finch and Kim 2012, 490). Before the era of ESA, study abroad was considered to be mainly for 
graduate (or sometimes for college) education and was monopolized primarily by very wealthy 
families or a limited cadre of intellectuals. Thus, the widespread middle-class transnational-split 
family, entirely devoted to children’s pre-college education overseas, was not only largely 
unimaginable but was also very different from earlier transnational-split families caused by 
parents’ or family breadwinners’ labor migrations for economic survival, which leave families in 
less developed world while breadwinners work in the urban global North (Constable 2007; 
Massey et al. 2002; Parrenas 2001, 2005). 
In the 1990s, although it was gradually becoming more visible, the number of ESA 
students (and accordingly the number of geese families) was relatively small. However, 
beginning in the 2000s, especially as the government removed restrictions on early-study-abroad 
regulations at the end of 1999 and the South Korean economy began to recover from the 
Economic Crisis, the number of ESA students escalated rapidly.  While the number of primary 
and secondary school students leaving South Korea for study abroad in 1998 was only 1,562, by 
2002 it had reached 10,132. And the number continued to rapidly increase, setting new records 
every year and peaking in 2006 at 29,511, an almost 45% increase over the previous year.
23
 At 
                                                 
23
 The actual numbers of ESA students are probably much higher than the official statistics. This is because the 
figures do not, for example, include the number of students who accompany their parents who are working or 
studying overseas although it is widely understood that it is in fact these students (families), who have the greatest 
possibility of becoming ESA students (geese families) later on. Indeed, according to a survey conducted in 2008 
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the same time, as the phenomenon was heading to its peak, the average age of ESA students 
grew younger since parents tended to think that it would be better for children to learn English as 
early as possible. The number of primary school students going abroad to study surpassed the 
numbers of middle and high school students in 2002; by 2006, the number of primary students 
who were studying abroad reached 13,814, showing an impressive 69.5 % increase over the 
previous year.
24
 Thus, it is not difficult to imagine that the number of geese families also 
increased rapidly as this family format was considered to be the safer ESA option for younger 
children. According to The Korea Times article (January 2, 2006), it has been estimated that 
there were over 30,000 geese dads in South Korea in 2006.
25
 The number of ESA students has 
gradually declined since it reached its peak in 2006, dropping to 18,118 in 2009 in the aftermath 
of the global financial crisis. However, it soon increased slightly to 18,741 in 2010.
26
 Even 
though there are no official statistics for geese-families specifically, the geese-family 
phenomenon has become increasingly visible and also increasingly controversial in South Korea, 
as both an educational and social issue for well over a decade. 
                                                                                                                                                             
with 1,000 ESA students,  51.7% of these ESA students answered that they had gone abroad  accompanying their 
parents, who were working or studying overseas (from Ministry of Education, Science, and Technology [MOEST] 
2009) (Ihm and Choi, forthcoming). Also according to a news article, “Since the government permitted early 
schooling abroad in 1999, about 150,000 children went overseas to study.” (English Choson online news, October 
28, 2010) 
24
 At the same time, ESA destination countries grew more diverse as parents in the lower socio-economic spectrum 
also sought ESA opportunities for their children (Hannum, Park, and Butler 2010, 10). Especially, China and South 
Asian countries like Singapore and Philippine have emerged as new destinations mostly because of their more 
inexpensive costs, their proximity, and learning opportunities for both English and Chinese as global languages. 
According to one study, even people whose average monthly income is below approximately $2,000 are inclined to 
seek out ESA for their children and want to participate in it if they have the financial ability (Seo and Chung 2007). 
25
 There is no exact official number of geese dads but there are several estimations. For example, the number of 
geese dad was estimated to be over 50,000 by the education field (Segye Ilbo January 25, 2008). However, others 
estimated the number to be between 30,000 and 50,000 (Datanews May 13, 2009). Sometimes it was estimated to be 
over 200,000 (Segye Ilbo September 24, 2008). 
26
 The numbers presented here were collected from The analysis of education statistics, annual report (The Korean 
Educational Development Institute (KEDI): http://www.kedi.re.kr) and other articles in several South Korean 
newspapers.  
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It is widely understood that what decisively drove the South Korean middle class to ESA 
and the geese-family phenomenon was the aftermath of the Economic Crisis. Most scholars -- 
both from educational or sociological approaches -- tend to agree that parents’ basic motivation 
was the desire for social reproduction. As I already mentioned, after the Economic Crisis in 
particular, South Koreans experienced global interconnectedness more acutely than ever before 
both at the social and the individual level, while also facing the harsh reality of neoliberal 
competition for survival in the global economy. After the democratization of the 1990s, South 
Koreans increasingly clamored for the realization of the liberal principles of freedom and 
autonomous individuality; in parallel, the state yearned for the nation’s membership in the 
modern, democratic, developed world. 
It was, in fact, the Kim Young Sam government (1993-98) that first promulgated and 
mobilized an aggressive globalization regime, officially naming it “segyehwa” (globalization) in 
1995. As Samuel Kim (2000) notes, “Segyehwa has been touted as no longer a matter of choice 
but one of necessity — globalization or perish!” (2). Globalization did not merely mean 
“economic liberalization,” but was the unique concept which was meant to describe a more 
comprehensive effort “encompassing political, economic, social, and cultural enhancement to 
reach the level of advanced nations in the world” (3). After the Economic Crisis, indeed, the 
economic logic of laissez-faire capitalism seemed to be not only part and parcel of the new 
global hegemony, but also an unstoppable driving force in every aspect of South Koreans’ lives 
under the prevailing discourse of globalization and neoliberalism (Cho 2005; Kang 2000; S. Kim 
2000; Shin 2003). As Ulrich Beck (2000) puts it, “[Globalization] points to something not 
understood and hard to understand yet at the same time familiar, which is changing everyday life 
with considerable force and compelling everyone to adapt and respond in various ways” in South 
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Korea (20). As South Koreans witnessed both their country’s fall and the bottoming out of the 
middle class
27
 with massive unemployment, uncertainty clouded the bright futures that South 
Koreans had imagined for themselves as global citizens of a developed country. It resulted in 
intense class-reproduction anxieties for the middle-class. The state was not able to guarantee its 
citizens anything for the future and people increasingly felt solely responsibility for their own 
and their family’s social and economic survival (Abelmann, Park, and Kim 2009; Anagnost 2004; 
Apple 2001; Borovoy 2004; Cho 2009; Park 2006; Park 2010; Song 2006, 2009). ESA and 
geese-family making was a distinctive way that the South Korean middle class quickly 
responded to the crisis with a new, seemingly innovative transnational strategy. 
It is also worth noting that, in post-War South Korean society, education has long been 
the driving force of the nation’s fast development and growth and also foundational to class 
structure. Along with the characteristics of Korean familism, which has a strong family-centered 
survival strategy (Ahn 2009; Chang 1997; Kwŏn 2000; Lee 1994; Yi and Paek 2004; Pak 2004), 
education has been the most significant pathway for individuals (and families) to have a 
successful entrance into society, opening up opportunities for upward social mobility, especially 
with the waning of the old status system and in the context of fluid social conditions (Kim and 
Song 2007; Sorensen 1994). Also, as Koo (2007) notes, “Becoming part of the middle class is an 
                                                 
27
 Defining the middle class has been always difficult and controversial for scholars and the economic definition is 
also unclear. As Koo (2007) points out, the middle class is “a notoriously elusive and ambiguous category” in most 
societies and there is also the difference between objective class position and subjective class identification (52). 
Particularly in South Korean society, in which people have strong desire for upward social mobility, people had 
shown the tendency of subjectively identifying them as middle class more often than their actual class position until 
the Economic Crisis. In social surveys before the Economic Crisis of 1997, typically 60-70 percent of respondents 
identified themselves as a middle class, but after the Crisis, the number drastically dropped to the 40 percent level 
(Koo 2007, 51-2; Hong 2005, 1-5.Also see Shin 2004; Han’guksahoehakhoe 2008). There is a  variety of  terms 
indicating the “middle class” itself in South Korea; South Koreans more often use popular, journalistic term of the 
chungsanch’ŭng, often generally indicating the people who are not rich but not poor. Recently, following the 
OECD’s definition of the middle class, which defines a household as middle class if the household income is ranged 
between 50 % and 150 % of median household income, the Statistics Korea (T’onggyech’ŏng) released the data that 
65% of Korean household is middle class in 2012; however it was criticized that the data did not reflect the reality 
how people felt about their class position (Yi 2013). In this study, I often use the middle class as an interchangeable 
term of the chungsanch’ŭng, often relying on my interviewees’ self perception.  
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important criterion of social success for most ordinary people” (52). Thus, South Koreans’ strong 
desire for upward mobility or the maintenance of their middle-class status has been often 
expressed in terms of “education zeal” or “education fever” (kyoyukyŏl) (Seth 2002; O 2002, 
2008). 
However, after the Economic Crisis, the confidence in South Korean education nearly 
collapsed. Amid a rapidly spreading sense of urgency, knowledge, information, cultural 
creativity, and productivity have become increasingly emphasized as central to sustaining South 
Korea’s competitive strength for the future. And the post-industrial, knowledge-based global 
labor market is increasingly looking for high-skilled, competent professionals who are also 
capable of innovative thinking. English (as a global language) ability in particular has become 
increasingly considered among the most vital resources for determining one’s future 
marketability (Cho 2005; Chung 2008; Kang 2000; D. Kim 2000; S. Kim 2000; Lee and Koo 
2006; Park 2010; Park and Abelmann 2004). What quickly emerged was public outcry over the 
educational crisis. The critics charged that the current education system failed to nurture any of 
the qualities deemed essential for children’s futures, whether abroad or at home. Thus, the ESA 
and geese-family phenomenon emerged as both an alternative strategy for success and a 
profound critique of South Korea’s failures, particularly in its educational system.28 
Yet, because of public embarrassment, the phenomenon was often vilified as a social ill, 
emerging from excessive educational zeal, instrumental familism, and the fetishism of English 
and resulting in unreasonable familial sacrifice and costs. Both scholars and the media 
                                                 
28
 As many scholars point out, there are some push and pull factors for the ESA/geese-family phenomenon: that is, 
on the one hand, there is dissatisfaction with public education, overheated competition in society including the 
college entrance examination, and excessive cost of private, supplementary education; on the other hand, there is the 
desire for the acquisition of fluent English in a globalized world, as well as the desire for a better educational 
environment and foreign credentials (Cho 2002; Cho and et al. 2007; Chung 2008; Kim and Yoon 2005; J. Kim 
2010; Lee and Koo 2006; O 2008; Song 2010). 
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documented the phenomenon largely as an educational or familial crisis, focusing on its negative 
financial and psychological effects on family members and, at the same time, nearly 
unanimously criticizing their fetishism of English or collapsed educational system. In particular, 
many newspaper articles were published on family breakdown (e.g., financial hardship, divorce, 
fathers’ loneliness or suicide, and mothers’ extravagant life-style or infidelity abroad etc.) and 
the maladjustment of ESA children. Nonetheless the numbers of parents who wanted to send 
their children abroad continuously increased.  It seemed that many people had a “latent 
motivation” to implement ESA for their children if their economic conditions allowed them to do 
so (Son 2005, 96).
29
 It is ironic that although in the general public discourse ESA and geese-
family phenomenon is more often vilified as an abrogation of the collectivist spirit of South 
Korea by selfish, narrow, and unreasonable familism toward class reproduction, there are also 
some implicit celebrations of the strategic choice of a nurturing education abroad that feeds 
transnational, entrepreneurial modes of citizenship, competence, and cosmopolitan desire.
30
 
 
B. Professoriate Geese Families: Another Middle-class Exemplar 
Under these circumstances, however, a certain group of professors, namely those who 
have studied abroad in the United States (or other Western Countries), are in a somewhat 
privileged position to adapt themselves to these new challenges, often playing the role of 
                                                 
29
 According to a survey conducted with 1,579 adults (aged over 20, nationwide) in 2001, 41.5% of respondents 
answered that they were willing to emigrate for their children’s education (Dong-A Ilbo, September 11, 2001). And 
the public opinion poll, conducted by Dong-A Ilbo in 2005, also showed that 40.9% of parents in their 30s 
responded that they would choose educational emigration if they could, that 32.2 % of the same demographic would 
opt for ESA and 19.8% for a geese family arrangement (March 31, 2006). 
30
 Abelmann and Kang (2014) examine the ESA memoir/manuals, which flourished with the popularization of ESA. 
They argue that although these memoir/manuals have somewhat of a celebratory tone about what ESA students 
can/could achieve, in fact they are also defending against negative charges about ESA and geese families by 
variously rearticulating maternal labor and humanizing the children. In the peak period of ESA, it was not difficult 
to find that some newspapers alternately offered articles either criticizing ESA or giving realistic information for 
successful ESA. 
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globalizing agents at South Korean universities as I examine it in chapter five, and also being 
able to afford early-study-abroad opportunities for their children. Their own study-abroad 
experiences and their occupation as professors make it possible for them to activate the 
transnational educational strategy for their children by mobilizing their own transnational 
connections. As I show in the next chapter, for many reasons, these professors also occupy a 
privileged position when it comes to becoming and managing geese-family life. Even though 
they are not always financial elites, most professors are financially stable middle-class members, 
and their past experience of study abroad plays a significant role as cultural capital as they make 
decisions and actualize their plans for their children’s education abroad. Since professors are 
broadly considered to be “typical” middle-class exemplars and work symbolically as a reference 
group, they are often considered paragons of social consciousnesses, modernity, and high-culture. 
Other middle-class South Koreans without the same advantages busily watch these professors as 
exemplars and consider their strategies to be geese-family templates. 
In this sense, their private lives have become ever more public through their transnational 
educational strategy, which is often charged as an individualistic social reproduction/mobility 
effort that drains the country of both human and economic resources. In addition to the crisis in 
their public lives, which have been torn between the opposite claims of the “death” of 
intellectuals and the necessity of transformation toward “new intellectuals,” it seems that this 
private practice adds even more crisis, while foreshadowing what may become another “hot 
potato” in their lives as intellectuals. As I examined it in earlier part of this chapter, for South 
Korean intellectuals, both the nationalist consciousness and their sense of duty for building a 
modern developed nation have long been central to their public identities. Indeed, we can say 
that, to a great extent, these identities and duties continued to envelope personal lives and 
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aspirations through democratization in 1987 and possibly the Economic Crisis in 1997.  I will 
suggest that intellectuals became trapped in an apparent contradiction between the collectivistic 
responsibilities and leadership of the professoriate (i.e., for both their university and the nation) 
and their seemingly individualistic naked desires.  Thus, intriguing questions arise here: How do 
these professors navigate between private lives as fathers and public lives as South Korean 
intellectuals when they execute this transnational family project? How do they negotiate their 
individual/familistic values, aspirations, and cosmopolitan desires against the backdrop of 
collective/nationalist/social value? And, finally, how does this personal social-reproduction 
practice as well as their shifting professoriate role in the face of globalization eventually affect 
their own subjectivities? These are the questions that I explore throughout this dissertation. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
“INEVITABLE” EARLY STUDY ABROAD 
What a surprise! So many professors, including my colleagues, have already been 
choosing schools for their children around the globe. They choose the time and place for 
sabbatical year foremost considering children’s education. The phenomenon was not 
limited to just my colleagues in my university or only professors. Nearly all families of 
the middle class and above around me were agonizing over this issue and many families 
had already made the decision to execute “geese-family” lives. I only belatedly realized 
that I was the only one to have been indifferent to the issue. (Ryu, 2005, 39)
31
  
 
One fine Saturday afternoon in the fall of 2009, when I stepped into the one-bedroom 
apartment of Professor Kang (humanities, 56) for an interview, the first thing that caught my eye 
was an array of socks that covered one corner of his living room floor. Unwashed dishes were 
stacked up in a small kitchen located on the other side of the living room. A little abashed but 
with a faint smile, he told me that he was drying his socks, and that he had fixed up his apartment 
to look better than usual because of my visit. When I saw a big projector screen hanging on a 
living room wall, I asked him if he liked watching movies. He told me, showing me his high-
quality audio-system equipment, that he often watched movies when he felt lonely or bored. 
Professor Kang lived alone in one of the campus apartments funded by his university for 
professors like him who are working at the branch campus, located on the out skirts of the 
metropolitan area and distant from the main campus in Seoul. He had lived there for almost three 
years after he had become a geese dad when he sent his only son and wife to Canada. This was 
the only time that I visited an informant’s residence, but it gave me enough of a hint to form a 
picture of the daily lives of other geese-dads who live alone after sending their wives and 
children abroad. 
                                                 
31
 This excerpt was taken from an essay in which a geese-dad professor wrote about his experiences as a geese dad, 
in Jilly wa Chayu (The Truth and Freedom), a journal published by Yonsei University. The publication of this essay 
in the university journal also shows how pervasive the geese-family practice is within the professor community. The 
translation is mine.  
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By 2006, when the early study abroad phenomenon had reached its peak, South Koreans, 
especially in Seoul metropolitan area, found themselves surrounded by geese dads. According to 
one national poll conducted in 2005 by Dong-A Ilbo (March 31, 2006), the respondents who 
answered that they had at least one family member or relative who had executed some kind 
transnational migration for their children’s pre-college education was 46%, which could be 
divided up between those who emigrated for education (kyoyuk imin, 18.5%), those who sent 
their children for ESA (chogi yuhak, 16.4%), and geese dads (kirŏgi appa, 11.1%). As the 
excerpt at the front of this chapter shows clearly, if the survey had been made of the middle class 
or professor community only, the percentage would have likely been much higher.
32
 For over a 
decade, professoriate “geese-family making” has become evident and almost ubiquitous in the 
professor community, especially among professors with U.S. doctorates. 
As already mentioned in previous chapters, the commonly shared motivations for the 
ESA/geese family strategy -- transnational split families for education in other East Asian 
countries as well -- are most likely to converge into the desire for social reproduction or upward 
class mobility, especially through their children’s acquisition of English/foreign languages (Ahn 
2009; Cho 2002; Cho 2004; Cho and et al. 2007; Ch’oe 2007; Chung 2008; Finch and Kim 2012; 
Huang and Yeoh 2005; Kim 2010; Kim and Yun 2005; Lee and Koo 2006; O 2008; Ong 1999; 
Son 2005; Waters 2003, 2005; Yi 2008). Despite omnipresent parental desires for children’s 
class mobility, the reason this social-reproduction strategy of South Korean middle-class families 
is seen as such a striking attempt is because of the boldness of middle-class parents who do not 
hesitate to take this apparently extreme measure because of their anxiety for their children’s 
                                                 
32
 According to a survey, conducted by High Family Association in 2006, among the occupations of  98 geese dads, 
professors were the most common (28%, 27 people), followed by businessmen (26 people), white-collar workers 
(18), doctors (14), lawyers (7), government officials (5), clergyman (1). (Dong-A Online News, June 7, 2006). 
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future at the “risk of dismantling the family structure” or some other unforeseeable end (Ahn 
2009, 139). 
Anthony Giddens, Ulich Beck and other theorists see contemporary society as a risk 
society, that is, a “society increasingly preoccupied with the future,” which constantly generates 
the notion of risk (Giddens 1998, 27). Not just at the societal level, but also at the individual 
level, people have to make decisions in everyday life, facing the uncertainty of the future and its 
consequences. As Beck puts it, “The more risks, the more decisions and choices we have to 
make” (1998, 10). Among diverse and new forms of risks in our time, in a little different vein, 
Stephen Ball (2003) particularly pays attention to “the ‘mundane’ risks attached to the day-to-
day processes of social reproduction in middle class families,” which arises from the 
engagements between the family and the education marketplace (164). He examines the social 
and emotional complexity of social reproduction in relation to educational institutions and the 
education of children through interviews with British middle-class parents, focusing on school 
choice. In his study, Ball argues that the risks are “embedded in the paradox wherein society 
becomes structurally more meritocratic but processually less so, as the middle class work harder 
to maintain their advantages in the new conditions of choice and competition in education” (164). 
Ball’s insight is helpful to understanding the recent middle-class struggles in relation to 
education and social reproduction in the South Korean context, which has been increasingly 
neoliberal and also polarizing in its wealth (Sin 2004). 
As I discussed in chapter two, South Koreans abruptly faced more uncertainty of the 
future after the Economic Crisis in 1997. A generation of parents was laid off from their 
workplaces, which they had believed were life-long jobs, and the size of middle class which had 
been expanding all along drastically shrank. The shock and uncertainty of this parental 
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generation was transmuted into anxiety about their children’s future in an ever more changing 
and competitive global economy. I already pointed out in chapter two how education has played 
a significant role for individuals and families in opening up opportunities for upward social 
mobility in South Korean society. A “rags to riches” (kaech’ŏn esŏ yongnada) story may sound 
too dramatic, but it best describes South Koreans’ hope for upward class mobility in post-war 
society. In most of these stories, education allowed a person an opportunity to rise from a humble 
family. For a while, it looked as if society had become structurally more meritocratic because of 
educational expansion. Indeed, South Korea has achieved remarkable educational expansion 
within a single generation, not only at the primary or secondary, but at the tertiary level as well 
(Park 2007). The number of college students, in particular, rapidly increased due to an explosive 
increase in the number of universities in the mid-1990s. In 2010, 82 percent of high school 
graduates went to college and it was the highest rate in the OECD countries (Choson Online 
News May 24, 2011). However, as a result, the overproduction of academic qualifications has 
brought consequent credential inflation. As the overall attainment of a given level of education 
grows, qualitative differentiation, that is, which type of school the person attends, becomes more 
important for an individual’s life chances (Park 2007, 185). In the past, the attainment of tertiary 
education easily led college graduates to considerably good jobs and middle-class status, but now 
there are no such guarantees because the number of college graduate has grown more rapidly 
than the number of suitable jobs. Not only does the success story of rising from a humble family 
become an obsolete story or a myth, but also the middle class in particular, whose reproduction 
has mostly depended on the attainment of education, becomes more vulnerable to struggles in 
sustaining their class status. 
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About the effect of the devaluation of academic qualification on middle-class social 
reproduction, Bourdieu notes: 
When class fractions who previously made little use of the school system enter the race 
for academic qualification, the effect is to force the groups whose reproduction was 
mainly or exclusively achieved through education to step up their investments so as to 
maintain the relative scarcity of their qualifications and, consequently, their position in 
the class structure. Academic qualifications and the school system which awards them 
thus become one of the key stakes in an interclass competition which generates a general 
and continuous growth in the demand for education and an inflation of academic 
qualifications (1984, 133).  
 
In this vein, the ESA/geese-family phenomenon is the consequences of intensified (inter-class as 
well as intra-class) competition and the investment for better or the best academic qualification 
for social reproduction. As South Korean middle-class parents intensely feel the fear of “falling” 
and sense the crisis that their children’s education and future is at stake, they become open to any 
possibilities for their children’s success, taking risks. As Ball puts it, “When it comes to children, 
parental responsibility has no limits and indeed seems to be continually expanding” (2003, 166). 
It is in this context that this chapter examines South Korean professoriate geese families’ 
normative course and motivations of ESA for their children as well as geese-dad professors’ 
accounts of their educational strategies. I first examine how the professoriate geese dads have 
fashioned a normative geese-family trajectory that draws on their own cultural and social capital; 
I then show how these geese dads themselves reflect their own transnational family practice; and 
finally, I examine what kind of social meanings they produce through their own accounts of their 
practice. In doing so, this chapter endeavors to understand one facet of the subjectivity of South 
Korean intellectuals as middle-class fathers and individuals at this historical juncture. 
Based on the data, I argue that with more practical advantages in its execution, these 
professors’ transnational practices have been at the forefront of the geese-family phenomenon, 
serving as a veritable template for this trend. Interestingly, however, my informants tend to 
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differentiate their own “geese-family making” from that of others in general, thus effectively 
erasing their own privileges. They consider their own geese-family making and their various 
practical advantages as an “inevitable” and “natural” outcome of their own study-abroad 
experiences rather than a “privilege” that elites enjoy. But as “natural” as it may seem, such 
outcomes in most cases in fact derive from carefully constructed plans. It is clear that the fathers’ 
own study-abroad experiences and occupation as a professor function as the source of both the 
“inevitability” and “privilege”; and that these are the most significant sources of “social” and 
“cultural capital” (Bourdieu 1977b, 1984) that have enabled their transnational family project 
and ensured its relative success. I further suggest that their emphasis on inevitability and its 
accompanying internal contradictions might come from their consciousness of the criticism that 
they have attended the phenomenon -- often vilified as an individualistic familial reproductive 
effort, since these are professors who are the most prominent group of intellectuals and also 
educators in South Korean society, which has one of the world’s deepest ideological 
commitments to equality of educational opportunity (Seth 2002; Abelmann, Choi, and Park 2011; 
Park 2007). 
 
I. A Geese Family Template: The Normative ESA Trajectory  
In fact, the professoriate geese dads have fashioned a normative geese-family trajectory, 
which has served as an important template in the lager geese-family phenomenon. Through my 
interviews, I found that my informants made the trajectory of ESA mostly by either bringing 
their family overseas while using sabbatical leave and then dropping them (wife and children or 
children only) off in the host country, or in the case of children who were born overseas during 
their own study-abroad period, sending them alone. In both cases, these professors are in a 
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privileged position with many practical advantages when they implement this transnational 
educational project. 
Their most crucial advantages come from their own earlier study-abroad experiences. 
They are apt to send their children to countries in which they themselves studied abroad,
33
 nearly 
always English-speaking countries -- indeed, the most popular and seemingly ideal ESA 
destinations.
34
 Thus, they are familiar with the language, culture, and system of host countries. 
Even most of their wives (and often their children as well) who “primarily take charge of the 
family project on the front line in transnational social space” (Ahn 2009, 37) can speak English 
at least to the level that they can manage their everyday lives overseas because they have shared 
life-experiences overseas with their husbands. 
Furthermore, in many cases, their children have U.S. citizenship because they were born 
in the U.S. when their parents were graduate students. This is a very critical advantage that other 
children do not have while trying to figure out visa problems; it also reduces the financial burden 
of study abroad education because they can attend public schools (i.e., because they are legally 
eligible).  In addition, professors usually use a sabbatical year to begin the geese-family 
trajectory, later leaving their family in the host country as the fathers return to South Korea, an 
occupational advantage that other professions seldom have. Another occupational advantage is 
the long summer and winter breaks that make it possible for these fathers to sustain family ties. 
                                                 
33
 Among my informants, twenty-two professors sent their children to the U.S., three professors to Canada one 
professor to the U.K., one professor to both the U.S. and the U.K., and one professor to the Philippines.    
34
 Despite the relatively more expensive cost, the English-speaking countries are thought of as the ideal ESA 
destination because acquiring English is one of the most prominent reasons for ESA. Among these countries, the 
U.S. is the most popular destination. The Financial Times reports that there is a world-wide trend, in which 
increasing numbers of middle-class parents send their teen-aged children for early study abroad to English-speaking 
countries. The report says that Korean parents are at the center of this phenomenon of educational fever. It goes on 
to point out that nobody can beat the educational fever and demands on Korean parents, quoting the comments from 
the personnel of private schools in English-speaking countries like the U.S., the U.K.., and New Zealand etc. (Dong-
A Ilbo February 28, 2008).  
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With these advantages, there does indeed seem to be a particular professoriate geese-
family normative trajectory. As mentioned earlier, theirs has become a more general geese-
family template, which many middle-class parents with similar economic conditions often want 
to emulate, believing “if they can do it, I must be able to do it, too” (Chung 2008, 63) and with 
the conviction that the ESA/geese family should not be monopolized by the rich although, in fact, 
they do not have all of the same advantages of professoriate families. 
 
A. Better Prepared: English and Sabbaticals 
Most of my informants in this study were, in a sense, fathers who were better prepared to 
become geese dads. Foremost, their study-abroad experiences were beneficial. With fluent 
English skills, transnational networks, and cultural familiarity with the host country, these 
professoriate geese dads made the best use of their own cultural and social capital to facilitate 
their children’s education overseas. I introduce Professor Shin, who himself did not study abroad, 
to illuminate the difference with an example which compares fathers who had study abroad 
experience and those who did not. Through a negative example, the case of Professor Shin, we 
can see how a father’s study-abroad experience can be crucial cultural and social capital that 
gives advantages throughout the entire ESA process. 
Professor Shin (physical education, 49) was the only person I met who did not study 
abroad amongst my twenty-eight informants. Coincidentally, he was the only father who 
explicitly regretted sending his children to ESA.  He was not a geese dad but reluctantly sent his 
two children abroad for pre-college education against his own will. At the time of the interview, 
his daughter was attending one of the most prominent Art colleges in the U.S. and his son was 
still at a boarding school in England. His daughter had been an exceptional student when she was 
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in Seoul and ESA was the fruit of her own strong will and her mother’s even stronger support. 
Despite his reluctance about ESA and the fact that his wife had never considered becoming a 
geese mother, he had not been able to win his daughter and wife over. 
Although his daughter has been excellent in her academic work throughout her high-
school years in the U.S. beginning in 2003, her ESA experience — even into college — had been 
very difficult. While Professor Shin talked about her emotional and psychological hardships, 
including loneliness, depression, and other issues, which had become more serious over the years, 
surprisingly he told me that he and his wife have never visited their daughter except for at her 
high school graduation. His support for his children was, rather, more focused on the financial 
aspect and he had sometimes needed to ask his own mother for financial support for her 
grandchildren. When I asked him why the couple did not visit their children abroad despite his 
recognition of problems, at first, he told me that he did not feel that it was quite necessary since 
their children so frequently went back and forth during every break. However, later, he expressed 
his heavy heart at the very end of the interview emphasizing how he had been powerless to 
intervene in his daughter’s predicament. It is worth noting what his confession below suggests: 
Cultural capital -- English skills in particular -- of at least one parent is crucial for a successful 
ESA project. He confessed: 
I don’t have overseas experience at all, neither does my wife. It means…you know…if, if 
I had studied abroad, or at least if one of us had experienced cultures over there before, 
we might be able to do a better job of dealing with her issues and solving the problems 
[with better understanding of their system and her situation]. You know, neither me nor 
my wife could control the situation. [Since we cannot speak English] how are we able to 
freely ask and discuss with [the people in] her school about her situation? It would be 
better for people like us to not send kids abroad. 
 
Professor Shin’s last words clearly express his own frustration and regret. Although he was a 
professor, he could not even utilize the typical advantages of a professor such as the sabbatical 
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year or breaks to visit his children abroad, which other professors I interviewed enjoyed, because 
ultimately he did not have study-abroad experience and communication skills in English. 
Without a doubt Professor Shin’s case is somewhat related to individual disposition in the face of 
challenges, and it does not necessarily mean that ESA implemented by parents who did not study 
abroad necessarily leads to negative results. Some parents, for example, rely instead on their own 
social networks such as relatives abroad. However, what is apparent from this account is that to a 
great extent the study-abroad experience itself serves as influential cultural capital preparing 
parents for ESA and geese family arrangements. 
Not all middle-class parents, especially among those who have relatively limited financial 
resources, can execute ESA/geese family only because they wish for it. As scholars point out, 
parents’ income level, educational attainment level, and occupation are all influential factors 
determining who is more likely to send their children abroad for ESA (Kang 2002; Kim and 
Yoon 2005; Son 2005). In addition to the importance of parents’ high income, more education, 
or a white-collar job, parents equipped with proper tools and resources for this educational 
project have better chances of carrying it out successfully. For example, Cho Ŭn (2004) found in 
her research that the more proficient the mothers were in English, the more they tended to 
become geese mothers.
35
 She goes on to argue that the basic structure of the geese family is the 
combination of a father who can afford it financially and a mother who can speak English, 
regardless of which route they may take. If they fulfill these conditions and their children are not 
afraid of life in a foreign country, people willingly enter the life of geese family at any cost. 
Clearly, parents’ English skill as well as children’s is crucial cultural capital for this 
transnational educational project from the outset. Many South Korean parents (usually mothers)  
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 Kim and Yoon (2005) also make the same argument, that when mother has few communication problems in 
foreign countries, it is more likely that families will decide to migrate overseas for their children's education. 
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generally seek help from study-abroad agencies (yuhagwŏn) when they prepare for ESA. From 
gathering basic information to making a decision, even after sending children abroad, many 
parents, particularly those who do not have any specific experiences or social networks (most 
likely relatives or friends) overseas, have no choice but to rely exclusively on these agencies (Yi 
and Yu 2008, 82). On top of language barriers that hinder ordinary parents from accessing 
necessary information, many parents are intimidated by their unfamiliarity with foreign 
educational and legal systems.
36
 Whether sending children abroad alone or with the mother, from 
the beginning to the end, the whole process of preparation, decision making, and implementation 
of ESA is not only financially and emotionally arduous but also practically difficult for most 
ordinary middle-class parents to manage. 
In contrast to the struggles of parents who do not have enough cultural or social capital, 
most of my informants showed different patterns. Their execution of ESA looked relatively 
much easier and many of the fathers were also enthusiastically engaged in the process. They 
meticulously conducted research for their children’s ESA and also actively took advantage of 
their sabbatical years. For instance, Professor Kim (Humanities, 49), who had been a geese dad 
for two and half years for his daughters, articulated how much of an effort he made to find the 
ideal destination in the U.S. for his daughters. Although he chose California as the destination for 
his sabbatical year as a visiting scholar, a place where his relatives lived, he told me that living 
close to relatives was not his primary reason for choosing California. He said: 
What I considered most was the educational environment. I did a great deal of research 
myself. I scrutinized every “school district” (in English) considering which “district” and 
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 Hence, some parents rely on the package of “ESA management program (kwallihyŏng yuahak) as a popular option 
for ESA execution (Yi and Yu 2008, 82-83). This type of service has been getting popular. When parents cannot 
stay with their students in host countries, managers or guardians who are appointed by study abroad agencies 
systematically manage student lives.  From students’ school work to their private lives, these managers or guardians 
regularly report students’ condition to parents.  In addition, the service even affords systematic learning programs 
tailored to students’ academic adjustment needs after returning to Korea. 
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school would be a better fit for my daughters. But, I didn’t want a school with too many 
Korean kids. I calculated that if my daughters adapted well in a good school in a good 
“district,” and in the school which didn’t have too many Korean kids, that perhaps they 
could remain and keep studying there. If not, then, we would need to come back to Korea 
right away; that was my thinking.  
 
He explained further about the many hours he spent investigating the school district’s racial 
distribution, academic performance, and reputation, and even parents’ educational attainment 
levels! He told me that he was able to find out everything he wanted to know through the Internet. 
His account also reflects the wishes of most South Korean geese parents: their preference for 
small- and medium-sized cities with better conditions for learning English including an 
education-centered social environment and fewer South Korean students (Ahn 2009, 11-12). 
Nevertheless, if the geese mother has language and cultural barriers and does not have any 
relatives or friends, options for locations become more limited to Korean-concentrated areas 
regardless of the family’s wish, because they need to rely more heavily on Korean social 
networks from time to time (Chung 2008, 156; Finch and Kim 2012). 
Another critical and practical advantage is the professors’ sabbatical year, which often 
allows them to experiment with ESA during a time of proper legal status in the host country. 
Like Professor Kim, typically a professor uses his sabbatical year to initially visit the U.S. with 
his family, acquiring legal status as a visiting scholar (J-1 visa and J-2 for family) with the 
sponsorship from the university in the U.S., which is often his alma mater or a place where he 
has academic connections. The majority of my informants (16 out of 28) utilized their sabbatical 
years to start this transnational educational project. The exceptions were mostly cases where the 
wives led the ESA project or cases in which the fathers returned to South Korea for a job after 
getting degrees and left their families abroad. Even the cases in which professors did not use a 
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sabbatical year for the initiation of ESA, they still made use of it for visiting their family or 
children overseas. 
Foremost, the sabbatical year allows families to “test” whether foreign education will 
work for their children or not for a year, rather than run a risk of first sending children (and wife) 
overseas. As Professor Kim mentioned above, if children adapt well in their schools while 
making good progress in their English skills, children could stay and keep studying abroad; but if 
not, their family could just return to South Korea all together. When we consider that children’s 
adjustment to life in the U.S. is “the least-predictable aspect” of this transnational family project, 
this makes for a very significant advantage (Finch and Kim 2012, 498). Professor Moon (social 
science, 47) talked about the decision-making process this way: “My son’s will was the most 
important. […] But, at the back of my mind, I probably made a decision within two or three 
month as I watched how well my son was doing there. I had already made up mind that if he 
wanted to stay I would let him do it. Further, I actually hoped that he would decide to stay.” 
 
B. Returning Alone, Leaving Family There: U.S. Citizenship and Economic Burden 
When the sabbatical year approaches its end, the professor’s family faces a moment in 
which they must decide whether or not to continue foreign education for their children. Because 
the father has to come back to South Korea, he has to consider both the family members’ legal 
status and financial conditions. He either chooses to become a geese dad or to leave his 
child/children alone in the host country. When the father is going to be a geese dad, he often 
extends (two more years for the maximum) his J-1 visa status for their family’s legal status (J-2) 
despite his absence in the host country. It is indeed a very common practice among geese-dad 
professors, which is known as “drop and run” (to drop the family in the host country and run to 
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South Korea).
37
 Other fathers, like government officials who have educational opportunities in 
the U.S. with J visas or employees who are assigned to a foreign position can also use this 
opportunity to drop their wives and children in host countries for ESA for more years and leave 
alone for South Korea (Ahn 2009; Finch and Kim 2012; Lee and Koo 2006). 
However, these professoriate families’ additional advantage was their children’s U.S. 
citizenship (dual citizenship
38
 in South Korea and the U.S.). In most cases, these professors’ 
extension of visa status was for the purpose of securing their wives’ legal status as a geese 
mother, rather than for their children, who already had U.S. citizenship. Even after the mother’s 
J-2-visa expiration, she could still manage a geese-family life by going back and forth as long as 
the geese-family life did not last too long. Some mothers themselves studied as full-time students 
with F-1 visas, or stayed as research/visiting scholars with J-1 visas in host countries while 
raising their children. It is not too rare for geese mothers to study in host countries in general. In 
fact, many geese mothers try to secure F-1 visas for their children’s education by enrolling in 
U.S. educational institutions, such as an English language institute, community college, 
undergraduate, and graduate programs.
39
 Kyung Ju Ahn (2009), in her dissertation which 
explores geese mothers’ subjectivities in the transnational social field, points out the importance 
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 A university officer, who was in charge of the international scholar services in her university, argued that this 
practice of “drop and run” by South Korean visiting scholars was so pervasive that it became a headache for the 
office. (Practitioners’ Forum in “Conference on South Korea’s Education Exodus (Chogi yuhak): Risks, Realities, 
and Challenges,” Asian American Studies, UIUC, March 28-29, 2008.) 
38
 In recent years, there have been several changes in the Nationality Law related to dual citizenship in South Korea. 
South Koreans could only keep their dual citizenship until they become 18 years old, until the new Nationality Law 
(effective since 2005) did not permit multiple nationalities. Later, there was another revision of the law (effective 
from January 1, 2011) and dual citizenship became again possible but only after fulfilling compulsory military 
service for men. For more details, see chapter 4. See also Kim 2013. 
39
 It is prohibited by South Korean law for elementary students to study abroad.  As Ahn (2009) explains, “the only 
way that goose mothers can stay with their children legally in the United States is to get an international student visa 
(F1). Therefore, most goose mothers try to get admitted to an educational institution in the United States and then 
bring their children as dependents (F2), which is a good way to evade the Korean law, and to stay legal in the U.S. 
as well.” It also means that they have to pay expensive education fees (approximately $1700-$7000 per semester as 
tuition fees) to stay in the United States (144). However, a mother’s F-1 visa status also reduces the financial burden 
of the family by ensuring children’s eligibility to attend public schools in the U.S.  
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of the legal status (F-1, J-1, and green cards / citizenship) of geese mothers; she argues that legal 
status “determines transmigrants’ life setting and their level of lifestyle, an indicator of their 
future” (171). Yet, not only is the legal status of mothers important, but also the  children’s legal 
status is crucial in that it affects the whole family’s lifestyle, finance, and future as we will see 
more through this and other chapters. 
When children with U.S. citizenship had to stay alone without their families, it was 
usually arranged for them to live with a legal guardian who was often their relative or a friend of 
their parents in the host country; they would then continue to attend public school. Even when 
the children were sent alone for ESA directly from South Korea without using their fathers’ 
sabbatical opportunities, the process was also much easier and simpler if the children had U.S. 
citizenship. Professor Lee’s (Natural science, 50) case, which I introduce in more details later in 
this chapter and also chapter four, shows this in a somewhat shocking way. To our surprise, his 
wife secretly sent their son to the U.S. for ESA despite Professor Lee’s strong opposition while 
he was participating in an international conference overseas.  His wife planned and executed it 
alone, so Professor Lee realized the fact only after his returning from the conference. After 
realizing what had happened, he was so upset that he had a difficult time with his wife for a 
while. He explained: “I didn’t realize that it was so simple. My son didn’t even need I-20 
because he was a U.S. citizen. He already had both U.S. and Korean passports and it was 
arranged for him to be in our relative’s home. Thus the process was so simple [i.e., to the extent 
that I didn’t know my wife’s preparation].” This contrasts sharply with the difficulties and 
complications that make other parents seek study-abroad agencies. Usually, children without U.S. 
citizenship have to get into expensive private schools in order to stay legally, even if they live 
with a legal guardian there. At the worst, if parents cannot find a proper guardian for their 
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children, the last resort is the more expensive boarding schools, although some parents do 
voluntarily seek boarding schools because of their quality of education. 
Children’s U.S. citizenship also made this transnational family project much cheaper. It 
critically reduced fathers’ economic burden by allowing the children to keep attending public 
schools without paying tuition. It was in fact one of the most central reasons that allowed most of 
my informants -- who were obviously middle class in economic terms – to keep managing their 
geese-family lives for several years without being over-burdened, at least until their children got 
into college. When middle-class families take part in the phenomenon, their financial, personal, 
marital, and familial costs are, in fact, enormous. Especially when it becomes a long term project 
reaching ten years, the costs are vast.  One study revealed that most geese dads sent 50-100% of 
their family incomes to their families overseas and experience strong financial pressures (Kim 
2006, 149-150). They often sell their own real estate, move to much smaller living quarters, and 
invest everything for their children while sacrificing their own retirement funds. It has been 
expected that it costs families roughly $28,700 to $76,500 annually to support their children (150; 
The Korea Times. October 31, 2005). Professor Lee, whom I introduced above, said that ESA 
would have been economically burdensome without his son’s U.S. citizenship. A few years later, 
after sending his son to the U.S. and managing geese-family life with his wife’s travelling back 
and forth, he was satisfied with the returns on his son’s ESA. However, when his wife badgered 
him again into sending his youngest daughter in middle school to the U.S., he rejected the idea 
outright. It was not because she was a daughter, but because she did not have U.S. citizenship. 
He told me, “I said to my wife, ‘Didn’t you say we don’t have money?’ I cannot send her 
because I don’t have enough money. Of course, we might send our son because we could finance 
it. But actually we didn’t spend a lot for him because he attended public school while staying 
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with our relatives. But my daughter is not a U.S. citizen unlike him and it will cost a lot. I cannot 
manage it.” Even within a family, having U.S. citizenship matters in determining a child’s 
opportunities. 
 
C. I Am Not a “Penguin Dad”: Regular Visits for Family Bonds 
Beyond just the sabbatical year, geese-dad professors have a number of advantages that 
allow them to be more proactive fathers who can maintain family bonds. These professors 
certainly are in a better position to sustain their family ties, intimacy, and stability by regularly 
visiting the host country, taking advantage of long summer and winter breaks with more 
flexibility. Most middle-class geese dads, even those in higher-earning professions, rarely share 
this privilege of periodic long family reunions. 
Maintaining geese-family life is both economically and emotionally tough as the mass 
media has frequently pointed out with the phrases “the drain of national wealth” or “family 
breakdown.” In particular, it is difficult to sustain family bonds over vast geographical distance; 
the negative effects on family members’ emotions and relationships have been frequently 
discussed by both scholars and in media discourse. Geese dads often feel that they are alienated 
from their own family and their family relationship becomes a little bit awkward (Ahn 2009; 
Ch’oe 2005; S. Kim 2006; K. Kim 2009; Kim and Chang 2004; Kim and Kim 2009; Ŏm 2002; 
Yi 2008). Ahn (2009) describes the typical geese-family reunion overseas in this way: “Wives 
and husbands’ face-to-face meetings once or twice a year are not always successful, because for 
the first three or four days, they feel unfamiliar with each other; and when they start to get used 
to each other, it is time for the husband to leave” (2009, 94). Geese families often become 
estranged from each other because of lack of face-to face interaction and shared experiences. As 
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a result, fathers in particular discover that they are strangers to the family and, as a scholar 
expresses, experience a sort of “anomie of inner world” through which their “symbolic cosmos” 
collapses (K. Kim 2009). Thus, the geese family is called the “moratorium family,” a family that 
sacrifices family of the present for the sake of children’s future by giving up family intimacy or 
father’s presence (Ch’oe 2005, 248). 
The hardships that are most repeatedly reported by domestic media are also those of 
geese dads. Particularly as the geese-family phenomenon spreads out to the lower-middle class, 
the geese dads who do not have enough financial resources and mobility have to face the harsh 
reality of seldom seeing their family and all the various problems that come with this reality. 
Although most geese families try to maintain their emotional ties through advanced 
communication technologies like the Internet or phone calls, creating a “virtual context of ‘co-
presence’” (Ahn 2009, 8), the virtual presence never matches the physical presence of family. 
Thus, the media often portray the geese dad as a “poor dad” who is left alone. In these depictions, 
the father becomes a “money-making machine” and is thrown into awful circumstances of 
loneliness, alienation, depression, a heavy drinking habit, a poor diet, sickness, and/or sometimes 
divorce. Further, the media intermittently delivers more shocking news of geese dads who 
eventually commit suicide because they cannot overcome economic or emotional hardships, or 
geese dads who are unexpectedly found alone with chronic illness and without family care. Even 
a major life insurance company used a lonely geese dad who sent his wife and children to the 
U.S. as the main character of a TV commercial in order to deliver the message that people need 
to prepare for family futures with life insurance.
40
 According to one survey of 98 geese dads in 
2006, many geese dads in fact experienced physical or emotional difficulties and also felt a sense 
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 This is one of a TV commercial series, aired by Samsung Life Insurance Company in 2009. This indicates how 
pervasive the image of the geese family is. 
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of shame. And 10% of geese dads responded that they currently were not able to adapt to geese-
dad lives (Dong-A Ilbo Jun 7, 2006). However, while generalizing and victimizing all geese dads 
as the father who gives up a sound (marital) life by succumbing to excessive educational zeal and 
overly-selfish familism, the media tends to ignore the geese-dad’s agency as a father who is a 
caring father and also a competent educational consumer. The media, in presenting geese dads 
this way, easily vilifies geese families as a social ill and in an attempt to prevent the proliferation 
of the geese family phenomenon.  However, these images do not represent the entire spectrum of 
geese dads. 
In contrast, I found that my informants often appeared to be active fathers who tried to 
control the split-family situation by taking advantage of all the characteristics of their 
occupation.
41
 In addition to routinely using communication technologies like the Internet, Skype, 
and phone calls, they regularly traveled at least twice a year to host countries and stayed with 
their families for periods of time that ranged from several weeks to several months at a time, 
usually using their long summer and winter breaks from their universities. Some of them made 
extra visits to their families by using the mid-term period or adding a few more days onto their 
international conference visits in host countries. Some stayed with family in host countries using 
their sabbatical year and restored family bonds which might have been somewhat weakened 
without it. 
There are South Korean social slang terms expressing geese dads’ mobility which also 
imply fathers’ different economic ability and social status: there are penguin dads (p’enggwin 
appa), geese dads (kirŏgi appa) and eagle dads (toksuri appa). Penguin dad refers to a father in 
the lower-middle class who seldom (less than once a year) visits his family because of lack of 
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 Lee and Koo (2006) also found in their study that the fathers were not only as active as the mothers but also often 
the initiators of their geese-family arrangement and strategy. 
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money and time. As penguins cannot fly although they have wings, penguin dads cannot freely 
fly and are stuck at home, constrained by their work and finances. Eagle dads have the best 
mobility, with enough money and flexible time. Unlike the average geese dad who visits his 
family once or twice a year mostly by using yearly vacation, eagle dad can fly overseas like an 
eagle whenever he wants to go or whenever his family needs him. 
None of my informants’ situations made me think of them as penguin dads. Some 
professors openly admitted that they were eagle dads. It is also true that there was a disparity 
among my informants in terms of individual financial circumstances. Some could visit their 
families more often than others. However, they all enjoyed family reunions at least more than 
twice a year, sometimes adding the variation of having the family visit South Korea. Most of my 
informants made comments like this one: “If I were not a professor and I didn’t have time to visit 
my family like other salaried men, I am not sure if I would ever make the same decision.” For 
this reason, they seemed relatively more confident and satisfied with their transnational family 
project than others because of their more stable families and marital relationships despite 
transnational distance. Although these professors mostly emphasized their time flexibility as the 
crucial factor that made their regular family reunions be possible, it should also not be ignored 
that these reunions were also possible because of their comparatively upper-middle-class status, 
which was relatively free from monetary worries. 
Until now, I have examined how geese-dad professors developed a normative trajectory 
of this transnational educational project with many advantages, establishing a template for the 
geese-family phenomenon which other families sought to emulate. As discussed above, they 
were in a privileged position to implement the geese family with their cultural, social, and 
economic capital which mostly came from the combination of previous study-abroad experience 
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and their present occupation as professor. I was intrigued, however, by the fact that many of my 
informants asserted that their geese family was not the fruit of their privilege, but rather an 
“inevitable” or “natural” outcome of their own study-abroad experiences. 
 
II. Special Circumstances: “We Are Different” from Other Geese Families 
During the interviews, many of these professors showed a tendency to differentiate their 
own ESA/geese family from that of others in general and distance themselves from the 
phenomenon when they were talking about their ESA circumstances, motivations, and 
management. They narrated their own distinctiveness, often replacing the advantages that they 
benefit from with the “inevitability” of the situation. While defending their own practices as 
“inevitable,” “natural,” and somewhat “different” from others, they emphasized their children’s 
ESA success as a result of their children’s own competence rather than a result of unfair 
privileges (Abelmann and Kang 2014; Park 2010). They seemed to express that they were 
somewhat entitled to the privileged position of being social elites, overlooking the issues of 
unequal educational opportunities and social class related to ESA. In this process, they also often 
revealed contradictions between their actual active involvement in this family project and the 
rhetoric of inevitability, which downplayed their own agency. 
In my informants’ accounts, I often found that inequality of access to ESA (more broadly, 
access to educational opportunities) was erased. Some studies are particularly insightful in 
shedding light on why these geese dads are often tempted to erase their privileges as social elites 
in their ESA practice and rather naturalize the opportunity as what they or their children may 
deserve.  They might say something like, “Because my children adapted and performed very well 
in U.S. school, I dropped them there” or “I knew my child was smart, so he would excel in the 
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U.S.” Joseph Park  (2010) analyzed “success stories” of English learning in the South Korean 
conservative press and found that, in those stories, the linguistic competence of the successful 
learner was imagined as “deeply grounded in subjective, human qualities of the learner” rather 
than as “rooted in the learner’s social provenance of institutional privileges” (23). Through this 
“naturalization of competence,” he goes onto argue that the “class-based constraints on access to 
English” and inequality are obscured; the process of both erasing privilege and highlighting 
competence “ultimately rationalizes and justifies the neoliberal logic of human capital 
development” while reducing the underlying complexity (22). And such naturalization serves as 
“the fundamental ground for justifying the position of the privileged class” (34). 
Pierre Bourdieu (1984) investigated how the making of cultural distinctions by dominant 
groups legitimates the power and control deeply rooted in economic inequalities and is used as a 
means of social reproduction. Bourdieu points out that, in order to accumulate cultural capital, 
people need resources -- considerable time, effort and expense — which are not equally available 
to all; economic conditions that are distant from necessity is the precondition of accumulation of 
cultural capital. Yet, professors are a group of people whose “reproduction mainly depends on 
cultural capital” more than “economic capital” (115). It seems that because the characteristic that 
most of my informants mainly rely on for this family project is their cultural capital more than 
economic capital, it tends to make them look differently on their own practices. In this process, 
they showed contradictory attitudes. On the one hand, in keeping with the media, they tended to 
treat others’ practices collectively, regarding others’ practices as coming from either wealth or 
overeager parents, while on the other hand, they hoped that their own practice would be 
respected as an “inevitable” individual “choice.” 
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As I discussed in chapter two, South Korean professors are an important symbolic 
reference group as both social elites and moral exemplars, intellectuals who are considered 
paragons of social consciousnesses, modernity, and high-culture in South Korean society, which 
still sustains a strong Confucian legacy of respecting and valuing scholarship and scholars 
(despite the fact that most professors are actually economically middle-class). In this vein, I 
cautiously interpret this differentiation of geese-dad professors as a conscious/unconscious effort 
that comes from a desire to both hold onto their self dignity as intellectuals and to maintain their 
identity as social elites who usually do not want to assimilate to popular trends because “social 
identity is defined and asserted through difference” (Bourdieu 1984, 172). 
 
A. Not Privileged, but Inevitable/Natural 
First of all, many of my informants tended to think of the “choice” they made to become 
an ESA/geese family as the inevitable outcome of their own study abroad. Further, they thought 
the naturalness of the phenomenon came about  as much from their children’s foreign citizenship, 
explaining that they had just followed the life trajectory which their study-abroad experiences 
and their occupation brought about. These fathers frequently talked about the special 
circumstance that they had. Indeed, the words, “special circumstance” (t’ŭksu sanghwang), came 
up during a number of my interviews. Although each special circumstance was somewhat 
different, they commonly attributed the particular circumstance to their previous study-abroad 
experiences. 
Professor Kim (humanities, 49) also claimed that his family was in a special circumstance 
when I asked him how he ended up becoming a geese dad. Professor Kim has exited from his 
geese-dad life a few years earlier at the time of the interview. As I introduced him in the previous 
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section, he used his sabbatical year to visit the U.S. when his older daughter was in 10
th
 grade. 
His older daughter, who had lived in the U.S. in the past when her father studied for his doctoral 
degree, had many memories of the life in the U.S., but she did not have U.S. citizenship because 
she was born in South Korea. In contrast, his younger daughter was born in the U.S. but actually 
did not know much about U.S. life. When a year of sabbatical in the U.S. ended, Professor Kim 
extended his J visa for his older daughter’s legal stay in the U.S. until she got into college. At the 
time of the interview, his older daughter had already graduated college and just gotten into a 
graduate school in the U.S., and his younger daughter was attending an international school in 
Seoul. 
When I asked him why he thought that their circumstance was “special,” he assertively 
spoke, “We don’t have the financial condition to send kids for ESA as others do, and we didn’t 
plan ESA for our daughters.” However, I felt that his argument was somewhat contradictory to 
his account of how he carefully planned and prepared this family project using his sabbatical 
year while meticulously researching schools in California for his daughters and having it in mind 
to test whether the U.S. education would work for his daughters or not. He went on: 
Well, it is more reasonable to say that we were led by a special circumstance rather than 
that we created it. It was not like that we had an intention for ESA from the outset. Rather, 
it came from my [older] daughter’s natural experience of the life in the U.S. in the past. 
So we didn’t start it with saying like “let’s educate our daughter in better educational 
environment.” Rather, as I said, it only emerged and was decided in my sabbatical year. 
And it actually came from…you know... the change that my previous study abroad 
caused. […] If I hadn’t studied in the U.S. so that my daughter wouldn’t have lived and 
attended elementary school there, we probably wouldn’t have become a geese family. 
 
He emphasized that not only did it start from his sabbatical year without a pre-made decision but 
that his family’s action was also taken to resolve the special circumstance that resulted from his 
previous study abroad. Professor Kim explained it in this way: He thought that his older daughter 
94 
 
would well adapt to South Korean school life when his family returned to South Korea after he 
got his doctorate because she was still young (nine-years old). He went on: 
Although she didn’t speak out much about it, it seemed that she had gotten through the 
cultural shock after she came back to Korea. She couldn’t adapt well to the Korean 
educational system. Actually it was not a real issue whether she academically performed 
well or not in school. She was emotionally very dissatisfied while wanting more to read 
English books than Korean books and missing the environment in the U.S. 
 
What he implies in his account is that his choice was not totally voluntary because of the special 
circumstances. His daughter happened to live in the U.S. because of her father; she experienced 
some difficulties as an outcome of it; then an opportunity was given to them that offered the 
possibility of dealing with the problem. It was easy for him to think of it as inevitable. And many 
spoke similarly of inevitability. 
Some professors claimed that they indeed had not wanted to be a geese family at all but 
felt that there was no choice. According to them, their inevitable situations resulted from their 
own or their wives’ study or their extended stay in foreign countries for post-graduate careers as 
post-doctorate fellows or researchers. Once their children began to attend middle or high schools, 
they did not feel that they could insist that their children come back to South Korea with them 
since they could imagine the difficulties that their children might be faced with. Rather, they 
witnessed the cases of other fathers who decided to return to the U.S. despite their decent work 
positions in South Korea because their children failed to adjust to the South Korean school 
system, competitive learning environment, and peer culture. And they were even persuaded by 
others who asked them why they tried to bring them back to South Korea when other parents 
went to desperate efforts to send children abroad. 
On the other hand, some professors thought that their geese families were “different” 
from others’ although there was no apparent inevitability or urgent reason that made them unable 
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to resist. A few professors even thought that what they were doing for their children now was not 
ESA. Professor Kwon (business, 55) was one of them. Professor Kwon has been a geese dad for 
about three years for his second and third daughters who have U.S. citizenship. His interview 
with me was occurred right after his wife returned from the U.S., after his third daughter was 
accepted into college. When I started asking in earnest about his motivation for his children’s 
ESA, he surprised me with this first response: “Ah! Ours actually is not ESA.” So I had to 
remind him that I was interviewing him because he was geese dad. Then he denied it again, 
replying, “Yes, I’ve been geese dad about three years, but my case is somewhat different because 
… well, in fact I don’t think our case is ESA.” He even thought that his daughters were not so 
young to be doing what was called “early” study abroad. He then started to explain why his case 
was different. According to him, his geese family experience started during his second sabbatical. 
He had already spent his first sabbatical year in 1999 in the U.S. when his first daughter, who 
does not have U.S. citizenship but spent a substantial period of her early years in the U.S., was in 
10
th
 grade. At that time, their family came back to Seoul together, without the slightest hesitation, 
although his oldest daughter had a difficult time for a while in Korean high school. However, 
fortunately, his oldest daughter managed well, got into a top college in South Korea, and 
eventually got into a U.S. graduate school. 
When he had his second sabbatical in 2006, his family went again to the U.S., to a 
college town in New York. This was when his second and third daughters had finished 10
th
 and 
8
th
 grade respectively, but he thought that the family would return to South Korea like they had 
after his first sabbatical despite the expected future difficulties of his daughters in South Korean 
schools. Yet, he decided to return to Korea after his sabbatical alone since his daughters “adapted 
well” in U.S. schools, and he became a geese dad. He said, “I neither thought of nor intended 
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ESA at that time as people think of ESA. I just thought I could see how the situation would turn 
out. And they adapted well…” Although he denied his intention to pursue ESA, as the interview 
proceeded, it revealed that the trajectory of his geese family was very typical of the route that 
many other geese-dad professors took. And later he somewhat admitted that he, to some extent, 
considered the possibility of becoming a geese family when he brought his family to U.S., saying, 
“Um… well, now that I think about it, it may be true that at that time the intention of leaving my 
daughters there might have been stronger. But if they couldn’t adapt well, there was no reason to 
leave them there. Still it was not like we should do it because other families do.” Even though 
Professor Kwon said that they did not do it because other families did it, it is plausible that they 
might have decided to do it more easily because others did it. Making the decision to stay in the 
U.S. in 1999, even given that his oldest daughter had U.S. citizenship, would have been more 
difficult than in 2006 when the geese-family phenomenon was pervasive and at its peak. 
Yet, for some fathers, the geese family is not only inevitable, but also very “natural.” 
Professor Chon (natural science, 51) was especially convinced himself of the naturalness of 
whole procedure of his geese-family making although there were certain moments in which he 
clearly initiated the process. He has been a geese dad for five years at the time of the interview. 
He did not use his sabbatical to start his children’s ESA, but rather sent his two children who 
have U.S. citizenship to the U.S alone. He first sent his daughter in 2001 and his son in 2003 to 
his wife’s close friend in Maryland when the friend offered to take care of them. Later, his wife 
also joined their children in the U.S. when her friend expressed that she had some difficulties 
taking care of the Chon’s two children in addition to her own children. Professor Chon said that 
there was no special reason whatsoever for his family to do ESA and neither did he “make up his 
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mind” to do so. It was a matter of every condition naturally lining up such that the process was 
smooth. He described: 
You know, the whole procedure was so natural, so my “wife” (in English) believes that 
God guided us while preparing it for us. Indeed, there was a specific circumstance in 
front of us that we could make a certain “choice” (in English), so we simply asked our 
children, “Do you want to go there?” We planned nothing. This whole situation happened 
with God’s guidance. That’s what we believe. We never thought we should send them 
abroad for their success or said to them, “Go and learn English.” Not at all! It so naturally 
happened as if water flows (mul hŭrŭdŭsi).  
 
The specific circumstances that he means are primarily the combination of his children’s U.S. 
citizenship and the voluntary offer from his wife’s friend to take care of his children. Professor 
Chon’s family had lived in the U.S. for ten years including his extended post-doctoral years until 
his daughter was in second grade. In addition, his children had regularly visited the U.S. during 
summer vacations because their relatives were there. 
Contrary to his previous assertion, through the interview, I found that this ESA project 
was hardly a natural occurrence, but initiated by him through his repeated questioning of the 
children if they wanted to go there. However, he kept talking about how his decision, as well as 
his daughter’s and son’s decisions was natural. When I asked him if he gave a thought to the 
possibility of eventually being a geese family when he sent children to the U.S., he replied: 
There was no special thought about it, no. “Let’s think about what happens ‘in the future’ 
in the future,” was how I thought. I didn’t give a thought that I might become a geese dad 
if I sent my children or I would never have become a geese dad. […] As I told you before, 
simply there was an opportunity to make a “choice” (in English). If my kids didn’t have 
the U.S. citizenship, they would definitely stay here since we never had an intention for 
ESA.  
  
To Professor Chon, as children’s U.S. citizenship was the natural outcome of his study abroad, 
the whole process of becoming a geese family was doubtlessly natural because everything 
worked in concert, especially with God’s help. And what I found in his account was that his 
agency naturally slipped away and he took his advantages for granted. 
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These professors often said that they just wanted to use the opportunity, but the 
opportunity itself was not the purpose. As many of these professors pointed out, the geese family 
project was possible because of the merit of their occupation and also their children’s abilities to 
adapt to the U.S educational system, and not mainly because they had enough money. Since it 
was not mainly based on their financial ability, they tended to obfuscate those advantages, not 
admitting to them as privileges. They underscored that their previous study-abroad experiences 
and their sabbatical years brought them special circumstances and, in doing so, argued that their 
geese families were inevitable, natural, and different. Yet, what they did not recognize was that 
the so-called inevitability was in fact no more than their special advantages that ordinary people 
were envious of.  They did not recognize that they had a certain privileged mechanism that 
enabled the mobility and stability of their families. 
 
B. Excessive Educational Zeal? Not Us! 
As these professors busily differentiated themselves from others, there certainly were 
some differences between my informants and other geese parents in general in terms of the 
procedure, circumstances, and family stability. What these professors expressed in their 
differentiation also often converged with the idea that they were not overzealous parents, but 
good parents. To a great extent, the rhetoric of inevitability is not different from an implicit 
expression of it. 
Although my informants also shared the general parental concerns that there were 
negative push factors in South Korean education such as dissatisfaction with public education 
and overheated competition, many of them were somewhat reserved in their overt complaints 
about those issues and rarely said that they also followed the trend of ESA because of these 
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issues. Also, only a few of my informants candidly expressed their bafflement when they had to 
decide on their children’s ESA as a very practical strategy to overcome difficult situations, 
especially when they expected that their children might not enter elite universities in South 
Korea despite their firm belief in their children’s capabilities. These fathers or their wives 
believed that their children could have more opportunities in the U.S. (or other countries) and 
have a successful return to South Korea. However, in general, I sensed that they did not want me 
to misunderstand their family project as “escape ESA” (dop’ihyŏng chogi yuhak), which was an 
alternative route that was pursued when children could not adjust to the rigors of the South 
Korean educational system and parents had either enough financial resources or excessive 
educational zeal to send them abroad. They also seemed to want to assert that learning English 
also was not their ultimate purpose -- unlike the typical ESA project. 
South Korean parents’ educational zeal for their children is already well known and in 
fact familial expenditure on education in South Korea is among the highest in the world (Park 
2007). It is not an exaggeration anymore to describe that South Korean students prepare for their 
college entrance examination beginning in kindergarten and that a family’s daily schedule is 
focused around the students in the family. It is probably not easy to find a nation like South 
Korea, in which educational issues are discussed so frequently and appear in the mass media so 
often throughout the entire year, and in which the governmental offices and companies delay 
their work time for hours for the transportational convenience of students taking the college 
entrance examination. The psychological pressure from the competitiveness that both parents and 
students feel is enormous across the board in South Korean society. The reason why the 
educational strategy of ESA/geese family, once confined to the upper classes, can now be seen 
across the socio-economic spectrum is because parents seek assurance of a competitive future for 
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their children, especially as South Korean parents increasingly recognize English as critical 
cultural capital for competition in the global economy (Cho 2005; Chung 2008; Park 2010, 2011; 
Park and Abelmann 2004; Song 2010). 
However, many of my informants distinguished themselves from others, explicitly 
emphasizing that their motivations of ESA were not born from excessive educational zeal or 
blind desire for English learning as in the case of other parents. It seemed that they, by and large, 
were not happy to admit their participation in the phenomenon. They frequently denied that they 
were following the social trend, in contrast to geese mothers in other studies who saw themselves 
as “being driven by external influences” which could be called “trend” or “current.” However, 
the geese mothers in these studies are in fact active agents driving this phenomenon (Chung 2008, 
106). 
For example, Professor Chon (natural science, 51) expressed his indifference to the 
ESA/geese family phenomenon by stating that he never heard about the social commentary about 
how ESA was the manifestation of excessive educational zeal. He emphasized that his children’s 
ESA was not based on such “excessive zeal” (kwayŏl). Further, Professor Chon said that he had 
never speculated about other parents’ motivations for ESA although he knew many people were 
talking about English. He went on to say that it was only the occasion of our interview that got 
him thinking about what would be the advantages or disadvantages of sending his children 
overseas. Shockingly, he said, “This is the first time I’ve thought about it, really!” According to 
his account, he simply made practical life choices for his children following his own value 
system and others’ gaze did not matter to him. 
Of this denial, Kayoun Chung, in her dissertation (2008), illustrated a mother who lived 
in a college town in the U.S. with her husband and young children during her graduate education. 
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The mother distinguished herself from other zealous (geese) mothers who temporarily migrated 
there for their children's English education. Similar to my informants, the mother tended not to 
think she was part of the Korean English fever (yŏng’ŏ yŏlp’ung) phenomenon although others 
still considered her family to be there for their children’s English education. Chung argues that 
the boundary between motivations for children's English education and parents’ education is not 
clear and that each family takes seemingly different paths (87). Chung also points out that geese 
mothers do not see their own practice as anything extreme; she argues that parents, who think of 
preparation of children for globalization and cosmopolitanism as good parenting, validate their 
choices of temporary migration to the U.S. for their children’s English education and normalize 
their seemingly extreme practice by envisioning their children's future happiness. 
In a similar vein, a study also shows that South Korean middle-class mothers have a 
tendency to minimize their investment in their children’s education by saying things like “what I 
do for my children is not special” although they in fact invest a lot. To explain this attitude, 
Minkyŏng Yi (2007) draws on François de Singly’s ideas of “official indifference.”  According 
to Singly argument, which resonates with Park’s “naturalization of competence” (2010, 22) 
above, this attitude comes from mothers’ desire to emphasize that their children’s achievement 
comes from their children’s own ability, not from their investment. Underneath mothers’ 
psychology, there is an intention to interpret the “cultural” as “natural.” Yi goes on to argue that, 
in the South Korean context, this sort of mothers’ attitude is also a defense mechanism activated 
by their consciousness of the negative connotations surrounding excessive educational zeal (172-
3). 
Many of these geese-dad professors thought that the words “excessive educational zeal” 
(kwayŏldoen kyoyungnyŏl) could be applied to some of the other geese parents, especially those 
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who sent children to expensive boarding schools, spending almost a hundred thousand dollars a 
year; yet they did not apply the phenomenon to themselves. These professors often said, “I am 
not in that category.” They said that they rather often felt a “big gap” between themselves and 
the parents who had “enough” money to send their children overseas. If they did not have the 
conditions they did (which I discussed in the previous section), they would have “never even 
dream of it.” Some professors in fact complained of financial difficulties they have had 
especially after the global financial crisis in 2008 and its concomitant effects on the exchange 
rate, sometimes saying that they were in debt or  they might have to sell their apartment soon to 
keep supporting their children’s education, especially when their children went to college. 
Some fathers pointed out that all ESA could not be identically treated as excessive 
educational zeal. Professor Kwon (business, 55) elaborated it in this way: 
I have no intention to defend the people who choose ESA, but as you know it, the 
educational cost is already huge even if parents raise their children in Korea. […] We 
may call it as “excessive,” but we cannot simply say that parents who send children 
overseas are excessive and parents who keep children at home are not. It is just a matter 
of which measures they take. The very reality that even parents who do not have money 
have to spend so much money for education is truly excessive, isn’t it?  
 
Professor Kwon also stressed that he did not send his children abroad because of the 
maladaptation to or avoidance of something wrong in South Korean education, since he thought 
Korean education also had its own strengths. Rather, he did so because they had an opportunity 
and he thought, based on his experience – his own study abroad and previous sabbatical stay in 
the U.S. etc., that education abroad could give his children something more. For example, it 
could give them different experiences and broader, cosmopolitan perspectives. 
In a similar vein, Professor Park (engineering, 49) rejected the collective judgment of 
ESA/geese families. He spoke: “It is an individual choice. And everyone has his/her own reason 
and thought to do so. Since I think it is not right to just lump all of them, different individual 
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cases, together as identical one, I don’t care what others say about it. And it doesn’t have an 
impact on me.” He said that his children’s ESA started from his hope to give his children a right 
to make a choice for their own future. Like Professor Park, my informants often showed a strong 
orientation toward individual freedom and parental desires to give their children the 
opportunities to make a choice for their own lives. It seems that some of them certainly pursue 
the liberal ideas of personhood beyond the competition and fixed framework of success, as I will 
discuss more in depth in chapter four. Some fathers showed optimism for their children’s 
happiness as the most important gain abroad, saying that they did not expect only instrumental 
returns – returns on the symbolic and economic value of foreign education and credentials -- for 
their transnational family project. This also seemed to be another reason they believed that they 
were different from others. 
 
III. Inevitability, the Manifestation of Internal Struggles 
As I examined, although these fathers took part in the ESA/geese phenomenon, and to a 
large extent played a leadership role in creating a normative course for this transnational project, 
in sum, they were reluctant to be identified as “typical” geese families. Through the interviews, 
they stressed individual choice, boasting their pioneering spirits and abilities as a competent 
father, but at the same time highlighted the circumstances, belittling their own agency of choice 
and erasing privileges. Also they did not want to be seen collectively, but they still kept distance 
from other geese families, treating others collectively. 
Some scholars who have researched geese families have often confessed that they are 
faced with the difficulty of recruiting interviewees since many geese mothers and fathers usually 
are “not enthusiastic about being interviewed.” This is because they are “angry about how they 
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are portrayed in both the mass media and academic articles” (Finch and Kim 2012, 495). They 
are also fear that “they might appear too frank or shameless” (Chung 2008, 105) or that their 
stories might become an object of “blame and judgment” (Ahn 2009, 26). These groups of 
interviewees, which include my interviewees, often feel that the media and scholarship 
sensationalize their situation by distorting the truth; thus they naturally try to keep their distance 
from these negative, vilified general descriptions of geese families. 
In addition to these general concerns, it seems that my informants’ contradictory attitudes 
come from their self-recognition as professors, whose occupational prestige index is one of the 
highest in South Korean society, and the struggles that come with this recognition (Hong 2010, 
65). They probably recognized the instrumental characteristics of the transnational family project 
and did not want their practice to be seen as something that runs against the social imaginary of 
respectable professors, even in the case of those professors who do not care about others’ gaze. 
Indeed, Professor Kim (humanities, 49) unconsciously unlocked a fragment of his inner thoughts 
at one point in the interview. He stated: “I was sometimes cautious to talk about my own geese 
family. Professors usually are not rich enough to send children abroad, still most people cannot 
send children abroad, you know, so there might be an issue of social disharmony (sahoejŏk 
wiwhagam). So I was a little cautious…” Professor Kim’s concern over the “social disharmony” 
might come from his awareness of an “inequality of chances of access” to better education, the 
mechanism which transmutes social inequality into educational inequality or inequality of 
success in Bourdieu’s terms (1977b, 158). 
Sociologists have argued that not only is a person’s socio-economic origin indicated by 
parental education and occupation, but also educational capital is closely related to social origin 
(Bourdieu 1984; Park 2007). Especially in South Korea where individuals take on the brunt of 
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the cost of education with little public support, “advantaged families [with more resources] are 
more likely to succeed in sending their children to qualitatively different, better placements at a 
given level of education” (Park 2007,185-186). In terms of socio-economic origin, indeed, 
among my twenty-eight informants, twenty four professors self-defined their socio-economic 
origin as middle class and over; based on my informants’ accounts, fifteen professors were from 
the middle and upper-middle class, nine professors were from the upper class, and only four 
professors were from the lower class. Most of these professors are the first in their families to 
study abroad; only seven professors have immediate-family members (parents or siblings) who 
had study abroad experiences. In a sense, these professors are those who can successfully 
preserve their class status and achieve upward social mobility as social elites through education, 
more specifically through study abroad. 
For over a decade, the polarization of educational opportunities has become a serious 
social concern. As I mentioned above, it has become more and more difficult to find people who 
rose from a humble family only through education with their own talent and diligence. An 
editorial in Kyunghyang Shinmun raised the issue of educational inequalities by making a 
contrast between children who go to ESA and those who cannot even pay tuition for secondary 
education (13 October, 2006); ESA has become a typical symbol of educational inequalities. My 
informants are parents who are “able to use economic, social, cultural and emotional capitals at 
moments of crisis or key moments of transition to ensure access to privileged trajectories or to 
avert calamity” as I have shown above (Ball 2003, 169). Moreover, their experiences appear to 
contrast with those of lower-middle-class geese parents, especially those whose children get 
stuck in Singaporean public schools, unable to return to South Korea because they face 
unexpected demotion and other difficulties (Kim 2010). What Jeehoon Kim clearly demonstrates 
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in his study is that transnational schooling does not necessarily operate evenly favorably for 
participants from different class backgrounds, despite their similar parental aspiration for the 
betterment of their children’s future. It shows that parents’ abilities in dealing with the 
unforeseen consequences of schooling overseas were deeply shaped by class. 
Professor Hong (natural science, 52) also revealed his discomfort toward the ESA/ geese-
family phenomenon in general, which he took part in as a result of his family decision, especially 
due to his wife’s study. He spoke, “It [the phenomenon] is like ‘someone is cutting in line.’ It 
exposes the mentality that everyone wants to cut in line for his/her own interest instead of 
thinking together about a better solution to make a shorter line for all.” What his remark implies 
is that he perceived the phenomenon as coming from a competition for who can climb up the 
ladder of success first. However, what he also wanted to express through his account was that 
this was not his own family’s motivation. 
Ball points out that some British middle-class parents experience social guilt about their 
choice of private schooling for their children over  state schooling; which makes them  judge 
themselves (2003, 171). Likewise, it is plausible that these geese dads might undergo similar 
experiences, perhaps more intensely, as both middle-class fathers and educators in the higher 
education sector. These geese-dad professors are ambivalent about their practices. There have 
been two different sentiments within the professor community reflecting this sort of conflict: on 
the one hand, the geese-dad are proud of being competent fathers with pioneering spirits and 
abilities, but they are also critical of themselves for being self-wounded intellectuals whose 
practices are often seen as individualistic efforts at social reproduction to sustain class status and 
cultural hegemony as members of the Establishment, which is at odds with the social ideals and 
public identities of intellectuals that I discussed in chapter two.  The embarrassment of these 
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geese-dad professors stemmed from the fact that their practices were seemingly identical with 
others’ because they are/were in fact at the center of the phenomenon. Thus, the rhetoric of 
inevitability might come from these frustrations over identification since they believe that their 
geese-dad experiences are not so simple to be just efforts at social reproduction. They were also 
greatly experiencing ongoing struggles to navigate the uncharted territories of raising their young 
children abroad, as I will examine in the following chapter. Their conflicts, ambivalence, or guilt, 
if they have any, may be more intense than that of ordinary parents since it also comes from their 
self-awareness as professors (or intellectuals) who are supposed to be socially respectable figures 
in South Korean society. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
PERSONALIZED GLOBALIZATION, VICARIOUS COSMOPOLITANS 
‘Globalization’ is on everybody’s lips; a fad word fast turning into a shibboleth, a magic 
incantation, a pass-key meant to unlock the gates to all present and future mysteries. For 
some, ‘globalization’ is what we are bound to do if we wish to be happy; for others 
‘globalization’ is the cause of our unhappiness. […] We are all being ‘globalized’ – and 
being ‘globalized’ means much the same to all who ‘globalized’ are. (Bauman 1998, 1) 
 
South Korean “geese-dad” professors are, in a sense, unexpectedly and also unwittingly 
getting trained to be cosmopolitans through the experiences of raising their young children 
abroad as global citizens. To a greater or lesser degree, it seems that they have undergone a 
personal transformation through their experiences, even if they do not fully realize it yet. For 
many of them, sometimes, the process and accompanying experiences of raising children abroad 
is not exactly what they expected from the outset when they planned and initiated the 
transnational educational strategy for their children. It is clear, however, that the more they 
believe that they made educationally right choices for their children, the more voluntarily they 
embrace their own transformative experiences as fathers. Surprisingly, it seems that both their 
children’s experiences abroad and the outcome of transnational education are so worthy to 
pursue that they are willing to endure personal hardships and internal struggles as geese-dads and 
even to accept their own paradigm shifts as intellectuals. 
As I examined in previous chapters, the reasons individuals send their young children 
abroad for education is not only related to personal, familial desires and circumstances but also 
intertwined with wider, complex socio-cultural and even global structures. Despite their efforts at 
differentiation, however, the most crucial and fundamental motivation for “geese-family making” 
of these professors and Koreans at large is undoubtedly the desire for familial and social 
reproduction in a competitive South Korean society in which neoliberal social and cultural 
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regimes call upon people to devote themselves to their own social and economic survival 
(Abelmann and Kang 2014; Abelmann, Park, and Kim 2009; Apple 2001; Park 2006; Song 
2010). The desire of social reproduction through the accrual of cultural capital (Bourdieu 1984) 
is certainly a powerful driving force for ESA or geese family although most professors that I 
interviewed rarely acknowledged it openly. However, it is too simplistic to consider the project 
as solely “instrumental” since there are other motivations such as pursuing their children’s 
happiness with the liberal ideas of personhood, as I briefly pointed out in chapter three. In this 
chapter, I will go even further and suggest that these geese-dad professors’ accounts reveal that 
these fathers activated their own cosmopolitan liberal yearning as well. 
“Cosmopolitan yearning” here is not only about desires for children’s global citizenship 
or what Aihwa Ong (1999) described as the capital accumulation strategy of Chinese “astronaut 
families” and “satellite kids” (which are very similar to that of South Korean “geese 
families”).”42 Here, I rather pay attention to the transformation of these fathers’ own 
subjectivities through the process of raising their children as global citizens. Johanna Waters 
(2003) criticizes Ong’s and other scholars’ accounts of Chinese transnational dispersed families 
for placing too much emphasis on the functional efficiency of the family unit, underestimating 
“the ways in which individual, personal experience may undermine overall ‘cultural capital’” 
(223); she goes on to argue that “the ‘satellite’ experience has involved a sense of personal 
transformation, perhaps related to a newly emerging sense of citizenship, although clearly 
divorced from the sense of strategy underpinning the initiation of these circumstances” (229). 
Likewise, the individuals (children, mothers, and fathers) of these South Korean transnational 
                                                 
42
 Ong conceptualizes “flexible citizenship” as “the cultural logics of capitalist accumulation, travel, and 
displacement that induce subjects to respond fluidly and opportunistically to changing political-economic 
conditions.”  She argues that “[t]hese logics and practices are produced within particular structures of meaning about 
family, gender, nationality, class mobility, and social power” (1999, 6). 
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families each experience their own personal transformation.
43
 I will argue that the transformation 
of these geese-dad professors is often closely related to cosmopolitan ideas: “the freedom to 
create oneself” and a new sense of citizenship as “a citizen of the world” (Appiah 2005, 2006). 
Based on ethnographic evidence, this chapter explores how South Korean geese-dad 
professors personally experience globalization and undergo a transformation of subjectivity 
through their children’s transnational educational experiences. I start this chapter by illustrating 
how geese-dad professors’ own study abroad experiences had an impact on their lives and how it 
was later connected to the motivations to implement ESA for their children. Next, I show how 
fathers evaluate the outcome of their family project, how they envision their children’s future, 
and how their own cosmopolitan liberal dreams are animated in this process. Then, I examine 
how children’s post-national thinking, one of the results of ESA, brings these fathers unexpected 
challenges. In doing so, I argue that many of these professors in fact undergo a paradigm shift in 
their thinking while raising their children abroad. Their thoughts and practices demonstrate how 
South Korean intellectuals themselves are transforming in response to globalization that is 
beyond traditional norms and boundaries, e.g., the nationalist consciousness and the sense of 
duty for building a modern developed nation, which have formed their public identities as 
intellectuals, as I examined in chapter two. In other words, in this chapter, I show how 
globalization becomes a “personalized” experience for these professors44; how their 
cosmopolitan thoughts and desires emerge and develop in this process; and how they are 
                                                 
43
 Despite recent growing literature on South Korean geese-family phenomenon, there are not many studies on 
geese-family members’ subjectivities, as I mentioned it in my introduction. However, there have been a few 
recently-conducted studies or studies in progress on the subjectivities of geese-family members, especially the 
subjectivities of mothers and children. For research on the personal transformation of geese mothers, see Kyung Ju 
Ahn’s dissertation (2009); for children’s, see Mun woo Lee (2010); Hyunjung Shin (South Korea’s Education 
Exodus, Lo et al., forthcoming book,). 
44
 I call this experience “personalized globalization” in the title and will elaborate on it later in the chapter. 
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transformed into vicarious cosmopolitans while juggling and negotiating their competing 
aspirations as both fathers and intellectuals in South Korea. 
 
I. Fathers’ Own Study Abroad 
As I discussed it in chapter three, professors’ own study abroad experiences as well as 
their professional lives are closely connected to their geese family lives.  Their own study abroad 
experiences, however, provide much more than practical advantages to their transnational 
educational projects for their children. Rather, these experiences often subtly affect the entire 
process of raising children abroad; in this way fathers play a critical bridge role in the making of 
future cosmopolitans. Their own experiences abroad seem to inevitably make them want to push 
their children to go abroad, hoping that they might have similar or even better experiences there. 
My informants often confessed that they were deeply impressed by experiences of their own 
study abroad and underwent some (sometimes unexpectedly huge) changes in their perspectives 
on their scholarship as well as on life or society at large. The impacts came from not only their 
classroom experiences in graduate school but also from their direct contact with Western 
developed societies. Metaphorically, theirs were the experiences of “frogs in a well” (umul an 
kaeguri), i.e., those who were confined to a small existence who come out into the bigger world. 
Jongyoung Kim’s recent studies (2011a, 2011b) offer insight into understanding the 
impact of studying abroad. While he analyzes the learning and cultural experiences of South 
Korean graduate students in the U.S. in the 2000s, Kim argues that South Korean graduate 
students, who are in an inferior position in the hierarchy of knowledge and language in a global 
educational environment, tend to accept the moral, cultural leadership and global hegemony of 
American universities through their study-abroad experiences. According to Kim, these students 
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have a tendency to view the United States as the center of the world and describe the excellence 
and superiority of American universities by comparing them to their experiences at South 
Korean universities. Furthermore, he argues, not only do Korean students suffer from 
psychological shock which comes from a new self-image as an inferior being because of their 
transnational positioning and lack of English skills, but these emotional experiences also 
reinforce the global hegemony of U.S. education. 
My informants often expressed similar characterizations of American universities. The 
excellence of American scholarship, access to prominent leading scholars, a more democratic 
environment, and richness of academic resources were repeatedly mentioned through the 
interviews.  They also experienced psychological, cultural shock, but tended to describe them in 
rather positive terms and more often expressed strong satisfaction and envy than frustration. 
Even when they were talking about difficulties or frustration caused by language barriers in the 
initial stage, heavy work load, or racism they encountered, they treated these hardships in a very 
casual manner in contrast to the students in Kim’s study. Some informants described the 
experience as “one of the happiest moments” in their lives in a great academic and living 
environment. 
One may ask why the impact of study abroad could be so strong and why the perception 
of the experience was also so positive for most of my informants. First of all, we can 
contextualize the specificity of the time and space of their lives as young intellectuals, although 
we cannot ignore personal dispositions. As young men in South Korea (usually college students), 
they found themselves in an undemocratic, authoritarian, and somewhat chaotic South Korean 
society in the 70s  and 80s, a period which often produced strong inner conflicts in the minds of 
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young intellectuals.
45
 Moreover, it was a time when the U.S. was still seen as a symbol of 
freedom, democracy, excellence, and a place of dreams in general. 
And if there are some differences between students in the 2000s (in Kim’s study) and my 
informants in terms of intensity of frustration about the same event of studying abroad in U.S. 
universities, it might be related to their different chronotopes.
46
 With the concept of chronotope, 
Mikhail Bakhtin (1981) stresses the necessity of understanding experience in terms of the 
relation of people and events to time and space. First, from the perspective of my informants, 
their study abroad was carried out in more democratic, and seemingly more ideal societies (in the 
U.S., the U.K., and Canada), especially because the social and academic environment in South 
Korea was relatively so much more undemocratic and authoritarian. In addition, their study 
abroad was already successfully completed a while ago in the past. Moreover, to the generation 
of my informants, studying abroad meant greater potential for upward mobility in a still-
expanding job market and at that time it actually secured their jobs, in contrast to Kim’s 
informants who are now struggling with both the ongoing practical problems of studying abroad 
and the uncertainty of the future in a more neoliberalized world. In addition,  my informants, 
who were relatively less exposed to global experiences before studying abroad, might have 
accepted their hardships in foreign countries more positively than  students today because they 
                                                 
45
 1970-80s is the period when South Koreans’ struggles for democracy and social justice were at their height under 
the developmentalist dictatorial government. Although the ardent involvement of college students in 
democratization movement is relatively well known, on the other hand, it is also true that more college students than 
self-claiming dissident students were actually struggling with these social and political issues as well, being torn 
between the ideal and reality of their actions, sometimes even dealing with a sense of shame and guilt.  
46
 I use the concept of chronotope here to contextualize and interpret different study abroad experiences between 
different generations. Although Mikhail Bakhtin never clearly gave the definition of this neologism, chronotope 
(literally, ‘time space’) is a concept that expresses “the inseparability of space and time” and also a way to 
understand experience in terms of the relation of people and events to time and space (Bakhtin 1981, 84). According 
to Bakhtin, “Actions are necessarily performed in a specific context [which is shaped fundamentally by the kind of 
time and space]; chronotopes differ by the way in which they understand context and the relation of actions and 
events to it” (Morson and Emerson 1990, 367). That is, “different social activities and representations of those 
activities presume different kinds of time and space” because “time and space vary in qualities” (367). Chronotopes 
are not only “historical” but also “dialogic”: they may change over time in response to current needs with variety 
and multiplicity; and chronotopes compete with each other both in society and in individual life (369). 
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regarded it as an inevitable but necessary cost of “coming out to the (new) world.” Their actual 
experiences and the chronotopes that they had as study abroad students at that time may differ 
from the experiences and chronotopes that these professors recall now because these professors 
were in different life-stages (different time and space). One should bear in mind that these 
professors now reflect on their own study abroad experiences with different chronotopes and 
subjectivities, creating different meanings, reading past events somewhat differently when they 
recall them as memories. Likewise, what we should not miss is that these professors tended to 
draw a picture of their children’s ESA based on their own impressions and recollections. 
In the latter part of this chapter, I will discuss how the transnational educational project 
for children turns out to be somewhat different from fathers’ expectations and often brings both 
ironic results and unforeseen challenges. Fathers might approach it with a logic similar to that of 
their own study abroad experiences, imagining a parallel but more intensive project. Unlike the 
study abroad experiences that the fathers experienced in their adulthood, experiences which were 
constantly reflexive, reformative, deeply tied to South Korea, and which eventually led them to 
return to South Korea, their children’s experiences are totally different from theirs because 
children have lost all the references that their fathers had as adults, and they have developed 
post-national thinking while living abroad from a young age. The children’s experiences are not 
a replica or mimesis of their fathers’ at all because they live in different chronotopes. Thus, to 
understand these dynamics better, I first examine the fathers’ own study abroad experiences and 
their impacts. 
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A. A Real Starting Point 
These professors experimented with certain ideas that they got from their own study 
abroad experiences in the past with their children. In many cases, the very impact of their own 
study abroad and their positive impression of Western societies covertly works as a starting point 
for imagining the geese-family project for their children’s transnational education. Yet, even in 
the case of some fathers who seek to reproduce the effects of their own study abroad, I learned 
that the process of sending their children abroad often gave  them new notions for what it means 
to have the chance to leave Korea. 
 
“It gave me the confidence to live my own life as a human being” 
Not a few professors enthusiastically expressed how their individual liberal desires, 
which were often deprived by the compressed modernity and authoritarian social climate in 
South Korea at the time, were somewhat fulfilled through their study abroad experiences. 
Professor Park (engineering, 49) was one of them. He spoke: 
Of course, [studying abroad changed my life] a lot! For instance, when I grew up in 
[South] Korea, I often could not help but feel, “something is off, this is not right.” But I 
could not figure out exactly what was wrong, so I unwillingly accepted things that I 
couldn’t agree with, anyway…feeling what’s wrong with me at the same time. Then, I 
directly saw and realized that not every society did things the same way as we [South 
Korean] did when I went there [the U.S.]. There actually was a normal (chŏngsangjŏgin) 
society where things happen in a way that people would expect. Not just abnormally 
forced “norm[s]” (in English). So I finally felt confident in myself. Ah! We can live like 
that. I gained way more confidence and eventually felt that I could live even in Korea 
having such confidence in myself, following my own heart. For me, the impact of that 
realization was immense.  
 
Professor Park was a one-time geese-dad (for three years) and was sending both his son and 
daughter to a prep school on the East Coast in the U.S. at the time of interview.  An engineering 
professor at an elite university in Seoul who had studied abroad in the mid 1980s with a 
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prestigious fellowship, Professor Park surprised me when he explained that his own study abroad 
was motivated foremost by his dislike of South Korea, and not by a desire for a PhD degree or 
future success. He told me that he valued freedom so much and was eager to live in the 
developed world -- in open (yŏllyŏ itnŭn) societies which had more freedom and choice. And to 
my surprise he added, “Actually, I meant to emigrate rather than just to study abroad from the 
outset. My intention was not necessarily to go to America but just to go somewhere else so as to 
leave Korea. Studying abroad was the easiest and only way for me legally to leave Korea at that 
time.” I was surprised because it was an unexpected account that I rarely heard from a promising 
future elite at the time. And indeed, his experience in U.S. society exceeded his expectations in 
all respects. Above all, he actively interacted and made good relationships with people there as if 
he was “a native who had finally returned home (kohyang).” He went on: 
Every day was so comfortable and joyful in spite of language barrier. Like…making 
close friends in the same age group in shorter time than in Korea and easily sharing the 
same taste for trivial things, etc.… It hit me that ah! I belong here, but I have lived in the 
wrong place for twenty-something years. And strange as it may sound, I asked myself, 
“Was I American in my previous life (chŏnsaeng)?” haha [laughter]. It was such a 
comfortable feeling from beginning to end…the feeling that people can have when they 
have finally returned home after straying in strange places. 
  
Despite all these extraordinary experiences, he could not help but return to South Korea because 
his wife -- he had married right before he left for study abroad -- didn’t want to immigrate and 
was against living in the U.S. after he got his degree. However, according to him, he could come 
back to South Korea only because he became so confident in himself and his way of life that he 
could live the life he wanted after all. He felt that he could live anywhere in the world with that 
confidence. That confidence was the most important thing he gained from his study abroad 
experience. 
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Professor Park was thus able not only to prepare for his career but also to realize that his 
own aversion to South Korea’s undemocratic and authoritative culture and politics at the time 
was warranted. He was able to affirm the legitimacy of his strong inclinations for freedom and 
autonomy. Building the confidence to live his own life as a “human being,” he solidified his own 
worldview, a universalistic vision of self and cosmopolitan desires – convictions that would play 
largely in his vision for his children’s study abroad, as I discuss below. 
 
“I experienced a ‘New World’” 
In a similar vein, Professor Han (humanities, 58) also spoke about the impact that the 
study abroad experience had on him. Unlike Professor Park, for whom it reinforced his own 
belief in himself, Professor Han experienced an unexpected paradigm shift as an intellectual. 
It [the shock] was huge! I experienced a “New World” (in English)! The U.S. made me 
realize that there really is this kind of world. […] Above all, I was really impressed by 
the American “system” (in English), especially by the “system,” which makes 
discussions possible for everything like a debate for “confirmation” (in English) in the 
“Supreme Court” (in English) and also debates in colleges. I was lucky in terms of my 
experiences in America. I had so many good relationships with professors that I could 
never have imagined in Korea. It was an experience that completely changed the old me. 
To put this in Christian terms, it was a sort of rebirth (saero t’aeŏnan) experience for 
me… so to speak, I rediscovered everything from nature to culture, system, and even my 
own “character” (in English) as a human being.  
 
Before going to the U.S., Professor Han had already worked as an assistant professor at a 
provincial college. He went to the U.S. for his PhD degree in 1980, but he had a more urgent 
reason for going to the U.S: he was a progressive intellectual who had been actively involved in 
the democratization movement, that is, he was a dissident at that time. After the Kwangju 
Democratization Movement
47
 in 1980, he had to find a refuge so as not to be arrested, and his 
                                                 
47
 The Kwangju Democratization Movement occurred in May 1980 in the Southwestern city of Kwangju. It started 
as a student protest against military regime in the beginning, but it escalated into an armed civilian struggle. The ten-
day struggle ended with brutal military suppression. For details, see Jai-cui Lee (1999), Gi-Wook Shin, and Kyung 
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older sister in California invited him to U.S. with a green card for his safety. He went to the U.S. 
with his wife and eventually earned a PhD degree at one of the Ivy League schools. 
Professor Han told me that he had been a passionate nationalist before studying abroad. 
He spoke: 
Nation (minjok) used to be really, really important to me. But I came to think that 
nationalism is not necessary, while I studying in the U.S. […] I came to think that from 
now on the way in which I contribute to our society should be through my own fine 
scholarship with universality, rather than taking part in particular social issues as an 
activist as I had done before under the name of the state or nation. Especially because my 
discipline is the scholarship of universality, I should go this way…   
 
In this account, we clearly witness the change that a passionate critical intellectual of South 
Korea had undergone after directly experiencing the American ideal of liberal democracy 
through his study abroad experience. Ironically, when many South Korean intellectuals and 
college students in the 1980s, especially after the Kwangju Democratization Movement, were 
awakened from the illusion that regarded the U.S. as a Good Samaritan and more inclined to 
anti-Americanism (Lee 2007, 7-8), Professor Han became assured of U.S society ideals and 
universal values. Although he was a U.S. green card holder, found a job as an assistant professor 
in a U.S. college, and changed his thinking considerably, he eventually returned to South Korea 
in the early ’90s, leaving his wife and son in the U.S. He left his family there mainly because at 
that time he could not find any suitable school for his son in South Korea, even among private 
schools. He has now lived as a geese dad for seventeen years. When I asked him why he returned 
to South Korea and if he ever imagined that it would become seventeen years, he replied that he 
could never have imagined it at all. 
I was too “naïve” (in English). I have always lived with the sense of calling 
(somyŏnggam). […] I still felt responsibility to democratize the academies (hagwŏn ŭl 
minjuhwa haeya twendanŭn) at that time and also thought I should play the role as an 
                                                                                                                                                             
Moon Hwang (2003). Also see Namhee Lee (2007) for details of the involvement of students and intellectuals in the 
minjung (common people’s) movement in South Korea in the 1970s and 1980s. 
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intellectual in my country along with my commitment to scholarship. So I thought I had 
to come here fulfilling my responsibility although my family was there… and it has 
become this long! 
 
Yet, he made up his mind not to adapt himself to negative aspects in South Korean society when 
he returned. He confessed, “[After returning South Korea] I ran into trouble in every situation 
(sasa kkŏnkkŏn). Hahaha [laughter]. I have been troubled with…um… I have remained 
committed to change in this society rather than adapting myself.  However, when it became more 
than ten years, I found that I had somewhat adapted myself. And I am not happy about that.” 
Professor Han told me that when he decided to leave his son in the U.S. for education, he hoped 
that his son could develop a spirit of goodwill for the world with a better/more ideal U.S. 
education. His son graduated from a prestigious university, found a promising job, and now lives 
a successful life in the U.S. as an adult. However, Professor Han expressed his frustration by 
somewhat disapprovingly saying that his son seemed to be only interested in worldly success. He 
gave me the feeling that this was not exactly what he wanted when he left his son in the U.S. and 
ended up living as a geese dad for seventeen years -- although he by no means thought of it as a 
total failure. 
 
“Studying abroad gave me a chance to broaden my perspective” 
In addition to the impact on their personal belief systems, many of my informants spoke 
about how much they could broaden and deepen their (scholarly) perspectives through studying 
abroad. For example, Professor Choi (humanities, 56) who had studied abroad from the end 
of ’70s talked about the external and internal merits of his studying abroad. According to him, if 
taking advantage of a U.S. PhD degree in the job market was an instrumental move, broadening 
his academic perspective was the intrinsic merit of his having studied abroad. 
120 
 
Studying abroad made me realize that our own [South Korean] historical scholarship was 
too narrow-minded. After liberation [1945], our history scholarship has had only 
nationalist, anti-Japanese, even chauvinistic tendencies. I started to see history with 
broader perspectives and also rethink about Japan as well while I was studying in 
America […] In fact, I had not learned anything about Japan in Korea. We could only be 
told media discourses asserting that Korea was better than Japan, so we would catch up 
Japan within ten years… that was all we had heard. But after I studied about Japan there, 
I could notice there was a deep cleavage between the views on Japan from outside and 
inside of Korea. Studying abroad gave me a chance to overcome narrow-mindedness in 
my scholarship…otherwise I would be under the spell of nationalism because of our 
nationalist history education.  
 
Many other professors shared similar experiences of broadening their scholarly and intellectual 
perspectives. Professor Cho (social science, 51) was thankful for what he learned through 
rigorous training from his graduate school in the U.S. It brought him confidence as both a scholar 
and a teacher to the extent that he thought he could not continue his job if he did not study 
abroad, especially, in this era in which old knowledge is disappearing so quickly. Professors also 
frequently spoke about how they were stimulated by a vibrant American intellectual community 
which had a stronger sense of excellence (illyugwan), freedom, and openness. They were often 
deeply impressed by these academic, social, and intellectual environments and also envied them. 
As shown so far, the study abroad experiences of many of these professors were not 
confined to acquiring tangible academic capital, i.e., “professional knowledge, an advanced 
degree (cultural capital in institutionalized form), English (cultural capital in embodied form) 
and academic competence” even though it made up the bulk of their motivation for studying 
abroad (Kim 2011b, 457; Bourdieu 1986). In addition to academic capital, some of them had 
(unexpected) opportunities to think about more intangible things like, namely, the meaning of 
becoming an autonomous liberal subject as an individual or living in a more ideal form of society. 
As I have shown above, they often realized that “something” had been missing from their lives 
and South Korean society in general while directly watching and experiencing, seemingly, a 
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more ideal society and bigger world. Starting from this personal, intellectual development and 
somewhat vague cosmopolitan yearning, the influences they were once exposed to during their 
studying abroad still lingered not only on their scholarship and profession as professors but also 
on their lives as fathers, often making them play the role of the bridge for the next generation of 
study abroad and future cosmopolitans. 
 
B. The Law of Inertia 
As I examined in chapter three, many of my informants consider their own geese-family 
making or ESA as an “inevitable” and “natural” outcome of their own study abroad. They tend to 
see it as a natural step in the continuing line of their life course rather than to consider it as 
sudden interference. It seems they always knew that at some point they would let their children 
study abroad and that it was only a matter of circumstance that it happened a bit earlier. The host 
country of ESA is also usually the place where the father had experienced crucial personal 
growth for his professional career. In a sense, their children’s study abroad may not be “the 
object of conscious estimation” but rather a natural or expectable educational chance in the 
“intuitive perception” of fathers who studied abroad (Bourdieu 1977b, 226). Like the law of 
inertia, although their own study abroad was done many years ago, the force and impact of past 
study abroad experiences still makes them move toward the study abroad of their children. Their 
views of studying abroad are often passed to their children and to their students as well. The 
more professors were influenced by their own study abroad, the more they tended to recommend 
it to their students. 
Some professors told me that they feel the same about their students and their own 
children. Professor Park (engineering, 49) spoke: 
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Actually, it is rare these days that students want to study abroad only because they cannot 
study certain field in engineering that they want to pursue in Korea. […] But I strongly 
recommend it, strongly. Go to the big world and see! In some sense, you can have more 
understanding of both Korea and Koreans. Also this is an era of globalization, you know. 
So I encourage them. We don’t need to confine ourselves within one place. So I tell them, 
“Fortify yourself with competence and choose the place you want to live, internationally 
(kukchejŏgŭro)!” This is not the world anymore in which I should live only as a Korean 
under Korean government because I was born in Korea. People can also choose their 
government. If you don’t feel Korean government is good enough for you, but you like 
American government, then live as an American. Or as a French. But in order to do 
that… if you want to choose, first you should get ready for that with global competence. 
Study hard and learn foreign languages….then you can live your life as a “global citizen” 
(in English). This is the era in which can do it. I encourage them this way. 
 
And Professor Park told me that this is the exactly same reason why he sent his children for early 
study abroad. It began with his desire to give his children “the chance to choose” and his 
conviction that he should not raise them only in South Korea. In his accounts, we can see that his 
yearning for a liberal and cosmopolitan life is still alive. 
Professor Choi (humanities, 56), who teaches in a lower-tier university in Seoul, echoed 
the cosmopolitan ideas that Professor Park expressed, but with a little different emphasis: 
I recommend it one hundred percent. Because our [South Korean] market or stage is too 
small, isn’t it? Not only our country but the whole world can be their stage these days and 
they can get a job in other countries. Besides, they can free themselves from a degree- 
caste system (hakpŏl), which is a pretty much pre-modern aspect of our society… 
[Getting an advanced degree abroad] is a good way they overcome it.  
 
Professor Choi, who had been a geese dad for ten years and whose two children got into top 
universities in the U.S., added that he sent his children abroad for similar reasons. He thinks that 
because the whole world is their stage and it is wide open, their generation needs to learn other 
languages and live in other countries in order to survive in the world. He also said that he raised 
his children in the U.S.in order to avoid the “examination hell” (ipsi chiok) in South Korea, 
which does not allow second chances for children when they fail the college entrance 
examination. Recently the college entrance examination system has changed so that students 
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have more chances than ever before to take the exam, but I could imagine as a Korean how he 
had mixed feelings about the college entrance examination and his students in his lower-tier 
university. It is understandable that he would want to avoid the possibility that his children might 
have to retake the exam year after year to get into a desirable college, and that he is concerned 
about Korea’s degree-caste system (hakpŏl) for his students. 
The hakpŏl is a degree-caste system (or academic pedigree) in South Korea, which makes 
people evaluate a person according to which schools (usually colleges) he/she graduated from. 
South Korean society has heavily valued the prestige of college pedigree or college name-brand, 
which all exist in a hierarchy. Not only are one’s lifelong earnings and social status dictated by  
hakpŏl, but also many other aspects of life like initial job, promotion, rank, social network, even 
one’s value in the marriage market are influenced by it (Kim 2011b).48 However, it is ironic that 
Professor Choi criticized hakpŏl as a pre-modern aspect of South Korean society on the one hand, 
but also suggested overcoming the system by getting a more advanced degree abroad (getting 
better hakpŏl) on the other. 
Most professors recommended studying abroad if students had opportunities to do it 
because their study abroad experiences were valuable in so many ways besides just getting 
foreign degrees as I discussed above; so they hoped that their students could have similar 
experiences. However, although these fathers said that the fundamental reasons for 
recommending study abroad for their students and children were all the same, their children’s 
                                                 
48
 The credential of prestigious universities (myŏngmun taehak) is one of the most crucial cultural capitals in South 
Korean society. It usually works as a symbol of one’s ability and future prospects. The keen awareness of these 
impacts of hakpŏl is an important virtual force driving many high school graduates (and their parents) to seek 
tertiary education, especially seeking for getting into limited high-ranked colleges that only a small minority can win. 
O Ukhwan (2002) also argues that South Korean education zeal is a phenomenon that comes from excessive 
competition of winning hakpŏl.  For more understanding of hakpŏl in South Korea, also see Shin Kwangyŏng, 
“Beyond the Hakpŏl Society” (Hakpŏl sahoe rŭl nŏmŏsŏ], Kyunghyang Shinmun, August 27, 2007. 
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experiences abroad and its result might be much different from that of their graduate students 
because their children go abroad when they are young children. 
 
II. Raising Children Abroad as Competent Cosmopolitans  
Through the interviews, I could witness that these fathers were actively developing and 
confirming new ideas of liberal personhood and global competence as cosmopolitans while they 
were raising their children abroad. For many of them, of course to varying degrees, the 
motivations for the transnational educational project for children came from these fathers’ own 
liberal dreams, which were often reinforced by their own study abroad experiences in Western 
societies, as well as their instrumental strategies for competition and survival. As I examined 
above, through their abroad experiences, they directly learned that there were other possible 
ways of life. In this sense, their transnational projects could be understood as a sort of struggle 
originating from the conflict that the fathers felt between the real and the ideal: i.e., between the 
actuality that their children lived uniformly with unsolvable educational issues in South Korea 
and the ideal educational and living environment that these fathers really hoped to afford to their 
children for their children’s personal, intellectual development by pushing the ideals of well-
roundedness, freedom, and happiness. And interestingly it seemed that the more these fathers felt 
that their hope for their children’s personal growth was realized, the more their cosmopolitan 
yearning for their children grew. 
 
A. Liberal Dreams and Western Education as Cosmopolitan Ideals 
These fathers believed that they had made the right educational choices, choices that 
made their children confident and happy while also giving them more freedom, making them 
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more well-rounded and also more competent. Sometimes, even I could sense the delight and 
envy of these fathers when talking about the education that their children enjoyed in their youth. 
Some fathers felt that their children were “lucky” because they had been given the opportunity to 
be educated in ways that suited them. When I asked them if they would make the same decision 
for their children if they could do it all over again, with the exception of two fathers -- one who 
struggled with his daughter’s difficulties and the other who had just begun geese-family life and 
so was not sure about it -- they all said they would.  I do not mean to suggest that all geese-dad 
professors or geese dads in general feel the same degree of satisfaction and confidence in this 
transnational family project as my informants. As I mentioned in my introduction, I do not rule 
out the limitation of my informant pool; it is certainly possible that they were willing to be 
interviewed because they were somewhat satisfied with their own project. 
Many fathers believed that their children have/had an education that makes them more 
competent by not only affording an educational environment that allows for well-roundedness, 
but also by reinforcing their strengths rather than focusing on their weaknesses. As an informant 
expressed, it seems that most of these fathers share the thought that the U.S. educational system 
recognizes diversity so “they do not regard ‘difference’ as a ‘failure.’” They often asserted that 
Western/U.S. education affords a lot of opportunities for children to think and do something for 
themselves, and helps children cultivate their inner talents and broaden their perspectives 
through diversity, in contrast to the South Korean educational system’s heavy reliance on rote 
learning. 
To these fathers, it seems that well-roundedness is, in a sense, a prerequisite for both a 
meaningful, happy life and for becoming a global citizen. On the one hand, it reflects these 
fathers’ own liberal dreams for their children’s personal growth, but on the other hand, it is also 
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associated with the acquisition of desirable qualities that make children likely to achieve social 
and economic success in the future, possibly making the world their stage. The problem is that it 
is hard to distinguish so-called “liberal” dreams from the “neoliberal” instrumental strategy to 
make children “the sole managers of their own biographies” because often these two are 
intertwined and look so similar that differentiating one from the other is far from clear-cut 
(Borovoy 2004). Not only are many contemporary South Korean parents already well-known for 
their educational zeal (or education fever, kyoyungnyŏl) but also parents in other Asian countries, 
in fact, heavily invest in their children’s extra-curricular activities like musical instruments, art, 
sports, computer, and foreign language lessons. Although seemingly seeking well-roundedness 
or “high quality,” they mostly hope that these investments will increase their children’s 
competitiveness through cultural capital, especially increasing their likelihood of getting into 
desirable colleges and then eventually becoming winners of social and economic success 
(Anagnost 1997, 2008; Byun and Kim 2008; Fong 2007, 2011; Kipnis 2006, 2011; O 2002; Seth 
2002; Sorensen, 1994).
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 However, the investment in well-roundedness does not always guarantee success in a competitive world, 
especially in the South Korean social context. In Byun and Kim’s study (2008), parental educational level and 
family income have a significant effect on parents’ and children’s cultural capital, but children’s participation in 
high-brow cultural activities has diminishing returns for academic achievement in South Korea. They explained that 
the South Korean education system and culture demands students, especially academic high school seniors, to spend 
most of their waking hours studying for university entrance examinations. As a result, students who spend their time 
participating in high-brow cultural activities may be academically disadvantaged by their lack of time to devote to 
study. However,  in this study Byun and Kim measure children’s participation in high-brow cultural activities only 
by counting the frequency of cultural activities like visits to concerts, plays, museums, galleries, etc. rather than 
including more active and long-term cultural activities like learning to play musical instruments or taking art lessons, 
etc. Nonetheless, the study describes an educational environment in South Korea that forces student mostly to focus 
on academic attainment (especially preparation for entrance examinations) and excludes chances for other activities 
that could enrich children’s life quality.  
According to a survey conducted by Korea Centers for Disease Control and Prevention in 2011(Kyunghyang Shinmun, 
December 14, 2011), the average sleeping time during weekdays for South Korean high school students was only 5.5 
hours. It is generally expected that the time allocation of waking hours of students revolves around their study plans. 
Indeed, there is a well-known unwritten rule among South Korean high school students that the student who sleeps 
more than four hours cannot succeed in the college entrance examination (sa-dang o-rak).  
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It is also well-known that although the South Korean educational system has tried to 
emulate the Western educational system as an ideal for raising global citizens, it has failed to 
overcome exam-focused education and continued to measure students’ ability mainly through 
their academic attainment for several decades despite repeated educational (policy) reforms. If 
one looks more deeply into why South Korean society does not overcome the educational focus 
on exam-taking skills, it will be soon realized that it is not just an educational issue; rather it is 
again related to the complicated, broader issues of class/stratification, upward class mobility, and 
the general public ethos of equality – it is about who can or cannot afford more opportunities for 
their children for the future (Fong 2007; Kipnis 2011; Park 2006; Seth 2002). Thus it is not a 
problem that can be easily remedied in a short period of time by merely changing some 
educational policies. 
In this reality, to my informants, especially those who keep direct contact with 
Western/U.S. culture, Western education is more likely to provide opportunities to achieve their 
liberal dream for their children’s growth. According to these fathers, what their children got from 
Western education were qualities that could not be easily acquired under the South Korean 
educational system. Professor Song (natural science, 47) who has been a geese dad for ten years 
described it this way: 
Many people think that geese dads send their kids to learn English, you know. But I think 
the more significant reason is to learn advantages or virtues of American society or 
developed societies. Learning how to live and think is much more important than learning 
English itself. So, it is a mistake that some people send their kids to India or Malaysia for 
only English. To me, you know… it seems they even don’t know the basic philosophy of 
what education is. Education is also learning through watching, feeling, and thinking as 
they are living there. On the other hand, we also need to rethink the nature of our 
education… of what would be the result when we confine our kids, who are in 
adolescence, within extremely narrow range of living experiences under the name of 
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education and…why many of our kids, who were graduated from specialized high 
schools and admitted into so-called Ivy League schools, tend to fail there.
50
 
 
Professor Song’s narrative shows that what he wants his children to acquire from U.S. education 
is not just English or foreign credentials. It is rather “the accumulation of cultural capital in the 
embodied state” (Bourdieu 1986, 244). Bourdieu notes that the accumulation of cultural capital 
presupposes “a process of embodiment” requiring “a labor of inculcation and assimilation” and 
time. Moreover, “it cannot be done at second hand” (244). Professor Song and many other 
fathers thought that U.S./Western education and culture would afford a better environment and 
living experiences for their children’s personal growth and more desirable personhood. 
 
B. The Outcome of the Transnational Family Project 
I turn now to a few detailed accounts that will help us to understand what kind of 
personhood these fathers imagine for their children and what their children have actually 
achieved from their transnational education. 
As Professor Song mentioned above, contrary to what we might expect based on the 
literature, when these fathers were asked about what their motivations and goals for this family 
project were, acquiring English skills was seldom mentioned as a central goal (Cho 2004; Ch’oe  
2007; Chung 2008; Lee and Koo 2006; Park 2010; Song 2009). Rather, in nearly every case they 
stressed affording a good environment for a well-rounded education (chŏnin kyoyuk), global 
competence, and/or a meaningful (happy) life. And a well-rounded person was most often 
                                                 
50
 In a news article in the Huffington Post, Samuel Kim points out that “44% of Korean students who enter ‘top’ 
American universities drop out before graduating. This is much higher than the dropout rate for students from China 
(25%), India (21%) and even the 34% dropout rate for American students at the same universities.” It is often 
criticized that their years-long preparation with extra tutoring for college only prepares them  for tests and not for 
acquiring a college education, so many Korean students perform poorly in top American Universities despite their 
high scores on the SAT, TOEFL and all the other entrance examination tests (Alan Singer, Huffington Post New 
York, November 24, 2009).  
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mentioned as an expected outcome of their education. That is, their goals were in parallel with 
the Western liberal educational goals of raising children as well-rounded selves “with great 
possibilities for self-fulfillment and personal development” (Mitchell 2003, 399). For example, 
Professor Park (engineering, 49) who now sends two children to a U.S. prep school said:  
It is well-rounded education! That is the most significant. We can find it only in precepts 
for school discipline (kyohun) in our country, haha [laghter]. My children get well-
rounded education there better than I expected. The American “system” (in English) is so 
wonderful that I cannot expect more. If my children don’t get one hundred percent from it, 
it is my children’s fault. […] I often told my children, “Your school is like a nice buffet 
restaurant so you need to have diverse delicious food there, not just to have noodles that 
you like.”  
 
He went on to talk about how their school not only affords an advanced level of learning but also 
teaches social skills. They naturally learn team work, sacrifice, service for others, and leadership 
through diverse interaction, sports, and other enriching activities that the school system provides. 
He was sure that all this would be impossible if he had raised his children in South Korea, where 
schools could neither provide “value-added service” nor create “added value.” He explained that 
some South Korean students in so-called specialized high schools (t’ŭkmokko) might be as 
excellent as American top students in terms of academic ability, but most of them missed a lot of 
other things for the sake of raising their academic ability, even though there must be other 
aspects that they should enjoy in their life other than academic achievement. He also did not miss 
pointing out that his children might also lose something because they could not live with their 
parents. For example, his daughter more often misses home than her older brother, who seems to 
appreciate these opportunities and try to maximize them. Professor Park, however, felt that what 
they gained and were gaining was much more than what they lost in total, intellectually, 
physically, in terms of their character, and also holistically for their lives. 
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Creativity, independence, and autonomy are also frequently mentioned positive qualities 
that their children get from education abroad. Most of these fathers think that the Western 
educational system and methods afford more opportunities for children not only to fully develop 
their personal character with more freedom, but also to foster children’s creativity, sensibility, 
and potential abilities. Professor Yeom (social science, 47), who just started his geese-dad life 
after a year of sabbatical in the U.S., was quite impressed by the fact that his daughter in high 
school not only learned but actually enjoyed poems of Emily Dickinson in her English class. He 
expressed pleasant envious feelings, saying that it was an experience that even he, who had a 
PhD degree, could not have. Professor Kim (humanities, 49) especially appreciated that 
American education made children write a lot and thus boosted their creativity and ability to 
think. Interestingly, many fathers shared the same opinion and expressed much satisfaction and 
pride especially when they felt their children wrote well in English. It seemed that they regarded 
writing ability as evidence of both commanding English well and having the ability to think – 
important constituents of global competence. 
Many of the children of these fathers were actively involved in extra-curricular activities 
in school such as playing musical instruments in bands or orchestras or participating in choirs, art, 
sports, theater, and debating clubs like most American/Western children do. While some fathers 
were slightly worried about how their children could balance these activities and their 
schoolwork — and were sometimes shocked by differences in school culture, like having a 
school concert the night before a test day -- some fathers told me that actually these activities 
were a part of reason they decided to educate their children abroad. They observed that in South 
Korea children can hardly sustain their interest of art, music, or sports in secondary school unless 
they have decided to major in these things in college. 
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Indeed, Professor Hong (natural science, 52), whose wife was a doctoral student and 
stayed with their two children in England, told me that he and his wife also wanted their children 
to keep fostering their musical talent and sensibility. However, it would have been too 
burdensome to financially manage geese-family life in England without the music scholarships 
that his daughter and son got from their private high school in England. Although his children 
were not English nationals (they have U.S. citizenship) and did not have the intention of 
majoring in music in college, they could still keep playing music which they liked  because of 
the school’s support. When he thought about how happy and how well his children were doing 
there and watched students of same ages as his children in South Korea, he often felt that his 
own emotional difficulties, like the loneliness that he had from time to time, were minor. 
Some fathers were very happy to see that their children were growing up as independent, 
autonomous, and motivated persons. Professor Lee (natural science, 50), who initially strongly 
opposed to his wife’s plan to send their son to middle school abroad, expressed satisfaction at 
how much his son in a U.S. public school had enjoyed discussions in classes and how much hard 
work he had done by himself, sometimes even voluntarily staying up all night to finish 
schoolwork. The process itself looked worthwhile to Professor Lee. He spoke, “One year after 
having sent my son to America, the thought struck me it was a good decision to send him.” He 
claimed that his son, who was now sophomore in college, became much more responsible, 
autonomous, and independent and gained a sense of self-respect and self-confidence by 
overcoming difficulties by himself. He found a different side to his son that he could hardly 
recognize when compared with his son in Seoul — for example, he realized that his son had 
become a lot more motivated now. 
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Professor Yoo (social science, 47) echoed these sentiments by talking about how his only 
son, who lost some hair because of stress in South Korea, not only was cured but also became an 
independent, confident, and happier person through American education. His son, who had 
stayed in his relative’s home for several years since middle school, surprised his father even 
more when he received the presidential award at his middle school graduation. Professor Yoo 
added that he knew the award did not mean his son was exceptionally intelligent whatsoever, but 
he was impressed by the fact that they appreciated his son’s efforts for his own improvement and 
progress as an “achievement.” However, needless to say, it helped his son to have more self-
esteem and a positive attitude. Having watched his son, he realized again how harsh South 
Korean society was to children: “Once a child cannot well adapt himself to the unkind education 
system, he immediately becomes a loser.” Talking about how he felt sorry for his son who did 
almost everything by himself because he was apart from parents, Professor Yoo also did not 
forget to point out how many students at his elite university in Seoul, especially from Kangnam, 
were controlled by their parents’ detailed directions and still could not make a simple decision by 
themselves even in their senior year. 
All these accounts show not only professors’ satisfaction at the outcome of their own 
transnational projects, but also that the fathers’ keen sense of the personhood that they imagine is 
also developing through their children’s growth. 
 
III. Cosmopolitan Desire, “Flexible Citizens,” and Korean Identity 
Although these fathers expressed much satisfaction with their children’s personal growth 
in their accounts, bringing up children abroad as cosmopolitan liberal subjects is not always a 
peaceful process. Their early study abroad affords the good education they expected for their 
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children, but it also brings some unexpected conflicts with their children. Surprisingly, it seems 
that many of these fathers were surprised that their children also developed their own aspirations 
and their own thinking about their lives for having grown up in foreign countries. Baffled by 
their children’s post-national thinking in particular, some fathers started to realize only later that 
their children did not at all have the same references that the fathers themselves had as Korean 
adults during their study abroad period. In a sense, the real challenge that these fathers faced was 
the very awareness and acceptance of these differences. Starting from this realization, their real 
journeys of being vicarious cosmopolitans began, while they juggled their competing aspirations 
as both fathers who value individual freedom and choices and intellectuals who have to maintain 
a responsible collective identity in South Korea. Along the road, they were often torn between 
their own cosmopolitan desires and their Korean identity. 
 
A. He/She is Someone in the World 
Above all, I found that most of these fathers were in fact busy envisioning their children 
as someone in the world, emphasizing well-roundedness, autonomy, and happiness. Focusing on 
these positive qualities that their children had or would have, they came more and more to 
believe that their children’s exposure to foreign cultures and languages would give them 
“freedom of choice” and help them to live as competent global citizens, as cosmopolitans. In 
some sense, it seems that the word “cosmopolitan” itself functioned as their mantra, opening a 
future for their children, alleviating their own anxieties about their children’s identities, and also 
justifying their own choice for educating children abroad. 
Interestingly, not all, but most of my informants assumed their children’s stage was the 
world, not just South Korea. This contrasts with the fathers themselves who all eventually came 
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back to South Korea after their study abroad. If fathers wanted their children to come back to 
South Korea, it was mostly due to a father’s concerns to keep children close for family intimacy. 
In a globalizing world, as if the world is no longer big and wide, some people, like my 
informants today, view the world as not merely a collection of states, “territorial units separated 
from one another,”  but an unlimited stage where every individual can pursue their own dream 
(Beck 2000, 21). As Ulrich Beck points out, “the notion of closed space has become illusory” in 
this world society (10), and my informants often expressed this globality in their accounts. 
Professor Park (Engineering, 49) told me that he was open to wherever his children 
would choose to live as long as they were happy and self-fulfilled; but, he added, if they wanted 
to choose where they would live, they should possess suitable abilities. When I asked him what 
he thought of as “ability,” he articulated his ideas like this: 
So to speak, [it is the ability that] they can communicate well and feel comfortable 
wherever they go. The comfortableness is, I mean, of course they may need to be 
financially comfortable, but above all, they should be mentally and emotionally 
comfortable in such situations. If they could be comfortable because they were already 
exposed to and absorbed in diverse cultures, then they can have broader range of choice, 
the freedom of choice. 
 
From these fathers’ accounts, I could see that through their transnational practices, these fathers 
constructed a picture of children through images of cosmopolitans, who were equipped with 
multiple languages and the capability to embrace cultural differences. They believed that these 
abilities in turn would give their children flexibility to choose where to live and how to live. We 
especially remember that Professor Park was eager to live abroad when he was younger and that 
he felt as comfortable in a foreign country as he was in his hometown. Although he eventually 
came back to South Korea and lives there now, we can notice that his cosmopolitan yearning is 
not dead, but kept alive through his children. 
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Anyone can have the desire to be a cosmopolitan. Yet, not everyone who wants to be a 
cosmopolitan can actually live as a cosmopolitan. The degree of mobility -- freedom of 
movement -- is a key prerequisite for being a cosmopolitan. Zygmunt Bauman points out that 
“[access to global] mobility climbs to the rank of the uppermost among the coveted values – and 
the freedom to move, perpetually a scarce and unequally distributed commodity, fast becomes 
the main stratifying factor of out late-modern or postmodern times” (1998, 2). Needless to say, 
financial viability/wealth is the most important factor for determining who can move and who 
has the freedom to choose where to be. And as Bauman puts it, the hierarchy of mobility has 
polarized human experiences. These days, in particular, the new middle class, which is 
oscillating between those at the top and those at the bottom of the hierarchy, suffers from “acute 
existential uncertainty, anxiety and fear” (4). It can also be argued that these fathers, who are 
mostly economically middle class but also elites in their society — elites, who are “always more 
cosmopolitically inclined” and have “more in common with elites across the borders than with 
the rest of the population inside them” (12-3) -- in fact carefully prepare the ground for their 
children’s cosmopolitan life by creating opportunities to equip them with the ability to be mobile, 
with cultural capital like communication skills (including English) and with the ability to 
embrace diversity through their transnational educational projects. Particularly these fathers’ 
own mobility that mostly comes from their study abroad experiences and professor jobs (as I 
examined in chapter three) allows for more advantages for their children’s mobility, most 
conspicuously through the dual citizenship (passport). 
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B. Korean Identity and Cosmopolitan Desire 
As my interviews progressed, I found more and more that my interviewees were certainly 
nurturing new ideas of cosmopolitan citizenship that superseded national subjectivity especially 
when some of them envisioned their children’s future. Yet, while some fathers without reserve 
displayed their own cosmopolitan desires through ESA, some fathers struggled more with the 
unexpected agonies beyond the financial or emotional hardships. The fathers often realized that 
their children have developed frames of reference and paradigms that were different from those 
of their fathers.  And some informants were still torn between their own sense of collectivistic 
responsibilities for the nation or nationalist sentiment and their individual cosmopolitan desire 
for their children, especially when they faced their children’s post-national thinking or 
transnational identities. They sometimes experience discrepancy in their own thoughts and 
attitudes when they were dealing with their dilemmas. In this process, they -- both fathers and 
children -- influenced each other in the process of trying to better understand each other. It seems 
that the more the fathers identified with their children, the more they unknowingly underwent 
changes in their thoughts and paradigms as we will see in their accounts below. 
When ESA was not originally initiated by the father’s own cosmopolitan desire, the 
father seemed to experience even more agonies. Yet, amazingly, rather than discontinuing ESA 
because it was the source of the problem, these fathers tended to adjust themselves to the 
situation by changing their own thoughts and attitudes about their children. Furthermore, fathers’ 
own latent cosmopolitan desires were unexpectedly animated by children in this process. 
Professor Min’s case demonstrates this. 
Professor Min (Education, 48) has been struggling with a dilemma involving his personal 
and private interests as a loving father and his public interest as a scholar and educator in the 
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education field since he became a geese dad. From the outset, when he was about to conclude his 
sabbatical year in 2007 in the U.S., the thought of “geese-family making” for his only daughter’s 
education caused  him to experience a severe conflict as a scholar, especially because he was a 
scholar who was actively engaged in educational policies in South Korea. He expressed: 
This is a critical “minus” (in English) for me, and to a great degree, I also have to feel 
guilty about it as a scholar of education as I told my daughter and wife. I told my family 
that I did this solely for her, but I myself would become an object of social criticism. I 
knew it well. I don’t have a single word to defend this to my own students. 
 
I could read the self-deprecating emotion on his face as he said to me, “It is not honorable at all.” 
This was a moment of explicit honesty that I could rarely find among my informants. I could 
imagine how often he had to deal with this thorny issue in his own mind in everyday life as an 
educator and especially as an active professional in the education field. However, the impetus for 
beginning geese-family life was not his own yearning to raise his daughter as a cosmopolitan but 
rather his desire to follow his daughter’s ardent appeal and rescue his daughter from emotional 
trauma from her school experiences in South Korea and its physical side-effects.  It was not until 
his sabbatical year that he and his wife learned why their daughter so often had a stomachache in 
South Korea; he had experienced changing understandings of her while raising her abroad. 
Lately, I told this to my daughter. “If you have a bit of thought considering the “premium 
[advantage/value]”(in English) of U.S. degree in Korea while you are studying in 
America and if you are going to remain at that low level, you must not keep studying 
there but rather quit now.” And I told her like this too, “The whole world is given to you 
as your stage, and the most important thing is that you do whatever you want to do 
whether you go to Europe or Africa. Isn’t it meaningless for you to say that ‘I should go 
back to Korea’?” She also says same thing with me. 
  
Here we can see that he expects her to live as a cosmopolitan. Interestingly, Professor Min 
differentiated his own study abroad experience from his daughter’s. He explained it this way:  
In terms of that she thinks her stage is the whole world, it is… well, her study abroad 
experience is very much different from mine. I just thought I should come back to Korea 
after getting my degree at that time, you know. It looks like she naturally and smoothly 
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adapts herself to that culture, but I was shocked at that time…, it [my study abroad 
experience] was sort of a shock to me.  
 
Having realized that her early study abroad experience was totally different from his in 
adulthood, he further argues that people who have the intention of coming back to live in South 
Korea do not need to go to early study abroad. In his opinion, if someone only considers his or 
her career success in South Korea, ESA is not the best option; rather, studying abroad for 
graduate studies would be a much better option in order to avoid possible identity problems or 
disadvantages in social networking/making connections (inmaek hyŏnsŏng) in South Korean 
society. He added that the only reason why he was ashamed of himself as a geese dad is because 
he was a professor of Education — this means that the choice that he made as a father is not 
shameful at all; if he himself had the capability of doing something well in any foreign country, 
he would also go abroad without hesitation as his daughter and young people these days do. 
What we can see in his last words is that although his daughter brought him some inner troubles, 
her experience also animated his latent cosmopolitan desire. 
In a similar vein, Professor Cho (51), who had been a geese dad for eight years and 
whose academic field is social science, has also somewhat struggled with feelings of 
contradiction between his own scholarly beliefs and his concern over his daughter’s identity. His 
daughter was born in the U.S. when he was studying there and lived in the U.S. afterward with 
her mother, who had kept studying for her PhD degree after Professor Cho came back alone to 
South Korea with his degree. Later, when Professor Cho’s wife got her degree and came back to 
South Korea, his daughter was sent to a boarding school in the U.S. since she resisted returning 
to South Korea. However, at the time of interview, his daughter was attending an international 
college in Seoul. According to Professor Cho, his daughter hardly had any conception of the idea 
of nation or state. He said, “When she was younger, if I asked her which nation’s citizen you 
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were, she used to answer it by saying ‘I am Berkeley citizen.’” When I asked him how he felt 
about it, he told me that he also did not much care about it. However, he expressed some of his 
ambivalence: 
There might be an interaction between me and my daughter in terms of identity. 
Sometimes I am so embarrassed because there is something vague and unsolved while I 
am raising my daughter. In fact, I myself have struggled with this issue though…, 
well…for me, theoretically the state and nation is the object to overcome, so when my 
daughter shows no sign of serious Korean identity, I have no intention to correct her. 
But…you know, on the other hand, in reality, from time to time I become somewhat 
uncomfortable about it by feeling it’s a bit off. Actually, it seems that I myself often send 
my daughter contradictory signals. It’s because…there is a conflict between theories and 
reality… And when I reflect myself on why I try hard to cross the boundaries of nation 
and state, I am sure, to some extent, I’ve been influenced by my daughter while I watched 
her growing up there.  
 
Even though he thought that “nation is the object to overcome,” his feeling as a father has been 
oscillating between nationalist sentiment and cosmopolitan desire for his daughter while he 
watched her growing up with post-national thinking. His effort to accept and understand his 
daughter as she is has inspired him to “cross the boundaries of nation and state” in his own 
paradigms of thought and his scholarship. 
Because of this ambivalence, when his daughter applied for college, Professor Cho made 
up his mind to urge her go to an international college in South Korea instead of a college in the 
U.S. I asked him with curiosity about why he did this and how his daughter responded to it. 
According to him, at first his idea made his daughter perplexed because she took it for granted 
that she would go to college in the U.S. and she resisted it. But she eventually accepted his 
suggestion and was attending an international college at one of elite universities in Seoul. He 
said that he persuaded her on two fronts: 
First, it was the emotional appeal from a father, who wanted to keep his daughter close to 
him, through reminding her that this might be the last chance for our family to live all 
together [before her marriage]. And then I told her, “The advantage now you have 
because you have lived in America is that you may have more freedom of choices. If you 
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go to college in Korea now, you can experience two countries and cultures and you either 
make your choice to live in Korea or in America later. But if you go to American college 
now, then it will not be a matter of choice anymore. Only one path will be left, and you 
should live in America without alternative. Why don’t you open both possibilities? I will 
respect your choice when you make a decision later.” 
 
Although he urged her and succeeded in keeping her near him in Seoul, in addition to fatherly 
emotion and a bit of Korean sentiment, in his account we still find his cosmopolitan desire for his 
daughter among his intentions — hope for his daughter to be a person who can choose to live 
abroad, not a person who is forced to live abroad (Robbins 1998, 254). 
The experience of Professor Lee (natural science, 50), whom I introduced in the previous 
section as a father who strongly opposed his wife’s plan to send his son to the U.S. but was now 
satisfied with the results, deserves more attention here. As I already briefly explained when I 
introduced his case in chapter three, his wife secretly planned and sent his son to a relative in the 
U.S. while her husband was abroad at a conference for two weeks as a last resort because of his 
strong opposition. He confessed that he had a difficult time with his wife for a while because he 
learned about the plan only after it had been already executed. When I asked him about why he 
was so strongly against study abroad, he answered that it was mostly because he had already 
experienced part of geese-family life and did not want to make his son a “foreigner” (tarŭn nara 
saram). “How and in what sense?” I asked him. At first he referred to his own study abroad 
experience: “Based on my study abroad experience, for example, after six years passed there, I 
started feeling I didn’t like Korea.” He said that he missed and wanted to visit South Korea so 
much for the first two years. However, after four years of staying he did not miss South Korea 
anymore. Then six years later when he visited South Korea, he felt strange and was irritated by 
everything that he had enjoyed in the past, like people, the street, manners etc. It was another 
cultural shock to him. Culture shock again from his own country! He said: 
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If my parents were not here [South Korea] or if the situation at that time seemed that I 
couldn’t get a job here, I must have thought that I didn’t have to come back to Korea. 
So…um…I felt…it may sound as if I am discriminating daughters from son, however, I 
was uncomfortable with the thought that it would probably end up making my only son 
American.  
 
Because of this reason, he said, unlike other professors, he deliberately spent his two sabbatical 
years staying home to avoid the possible conflicts of being a geese family. 
More fascinatingly, he told me that his father also was a geese dad almost forty years ago! 
Professor Lee, with laughter, allowed me to call his father as an “original” (wŏnjo) geese dad. 
His father, a business man, sent his second older brother and older sister with his mother to the 
U.S. for education when Professor Lee was a 6
th
 grader. They lived as a geese family for five 
years until his mother came back. Professor Lee told me that he paid special attention to his son’s 
identity because he watched his siblings’ cases. What he really did not like was that his older 
brother and sister lost the concept of the Korean family. They were still living in the U.S. He said, 
“Well, they became successful, but I didn’t think it [ESA] made them necessarily happy or better. 
It’s a kind of like they lost their [extended] family. No more solidarity. They are completely 
American. We cannot communicate well with each other.” Hence after sending his son to the 
U.S., he has tried to get in touch with his son as much as possible and let his wife call and visit 
his son as many times as possible so as not to lose emotional connections. In so doing, Professor 
Lee tries to make his son feel that he is not alone and does not need to do everything by himself 
because he has family to rely on. “Nevertheless, my son became so much independent and 
already had his own subjectivity. He tries to do everything for himself, for example, to the extent 
that he refused my help when he wrote the personal statement for college application,” he said. 
He went on to tell me that his son has probably started having uncomfortable feelings about 
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Korea by now because it has been almost six years since he moved there, recalling his own 
experience. 
Another part of his struggle to help his son maintain his Korean identity, Professor Lee 
started repeatedly telling his son that he must fulfill the compulsory army service. As he put it, 
Professor Lee tried to “brainwash” (senoe) his son into thinking he must go to the army, secretly 
hoping his son could be more “Koreanized” (han’guk-hwa) through the Korean army experience. 
“I asked my wife to help me at least for this. So my son seems to understand now that he should 
go to the army.” Professor Lee hoped his son could live in South Korea primarily contributing to 
his country. However, he spoke later, “Actually, what I really want is that he can work 
internationally in world stage, but with Korean identity.” Professor Lee described himself as 
someone who has a somewhat conservative view of the nation. But when I asked him if his hope 
and effort for a more “Koreanized” son originated from his view of the nation, he took time to 
reflect on himself and said that it was all for his son’s sake: “Maybe it is somewhat because I am 
conservative or selfish, but it is rather because I don’t want him to have a hard time in the future 
agonizing over his identity — about who he really is.” It seemed his son has respected his wish 
so far, but Professor Lee was not sure that his son would be same in the future when his son got 
older. Although Professor Lee worried about his son’s identity because of his son’s future well-
being, the identity he was concerned about was still focused on national identity, whether he was 
aware of it or not. It seems that he wants to avoid a predicament, a situation of conflict in which 
his or his son’s cosmopolitan desire might possibly work against his national consciousness and 
traditional family values. 
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C. Dual Citizenship and “Flexible Citizens” 
As was hinted about in Professor Lee’s case, the obligation of military service for men is 
an excellent example that clearly reveals certain tensions between these fathers and sons. As I 
discussed in chapter three, most children of my informants have dual citizenship. Having dual 
citizenship in South Korea is considered a privilege, but at the same time it has also long held 
negative implications and has often been blamed for leading  to avoidance of compulsory 
military service (Dong-A Ilbo July 7, 2002; The Korea Times Oct. 20, 2009). In May 2005, an 
intense and complicated controversy over dual citizenship and compulsory military service 
eventually led to a significant revision of the Nationality Law, which resulted in the abolishment 
of dual citizenship in order to prevent the avoidance of military service.
51
 When I was 
interviewing professors (from September 2009 to June 2010), the Nationality Law was in the 
process of being revised again so that dual citizenship would be again possible as long as men 
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 The revision of the Nationality Law was proposed by Congressman (Hannara-dang) Hong Junp’yo in 2005. Since 
the beginning of the 2000s, the appointments of high officials like Prime Minister or ministers have often  
experienced obstacles because of appointees or their family members’ dual citizenship (or foreign citizenship) or 
exemption of military service even though every South Korean man over 18 years old is required to complete  two-
year compulsory military service. Especially, in addition to the repeated accusations of high officials’ avoidance of 
military service, the incident of Yu Sŭngjun drew huge popular attention to the issue of dual citizenship, oversea 
Koreans, and compulsory military service in 2002. Yu Sŭngjun, a famous pop idol at that time, who had permanent 
residency in the U.S., strategically gave up his Korean nationality and chose to have U.S. citizenship to avoid 
military service despite his active activities as a singer in South Korea and his previous vow to serve the army in 
South Korea. After the incident, Yu could not maintain his career as a singer in South Korea. Thus, in the process of 
the revision of the Nationality Law in 2005, compulsory military service was the hottest issue and the Law became 
more complicated than ever. According to the new Nationality Law that became effective in 2005, not only does 
Korea not permit multiple nationalities for either its citizens or foreigners, but also Korean nationals who obtain 
citizenship of another country before turning 20 years old could not renounce Korean nationality unless they 
fulfilled the obligation of military service first, although it was also stipulated that one nationality should be 
renounced before the individual becomes 22 because the Law does not permit dual citizenship after the age of 21. 
Before the revision, it was possible for dual citizenship holders to renounce one of nationalities before the age of18, 
and if they did not renounce it, they automatically lost Korean nationality. In this case, they were automatically 
exempted from military service (and in this way, male dual citizenship holders could avoid their military service). 
During the short grace period before the Law went into effect in 2005, many people, especially parents who were 
seen as privileged when their children could have dual citizenship, rushed to have their young children give up 
Korean nationality in order to avoid compulsory military service. This was severely criticized by the media and the 
public as avoidance of obligation and lack of nationalist sentiment and noblesse oblige. Among the people who gave 
up Korean nationality at that time, 98.6% were men and 73% were less than 15 years old  (Dong-A-Ilbo May 4, 
2005, May 25, June 13, 2005; Hankyore  May 10, 2005; The Korea Times Oct 20 2009, Oct 30, 2009; N. Kim 2013). 
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fulfilled compulsory military service. The latest revision, passed on April 21, 2010 by the 
National Assembly and effective beginning January 1, 2011, was also promulgated to enhance 
the nation’s global competitiveness by preventing brain drain in the era of globalization. In 
September, 2009, at the time of my interviews, dual citizenship and military service once again 
had become a hot issue because it was disclosed that newly appointed Prime Minister Chŏng 
Unch’an had not fulfilled his military service and that his adult son had renounced Korean 
citizenship for U.S. citizenship. Chŏng became an object of public criticism and elites were 
called upon to serve the nation. 
Many of my informants had sons who would have to face their military duty. As the Law 
was about to change again allowing for dual citizenship, most of them told me that they wanted 
their children to obtain dual citizenship by fulfilling the responsibility of military service. And 
some of them found themselves having to actively persuade their reluctant sons. Professor Lee 
(natural science, 50) put it to his son this way: 
If you want to be really globalized in the future, you should not lose your Korean 
nationality. Only when you keep both Korean and American nationalities at the same 
time, you can keep both as your “market[s]” (in English). But if you don’t serve in 
Korean army, it means you lose Korean “market.” Why would you want to lose that?   
 
Above I introduced Professor Lee’s concern with his son’s national identity, but with these 
remarks, he calls attention not to national or social responsibility or patriotism, but rather to 
“flexible citizenship” (Ong 1998, 1999). 
As I discussed in the beginning of this chapter, Ong well conceptualized the strategies 
and effects of Hong Kong Chinese diasporic subjects, who seek benefit from different nation-
state regimes, making their choice of citizenship based on economic calculation in global 
markets. Flexible citizenship does not seem to bring much conflict to these Chinese subjects who 
have already attained the market-driven sense of citizenship in their diasporic tradition. However, 
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flexible citizenship is not a favorable idea at all to Koreans, who are often believed to be people 
full of nationalist sentiment, because it is risky to have an attenuating sense of citizenship and 
national consciousness. Yet, these fathers, even the ones who were full of nationalist, Korean 
sentiment, already knew that they could not persuade their children with nationalist rhetoric 
anymore because their children, having been brought up abroad, had already developed different 
identities and different paradigms from theirs. Thus, with this realization, some of these fathers 
appealed to their children to maintain Korean nationality with more practical terms, using a 
comparable idea of a flexible citizen who can survive a changing global political economy, while 
they themselves adjusted their own thoughts. Of course, it is very hard to disentangle fathers’ 
strategic deployment of flexible citizenship rhetoric with their sons from their own “true” 
rationales. I suggest that we take stock of ways that these geese dads have been transformed 
through their vicarious experiences of their sons’ early study abroad. 
Just as Chinese satellite children in Canada find a new way of life while accepting 
Western values and norms which may challenge their parents who keep traditional Chinese 
values (Water 2003), these fathers also often discovered that their children absorbed different 
values and norms in host countries and could stand on their own ideas, sometimes challenging 
the fathers.
52
 For example, Professor Hong (natural science, 52), who has been a geese dad for 
eight years, confessed how his son’s own will, which was based on apparently more universal 
values, actually caused complications in his mind as a Korean father: 
Actually, it is concerning me! My son told me he would rather be put to death than to 
serve in the army. It is not because he has to spend two years there, but because he is a 
pacifist, hahaha [laughter]! War is evil in his belief, so he can never support the war nor 
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 Water in her work (2003) pays attention to some changes in individual Chinese astronaut families in Vancouver 
since immigrating. According to her, Chinese children in Vancouver actually became acculturated to a “Canadian 
way of life” and “conceived of Canadian citizenship in more than narrow instrumental terms” (232). Not only do 
Children often desire a “different set of goals” as the result of their transnational experiences, but also many are 
“maintaining dual or multiple national loyalties” (221, 228). 
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go to army. So it is not persuasive at all saying him, “You should go to the army because 
you are Korean.” He may resist going to the army even if he lives in Korea. So it is 
agonizing to worry about how I should be dealing with this conflict in the future.  
 
Professor Hong could not negate his son’s values as wrong probably because he knew that his 
son’s thoughts were based on the liberal thinking of the “autonomy of the individual and the 
commitment of liberty and universality” (Mitchell 2004, 24). Because he did not know how to 
deal with his own conflict, he confessed that he indeed felt that he was so “pathetic” 
(hansimhage) sometimes -- as people generally describe geese dads -- especially when he felt 
that he was not fulfilling his sense of responsibility towards society as an intellectual. He felt he 
had no voice to add to some social issues like educational issues or dual citizenship because he 
was the very person who was caught in the middle of these controversial issues as a geese dad. 
He told me that if his wife did not study there, he would not raise his children abroad. However, 
he felt that he might have to adjust himself even further for his children later. 
Fathers often said that “children are different from us.” These fathers were experiencing 
extra conflicts in addition to the common conflicts that come from a generation gap. Pierre 
Bourdieu argued that “generation conflicts oppose not age-classes separated by natural properties, 
but habitus which have been produced by different modes of generation, that is, by conditions of 
existence which, in imposing different definitions of the impossible, the possible, and the 
probable, cause one group to experience as natural or reasonable practices or aspirations which 
another group finds unthinkable or scandalous, or vice versa” (1977a, 78; second emphasis 
mine).
53
 I discover that these fathers have started recognizing that their transnational projects not 
only afford children a so-called “good education,” but also inevitably bring more changes in their 
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 Bourdieu defines habitus as “systems of durable, transposable disposition” which generate practices and 
perceptions (73). Habitus is socially learned but unconsciously internalized in a particular type of environment—
historically and socially situated condition. According to Bourdieu, when an individual does certain practices, he 
does it not simply because of his choice that he makes by his will but also because of manifestation of habitus. For 
more of this complex concept, see Bourdieu (1977a). 
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children’s way of life and way of thinking than they expected at the outset because study abroad 
provides them with different conditions of existence that produce a different habitus. 
As Professor Min (education, 48) once pointed out, there are differences between the 
experiences of these fathers and their children in foreign countries. When these fathers studied 
abroad and also, in many cases, when they sent their children abroad, their own habitus as 
Korean adults limited their way of thinking, their range of choices, and even their aspirations. 
Their habitus made them often consider familial and national values, which permeated or were 
imposed on their paradigms. Yet, they realize they cannot limit their children by forcing them to 
share the same paradigms because their children have developed a different habitus. Thus, 
Professor Hyun (engineering, 52) echoed: “Because I am Korean…very naturally I always 
thought that I had to return to Korea when I studied abroad. There was no other thought. But in 
the case of my children…as they are growing up, I feel my thought has gradually changed. At 
first, there was no concrete thought at all, but more and more I became to think that it [which 
nationality to have or where to live] should be decided in the best way for my children and their 
happiness.” Instead of trying to change their children, rather, they hope their children will be free 
from the constrictions; this often makes them wish they themselves could be free from these 
constraints, which sometimes leads to a change in their own paradigms. They also feel that the 
world is changing to allow/demand them to make these changes. 
 
IV. Awakening as a Cosmopolitan  
Ulrich Beck argues that in this globalizing world, the imagining of possible lives is 
understood within world society, not just confined within the nation or ethnicity.  That is, “What 
people dream, how they would like to be, their everyday utopias of happiness – these are no 
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longer tied to a particular geographical area and its cultural identities” (2000, 65). While raising 
their young children abroad, through the interaction between the father and children, these 
fathers might have to continuously reflect on and reevaluate both themselves as fathers and the 
transnational educational project for their children. And as I have shown, in this process, they 
have to keep readjusting their own attitudes as parents, often experiencing conflicts. However, it 
seems that  the more these fathers recognize and try to accept their children’s post-national 
thinking and transnational subjectivities, the more they experience their own paradigms shifting 
while developing their own cosmopolitan thinking. Being open to any possibilities for their 
children as autonomous subjects, they gradually experience vicarious cosmopolitanism through 
their children. 
  
A. Eventually, It Is Their Choices 
When speaking about dual citizenship, all my interviewees admitted that South Korea 
was the only divided nation in the world now, so the government’s efforts to prevent the 
avoidance of military service were quite understandable. However, on the other hand, most of 
them indicated that they would eventually respect their children’s own choice for their future, 
even if their children ended up living only as American (or other countries’) citizens without 
serving in the South Korean army. They showed a tendency to value individual freedom and 
individual identity over collectivity and collective identity. In this process, these fathers were 
also developing a serious critique of the conception of nation. 
Some fathers did force their sons to serve in the army, but it was not necessarily because 
of their nationalist sentiment or their insistence on importance of collectivity. Rather, it was often, 
as in Professor Chon’s case, because fathers wanted their sons to live as better independent 
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people on a world stage. Professor Chon (natural science, 51) told me that he nearly had to 
threaten his son to serve the army and that his son would soon serve. He said that he gave his son 
a carrot and a stick because his son was very reluctant to serve; for example, he had to say things 
like: “Just do it for you. When you are discharged, I will buy a new car for you.” Still, the 
motivation to persuade his son did not originate from his patriotism or concerns over dual 
citizenship at all but was rather rooted in the father’s educational hope that his son would 
become a stronger and more mature man both physically and mentally through military 
experience -- which is in fact a very Korean way of thinking. He told me that his motivation was 
not related to nationalist sentiment whatsoever. His son actually wanted to keep living in the U.S. 
and he also was ready to accept it. He was even open to the possibility of international marriage 
of his son and daughter. He said that the most important thing to him was that his children lived 
their own lives, making their own choices. 
Some fathers argued that Koreans needed to change their biased perception of dual 
citizenship in this globalizing world. Professor Kim (humanities, 49), who has two daughters, 
spoke, “I think acknowledging dual citizenship is reasonable because it actually fits most their 
identities. If someone feels like he or she is half Korean and half American like my daughters, 
and then it is not bad at all for him or her to live with it.” In the same vein, Professor Yoo (social 
science, 47) also thought that his son, who was an undergraduate student at the time of interview, 
had had no identity crisis so far: “My son thinks he is Korean because his parents are Korean, but 
he also thinks he is American because he lives in America with American citizenship. But I see 
that he has his own identity without any conflicts. There is no problem so far except that Korean 
government demands to choose only one nationality between them.” Professor Yoo was the first 
and only one who voluntarily brought up the issue of military service during the interview. He 
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told me that his son wanted to choose American citizenship if he had to choose only one, and 
that his son’s thought and will could not be and should not be changed by parents’ force because 
his son has his own rationale and aspiration. He added: “I don’t think we are now in the world in 
which I must give up Korean citizenship if I get another citizenship.” These fathers seem very 
open to any possibilities for their children, trying to respect and accept their children’s own 
choices. 
Sometimes, the children’s post-national thinking tended to be more advanced than the 
fathers, so that fathers were often baffled by it, but also eventually adjusted to it. Professor Ahn’s 
(social science, 48) only daughter in the U.S. had no identity crisis so far but had multiple 
belongings. According to him, it seemed she thought she was Korean, but she also had deep 
affinity to Japanese culture and wanted to have a job in Japan after college graduation (she had 
lived in Japan, where she had many relatives, for a few years when Professor Ahn researched 
there). Nevertheless, she also wanted to apply to the U.S. Air Force ROTC program as an 
American citizen. Because she was not just becoming an American but also an American soldier, 
Professor Ahn thought that he should give up all his hopes of attaining high-official positions 
(positions like prime minister, minister, or even president of university) rather early after 
observing recent controversies. He especially pointed out that the exploitation of nationalism for 
political purposes by certain groups was not right. And he said: 
Although the devotion and love for the society they belong to is good, the perspective, 
with nationalism in particular, to see the relation of nation to nation as a “zero-sum game” 
(in English) is not good at all. But Koreans have that tendency. […] Actually, as a social 
scientist and a Christian, I don’t regard nationalism as good. So I think that the infusion 
of nationalist sentiment into children repeatedly saying like “You are Korean” is not good 
for children. I rather hope my child to grow up as an upright person and a good Christian, 
who has good will for others than antagonism toward others, regardless of nationality. It 
is more important to raise children as a crucial member of society regardless of which 
nationality they have.  
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Professor Ahn said that he had no intention to make his daughter live in South Korea if it was not 
her choice. Rather, he and his wife were considering living in the country where their daughter 
would live in the future after their retirement. 
Meanwhile, some fathers rendered more aggressive criticism of the contradictory, 
irrational attitudes of the South Korean government and people surrounding globalization and 
global citizenship. Professor Park (engineering, 49) especially criticized some lawmakers who 
were agitating nationalist sentiment of the people in their treatment of the dual citizenship issue. 
He attempted to explain, in an interesting way, the reason why the agitation did work for revision 
of the law despite some legal problems. 
Frankly speaking, our country has been a third-tier country, you know. That is the reason 
why Koreans are so sensitive to nationality issues. It seems it is from the [inferiority] 
“complex” (in English). If our country became wealthier one, then people would become 
much more open to the issue. I think the sensitivity toward dual citizenship comes 
from…um…the basic assumption that Korean nationality is inferior, isn’t it? If Koreans 
believe that Korean nationality is the best, why should it be an issue at all? If the Prime 
Minister’s son doesn’t have Korean nationality, people would rather say this, “Oh, what a 
pity for him!” The anger over the U.S. citizenship itself tells us that ours is third-tier 
country. So people ask that why his son alone has top-tier nationality; if it isn’t a 
privilege. That’s the psychology. It’s sad. I hope Korea becomes better country soon, so 
we can pity the people who have other nationalities, haha [laughter].  
 
Some may agree with his analysis, but some may not. Nonetheless, what I do not want to miss 
here is that the [inferiority] “complex” that Professor Park mentioned, in fact, connotes another 
issue, even if Professor Park himself might not be aware of it. The issue of dual citizenship is not 
just related to nationality but also to unequal opportunities to access global mobility (along with 
the issue of equally serving the army). Thus, the “complex” is also related to the frustration of 
ordinary South Korean people who have a deep-seated, strong desire to become world citizens 
but do not have mobility that elites enjoy. That is why this issue has been so sensitive. In some 
sense, the South Korean government ought to be blamed for this frustration because the 
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government continuously emphasizes globalization and global competitiveness for its entire 
population on the one hand, but demands that individuals solely take responsibility for that 
competitiveness on the other hand. And to control this social sentiment of frustration, the 
government tries to exert control over certain individuals by setting a strict boundary with 
inconsistent policies. 
Some professors were indeed bothered by the globalization rhetoric of the government. 
Professor Min (education, 48) was talking about globalization when he said: 
I don’t like the expression competitiveness (kyŏngjaengnyŏk) that the government often 
uses, but I think being pluralized (tawŏnhwa) is very meaningful. […] So, it becomes that 
people can demonstrate their abilities anywhere in the world, in any countries, and I think 
it is globalization (segyewha). So to speak, there is no border now… obviously, it has 
been disappearing. It will become more and more open as economy did. Um...the mindset 
that I can go and work anywhere they need my ability even though I am Korean and its 
following-up actions, rather than the drawing the strict “boundary” (in English) only for 
our nation …well, I think those are the real globalized. I don’t think globalization is the 
matter of world-ranks in which our country is for this or that as the government often 
argues.  
 
In some sense, today, Korean society is changing to the extent that the state’s control over 
citizenship and globalization is somewhat troublesome to some people who already have 
cosmopolitan subjectivities. 
In the era of globalization, “individuals as well as governments develop a flexible notion 
of citizenship and sovereignty as strategies to accumulate capital and power” and there are 
certain tensions between them (Ong 1999, 6). As I discussed in chapter two, the South Korean 
state has mobilized globalization (segyehwa) discourses among its citizens in order to raise its 
global competitiveness especially after the Economic Crisis.
54
 Although the state tries to control 
and demand loyalty from its citizens by engineering neo-liberal governmentality and 
                                                 
54
 See chapter 2 for how the state has  made an effort to reinforce its capability by encouraging citizens to raise 
individual capabilities for themselves and how those discourses that the state disseminates continuously have 
conditioned people’s sense of self and everyday practices. 
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emphasizing national belonging and culture in the face of globalization, it seems that some 
citizens like my informants are developing their own cosmopolitan ideas (Foucault 1991a; 
Hoffman 2006; Ong 1999, 2006; Rofel 2006; Song 2010; Yan 2003). This development happens 
while they bring up their children abroad, especially when they witness their children’s own 
growth and multiple belonging and when they continue to have direct contact with foreign 
cultures. 
Rules for how to globalize are no longer dictated exclusively by the state, but people have 
their own agency to produce and negotiate their own cultural meanings in their own lives in the 
face of globalization (Ong 1999). Having managed the geese-dad life, these fathers are 
challenging the nation-state’s cultural hegemony while breaking existing familial and national 
norms and boundaries and developing their own deterritorialized ideas in ways that the Korean 
state would hardly be able to imagine. The Korean state’s recent contradictory attitude toward 
dual citizenship and the confusion in the process of repeated revisions of Nationality Law was a 
clear example of this tension and embarrassment. Just as Professor Cho (social science, 51) sent 
his daughter contradictory signals about national identity, the Korean government also sends 
contradictory signals to its citizens, creating friction between the ideas of globalization and 
nationalism. The government emphasizes global competitiveness with aggressive neoliberal 
rhetoric and suggests that its citizens acquire flexible citizenship on the one hand, but also 
severely controls citizenship by banning dual citizenship with the close-minded perspective that 
only South Korean nationals can contribute to South Koran society on the other hand. 
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B. Personalized Globalization, Vicarious cosmopolitans 
These fathers create their own meanings of globalization while they personally deal with 
the more concrete realities and more urgent challenges of bringing up their own children abroad. 
I call their geese-dad experience “personalized globalization.” It seems that some fathers are 
determined to pave the road for their children to live as cosmopolitans, to the extent that they are 
willing to change their own paradigms to better fit their circumstances. They show quite 
progressive ideas about the nation and the global. And they tend to cherish liberal dreams by 
emphasizing individual autonomy to make choices about how to create oneself as an independent 
subject, even when the fathers are caught between their own positions and their children’s. They 
want their children to meaningfully live as well-rounded, competent cosmopolitans with global 
perspectives and every possibility. Some professors further asserted that neither nation nor race 
would matter in their children’s generation in this rapidly globalizing world. They talked in these 
ways: 
In terms of my son’s identity, I don’t think the identity must necessarily be based on the 
nation-state. One’s individual identity, who I am, should not be primarily governed by 
one’s national identity. (Professor Han, humanities, 58) 
 
I think… and I also hope that their generation will be the generation that people can 
acknowledge diversity. And I believe, for example, the notion that Korea is a solely 
homogeneous nation-state will gradually disappear. (Professor Yim, Business, 55) 
 
Now, I don’t think it’s necessary to divide the world into two parts like my country and 
the rest of the world. Whether my son contributes as a Korean or an American, the 
quality of his contribution to both worlds would not differ. That’s what I believe. 
(Professor Choi, humanities, 56)  
 
Professor Choi (humanities, 56) said that ESA students would bring about a so-called 
“cultural revolution” (munhwajŏk hyŏkmyŏng) to Korean society in the near future and that they 
had begun to bring some changes already. “Those children are already citizens of the world. The 
very cosmopolitan consciousness that they have must be recognized as the biggest benefit they 
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got from early study abroad.” He emphasized that these children would eventually raise the 
competitiveness of Korean society even though parents did not send their children with the 
intention of increasing national competitiveness. “I heard that recently [in 2010] Mr. Chŏng 
Ŭisŏn, the vice chairman of Hyundai Motor, gave a presentation in Beijing Motor Show. It was 
said that he did it by himself in a confident manner in very fluent English. Just the way that Steve 
Jobs does it. If he didn’t go to early study abroad, he probably couldn’t do it.” He pointed out 
that ESA or geese families were often vilified, but the real problem was not the phenomenon of 
early study abroad or the geese family itself; rather it was the thought that the opportunities for 
these practices was limited to a relatively small group of privileged people. He argued that if the 
opportunity could be open to more people, then South Korean education and society would be 
better. 
Anthony Smith (1995) once argued that the dream of a cosmopolitan global culture is 
utopian. Interestingly, however, most of these fathers expressed optimistic views on the 
cosmopolitan global culture. Their cosmopolitan dreams for their children are based on the 
premise that the world equally treats all people with tolerance, hospitality, and inclusiveness and 
affords equal opportunities regardless of nationality or race (Appiah 2005, 2006; Wallace 1997; 
Werbner 2008). It is also assumed that if anyone feels comfortable enough entering the world 
stage, they can pursue their dreams anywhere in the world without strain. Bruce Robbins puts it, 
“it is now assumed more and more that worlds, like nations, come in different sizes and styles. 
Like nations, worlds too are ‘imagined’” (1998, 2). These fathers also imagine a new world for 
their children which they themselves could not experience before. For most of my informants, 
the world today is not an object beyond their boundaries, but a place that their children can jump 
into and accomplish anything they want without limitations. 
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Still, their “bringing up children as cosmopolitans” is an unfinished project. We do not 
know yet how the children of these fathers will turn out: whether these children will be “tourists” 
with a free spirit or at least with so-called flexible citizenship or “vagabonds” without a sense of 
belonging in the world or in their future. Bauman puts it, “the tourists travel because they want to; 
the vagabonds because they have no other bearable choice” (1998, 93). My informants, in their 
accounts, emphasized that they wanted to give their children “freedom of choice.” If freedom of 
choice is “the tourist’s flesh and blood” as Bauman reminds us, we should wait to see whether 
these children will be able to maintain this flesh and blood in their life courses (93). Future 
studies may give us to the answer as to whether they are really becoming cosmopolitans on the 
world stage, going back to South Korea securing capital and enjoying a successful life as they 
somewhat expect, or stuck betwixt and between.
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All these accounts that I examined show how these geese-dad professors simultaneously 
experience contradictory, often agonizing, and transforming moments while they bring up their 
children abroad as global citizens. For these professors, the concept of “global” or “globalization” 
is not merely abstract anymore because it has already been actualized in their practical lives. It is 
not just a meta-discourse which is imposed by the state or institutions anymore, but globalization 
permeates their individual lives as personalized experiences, for some even reaching to the level 
of changing their own beliefs and value systems. Many of my informants might have started their 
transnational educational practices imagining comparable images of flexible citizens as a part of 
broader strategy of familial social reproduction or upward mobility. However, the result was 
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 Scholars argue that some children who have transnational childhood may be “caught between two nations, 
educational systems and ways of growing up” and may have the risks of “feeling marginal in both places” (Orellana 
et al. 2001, 583). Abelmann and Kang (2014) also point out that the global children of geese families are 
“ambivalent cultural figures.” According to them, they are intended to become flexible citizens on the one hand, but 
they are also demanded to become “proper Koreans” who fulfill their national and filial duties. Also see, Lo and 
Kim (forthcoming), which examines how ESA returnees in Seoul narrate their current lives. 
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more than what these professors expected at the outset. My research reveals that many of these 
professors undergo a paradigm shift in their thoughts on the nation and the global via the 
experience of raising their children abroad. In their accounts, they are certainly fashioning new 
ideas of cosmopolitan citizenship and autonomous liberal subjectivity that supersede national 
subjectivity when they envision their children’s future in particular. They are not only raising 
future cosmopolitans, but also nurturing their own cosmopolitan desire as vicarious 
cosmopolitans. And I found that these transformations were often reflected in their profession as 
well, especially when they play the role of campus globalizers at their universities, as I will keep 
discussing in the following chapter. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
CAMPUS GLOBALIZERS AT HOME 
[U]nless there is more organized resistance to the globalization agenda that links 
universities to markets, the result will be a shift from scholar to entrepreneur. Academics 
are in a position to examine these globalization practices in depth within their own 
workplaces and to begin to understand the way in which many workplaces are being 
restructured and downsized. They are moving in a similar way to assimilate globalization 
practices, almost through unconscious osmosis (Currie 1998, 6). 
 
The internationalization of the academic Self should be seen as a fundamental building 
block in an institution’s response to global forces affecting higher education. […] 
teachers as individuals must operate from a base that extends beyond local and national 
perspectives. They, themselves, have to be among the cosmopolitans of the 21
st
 century 
(Sanderson 2008, 276-7). 
 
Nearly always what caught my eyes whenever I got into elevators in buildings at elite 
universities in Seoul during my fieldwork (2009-2010) were posters advertising talks by 
purportedly renowned foreign scholars in the name of the “WCU” [abbreviation in English] 
project at those universities. As I couldn’t help but notice these “WCU” posters here and there, I 
became curious about the very meaning of WCU. Soon, I learned that WCU stands for the World 
Class University, a government-sponsored university project devoted to inviting and hiring 
world-renowned scholars especially in technology, bio-technology, and the natural science fields 
in order to “upgrade” South Korean universities. In addition, during my fieldwork period, I also 
frequently noticed the placards and posters on billboards informing the university public about 
the various international conferences, symposium, or talks by foreign scholars on campuses. 
Although it was in fact not so often that I saw foreigners on these campuses, I could feel the pull 
of what we call internationalization (kukchehwa) at South Korean universities. 
In chapters three and four, I have explored the complexity of being a geese-dad professor. 
I found that their private choices in child-rearing abroad were involved in multi-faceted personal 
and social desires and therefore, in a sense, possible future conflicts as individual parents and/or 
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intellectuals were inherent from the onset. In addition, in the course of the interviews, I 
discovered that there was another intriguing ontological irony that these geese-dad professors 
presented: that is, most of my informants were in fact playing the role of campus globalizers, 
more specifically the role of agents of internationalization for their own universities, while they 
made their personal decisions to have their children exit South Korean schooling and get a 
college education abroad. 
This is so because South Korean universities, in recent years, have striven for arguably 
one of the world’s most aggressive state-mobilized globalization programs for universities and in 
the process they demand professors to play the role of agents in the imperative to globalize their 
universities. Professors with foreign (mostly U.S.) doctorates like my informants are presumably 
the very professors who are expected to play the broker role for the internationalization of their 
universities: e.g., working in international colleges, developing international programs, teaching 
courses in English, or organizing exchange programs or international conferences and so on, 
while mobilizing their foreign experiences, and thus drawing on their English skills, international 
networks, and cultural understandings — the very same cultural and social capital that they draw 
on for their children’s education abroad. Then, how do they observe and envision their given role 
as campus globalizers? How do they juggle their personal and professional lives with the 
possible inner contradiction that comes from being geese-dad professors whose children are 
opting out of Korean schooling, but who themselves play the professional role of agents of 
internationalization for their universities? Do they recognize this as a contradiction or ever feel 
any conflicts about it? If they do, how do they try to resolve it? 
In this chapter, starting from the questions above, I first briefly examine the relationship 
between globalization and South Korean higher education. I especially focus on how the state 
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policy of internationalization of universities as a restructuring tool has wielded strong influence 
over universities (and thus academics) and how it has eventually become a major strategy for 
universities to cope with the changing external and internal environment of higher education. I 
then observe how my informants as faculty/academics are directly experiencing these changes in 
their profession and responding to it; I look at how they perceive, embrace, or resist their newly 
given role as campus globalizers. 
Throughout my fieldwork interviews, I could notice that some ongoing changes were 
taking place in the academic values and agendas in South Korean universities. My informants 
showed somewhat ambivalent attitudes toward the implications that these changes might have. I 
especially found ongoing struggles and ambivalence surrounding the idea of “internationalization” 
in light of these geese-dad professors’ subjectivities: i.e., on the one hand, they actively 
embraced cosmopolitanism and international education while pursuing a personalized 
globalization project for their children; but on the other hand, many of them revealed reluctance 
to follow the neoliberal demands  imposed on their profession and the uniform directions of 
internationalization from both their institutions and the state. For many, this reluctance came 
from their perception that the internationalization of higher education was operated by a very 
centralized metric-driven instrumentalism, focusing on competition and showiness. It seemed 
that their awareness of the imperfection of internationalization efforts in South Korean higher 
education eventually worked in two directions: pushing them to keep foreign education for their 
children one the one hand, and motivating them to work for more genuine internationalization at 
their universities, on the other hand. The extent of their participation in the activities of 
internationalization is varied according to the degrees of internationalization of their own 
universities, yet, most of them are in fact contributing to the internationalization of their 
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universities in diverse ways. Interestingly, however, I identified a tendency that the more these 
geese-dad professors perceived their children’s education abroad positively and also experienced 
their own paradigm shift, the more they tried to transform the new challenges related to 
internationalization in their profession into other opportunities by making good use of their 
international experiences. Yet, a few among them revealed contradictory attitudes toward the 
current institutional internationalizing efforts they were participating in, in contrast to the strong 
personal cosmopolitan yearnings they displayed for their children. Others expressed their 
frustrations caused by the gap between them and the institutions: the cosmopolitan, liberal ideals 
that they had accumulated through their personal vicarious cosmopolitan experiences seemed to 
clash with the reality of their institutions, which emphasized performance- and competition-
driven policies rather than pursuit of basic principles, values, and ultimate goals of 
internationalization. 
As “globalization” has become a contemporary mantra, there is extensive literature that 
pays attentions to the impact of globalization on higher education and internationalization of 
universities, particularly in the education field. However, while many have studied about how 
globalization or internationalization affects universities (educational institutions) and students 
(educational consumers), less scholarship has examined how it affects academics selves in higher 
education. Especially, in South Korea, there are hardly any studies that have addressed and 
examined in detail academics’ own individual experiences and thoughts in particular. In this 
chapter, I will try to provide a meaningful snapshot of this relatively unexplored realm in studies 
of higher education in South Korea, based on ethnographic data. Yet, the limitation that I should 
acknowledge here is that the interviews with my informants were not designed solely focusing 
on this issue. Rather, my inquiry started from my intellectual curiosity of questioning whether 
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their experiences of child-rearing overseas had any impact on their profession or not. I wanted to 
know whether these kinds of impacts actually existed, then, how those impacts, along with 
impacts of globalization on their professional work, eventually affected their subjectivities. 
Thus, my aim in this chapter is not to comprehend the internationalization of South 
Korean higher education per se, but to comprehend the current position and challenges of South 
Korean academics in their profession, specifically focusing on the experiences of geese-dad 
professors. I want to show how institutionalized -- both state-imposed and/or university-driven -- 
globalization projects transform the South Korean academics’ professional experiences and 
expectations and also govern them (Henkel 2000; Lin 2009; Sidhu 2006, Slaughter and Leslie 
1997), and how these processes eventually reshape academics’ own definition of their job and 
role in South Korean society. A full discussion of the literature dealing with these issues in depth 
is also beyond the scope and object of this chapter.  However, through this chapter, I attempt to 
understand how all these internal and external challenges (or  opportunities) in their profession in 
the public sphere of their lives ultimately affect South Korean professors’ own subjectivities as 
intellectuals at this historical juncture. 
 
I. Globalization and Internationalization in South Korean Universities 
In recent decades, globalization has become an “all-encompassing and irresistible idea” 
that is not easily challenged (Currie 1998, 10). As it has infiltrated every corner of the world, 
scholars around the world have tried to understand how globalization relates to changes in higher 
education. Above all, as Jan Currie points out, globalization has “brought the free market into 
universities but with serious ramification and significant costs,” making universities participate 
in the new order of business (6). Although scholars have criticized the marketization of higher 
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education under the globalization of the political economy, calling it sometimes “entrepreneurial 
universities” or “academic capitalism” (Clark 1998; Sidhu 2006; Slaughter and Leslie 1997; 
Slaughter and Rhoades 2004), it is still a strong global trend that cannot be easily resisted. South 
Korean universities also, for over a decade, have had to transform themselves quickly in the face 
of the changing environment of higher educational institutions because of the domestic and 
global challenges that globalization and the notion of the supremacy of the market have brought. 
Not only have the forms of knowledge and quality of education and research became more 
contested in the rapidly changing knowledge-based global economy, but the environment of 
higher education institutions has also become increasingly competitive and difficult for 
universities to survive and maintain their status in higher education markets (Altbach 2012;  
Beerkens 2003; Burnett and Huisman 2010; Byun and Kim 2011; Chan and Lo 2008; Chu 2009; 
Currie and Newson 1998; Iwasaki 2009; Henkel 2000, 252; T. Kim 2008; Lin 2009; Mok 2003; 
Rhoads and Torres 2006; Sidhu 2006; Slaughter and Leslie, 1997; Slaughter and Rhoades, 2004). 
 
A. Global Ranking Competition of Universities 
In the era of globalization, which places universities in the marketplace, university 
rankings in particular have achieved an “iconic status” across the world as an important tool in 
the global knowledge race, establishing hierarchies of institutions (Altbach 2012). Apart from the 
serious question of their validity, many universities in the world have struggled to be included in 
the “top” category of research universities in the rankings, sometimes “distorting their basic 
missions” in the process (27). Rankings are an “inevitable result of higher education’s worldwide 
massification” as well as “competition and commercialization within it” (27). As other Asian 
countries have changed policies and made vast investments in higher education to earn global 
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recognition in recent years (Altbach 2012; Chan and Lo 2008; Chu 2009; Iwasaki 2009; Lin 
2009; Lo 2010; Mok 2003; Ozawa 2009), South Korea also has put great pressure on her 
universities to improve their place in various world rankings. 
Unfortunately, it is only very recently that South Korean universities came to be included 
in the top 100 universities in any global university rankings. The frequent media reports that 
even Seoul National University, the so-called number one university in the country that is 
famous for exceptional education zeal, could not place its name on top 100 lists in any global 
rankings has aroused strong criticisms from both inside higher education institutions and the 
public. Naturally, it drove universities and the state into somewhat of a panic; the government 
with a sense of urgency further accelerated educational reforms, which included strong 
internationalization policies. To match the government’s expectations, indeed, in 2007, Seoul 
National University developed “Global SNU,” an internationalization project which is a major 
attempt to achieve the goal of becoming a world-class university that can be ranked within the 
top ten in the world rankings (Y. Kim 2009, 26). It might be too hasty to predicate that it is a 
result of these efforts for internationalization, but recently a few universities have made some 
tangible progress in terms of global rankings. For example, in 2012, three South Korean 
universities, including SNU (the 37
th
), were included in top 100 universities in “the 2012 World 
University Rankings” conducted by QS (Quacquarelli Symonds), a UK university rating agency 
(Financial News, 11 September, 2012). The South Korean government has continued to push 
restructuring policies both through incentives and sanctions to motivate universities to meet 
certain criteria to win the race of university rankings. 
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B. Internationalization, the Key Tool for Upgrading Korean Universities 
Along with the strong obsession with the global ranking competition, it is evident that the 
internationalization of the university is one of the most conspicuous and systematic efforts of 
universities to respond to and cope with globalization (Altbach and knight 2007; Burnett and 
Huisman 2010; Sanderson 2008). Although, in a sense, “higher education has always been 
international” (Beerkens 2003, 141), internationalization of higher education has increasingly 
become a global trend in recent decades and some scholars anticipate that increasing 
internationalization can also cause the further globalization of higher education (Beerkens 2003; 
Sidhu 2006). 
In South Korea in particular, internationalization apparently has been one of the most 
critical changing forces in higher education in recent years. In addition to the intense global 
competition for recognition and rankings, there has been growing global pressure to open up the 
domestic education market for transnational education services under the WTO, GATS and FTA 
negotiations since 1996 (T. Kim 2008; Y. Kim 2009).
56
 Under these circumstances, in which the 
government had to liberalize and open up the education market but at the same time curb 
increasing outward education migration, it seems that internationalization policy aiming to 
upgrade South Korean universities to global standards was the best way to ensure the survival of 
South Korean universities in global higher education markets, which have been increasingly 
internationalized, with “Anglo-American dominance” (Sidhu 2006, ix). 
However, in contrast with universities in Western developed countries, which are main 
exporters of higher education and have increasingly regarded international higher education as a 
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 The liberalization of the domestic education market started in 1996. It is often said that the latest and perhaps most 
radical decision in the government’s policy agenda for restructuring Korean higher education was to open up the 
domestic higher education market through negotiations with the World Trade Organization (WTO)/General 
Agreement of Trade in Services (GATS) and a new bilateral free agreement with the USA (T. Kim 2008;Y.Kim 
2009). 
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tradable commodity that can earn profits by charging high fees (Altbach and knight 2007; Sidhu 
2006), in South Korea, the internationalization of universities is more perceived as a “key tool 
for improving the quality and increasing the competitiveness of higher education” and eventually 
increasing national competitiveness in the global economy (Byun and Kim 2011, 468). Under the 
existing conditions in which international students usually move from the South/East to the 
North/West and where universities in the North/West have both controlled the process of 
internationalization and global education markets and benefitted financially from the process 
(Altbach and Knight 2007; Sidhu 2006), South Korea universities are in a disadvantageous 
position, facing challenges related to internationalization. As latecomers to internationalization 
they  have a burden to newly develop (in most cases) or enhance their international programs and 
infrastructure to draw more prospective international students, while also competing with other 
leading foreign universities in reputation. Furthermore, the degree of internationalization to 
pursue does not depend on the size, capability, circumstance, and strategy of each university, but 
rather depends on uniform measurement through detailed indicators of assessment that the 
Ministry of Education (MOE) or external examiners provide. Internationalization has become a 
critical criterion to evaluate the competitiveness, determine the domestic rankings of universities, 
and distribute government funding. Not surprisingly, there has been a tendency for universities to 
be so busy meeting the uniform standard that each university does not have time to develop their 
own distinctive internationalization programs and principles. 
In this vein, although the government apparently emphasizes global competitiveness as 
the rationale of internationalization and recent restructuring policies, it can be suggested that 
most South Korean universities are more likely to comply with them, foremost, to survive and 
succeed in the domestic competition by mostly focusing on external development that can be 
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measured and proved by figures. In fact, South Korean universities are faced with new, serious 
challenges in the domestic higher education market. Above all, the higher education supply in 
South Korea has started to exceed the demand due to rapid expansion of higher education 
institutions with government deregulation policies and the abolishment of enrolment quotas in 
1995 (T. Kim 2008). Some universities in fact have failed to meet their student enrollment quota. 
As a result, unlike in the past, South Korean universities cannot have the advantage over 
consumers in the education market anymore. Moreover, the demographical changes have added 
another crisis. As the size of the college-bound age cohort has continued to decrease, the number 
of 18-21 year-olds enrolling in higher education will drop from 3,278,000 in 2000 to 2,336,000 
in 2020, according to recent population growth projections. And the projections expect that the 
number will go down further to 1,511,000 by 2030 (MOE; Ryu, et al, cited in T. Kim 2008, 560). 
To make things worse, there has been increasing outward migration as parents choose 
overseas education like early study abroad. South Korean universities increasingly have lost their 
domestic consumers to foreign higher education institutions since they have failed to meet the 
demands of both domestic consumers and the labor market by failing to raise competent global 
citizens.
57
 The demand for high-skilled knowledge workers in the labor market has been 
heightened, and yet the unemployment rate of university graduates has rather increased (T. Kim 
2008; Park 2007). Now, only a limited number of universities with high reputations are part of 
the competition in the higher education market and universities are also put under the rigorous 
rule of the market. South Korea universities are at a crossroads for survival, facing consumer 
demands to develop human capital by teaching knowledge and skills for the 21
st
 century. The era 
when it was sufficient for universities to afford lectures and give credentials to students is gone. 
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 According to the data, provided by the Statistics Korea (T’onggyech’ŏng), the numbers of Korean students who go 
overseas for their undergraduate degrees were 113,735 in 2006 and 154,178 in 2012. Available at 
http://www.index.go.kr/egams/stts/jsp/potal/stts/PO_STTS_IdxMain.jsp?idx_cd=1534 
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Universities now have to compete to recruit students and commit to preparing competent job-
ready graduates for domestic and global markets. Besides, the employment rate of graduates has 
become an actual crucial indicator of the evaluation of and criterion for state financial support 
for universities. In short, as one scholar points out, “the war for reputation and dominant position 
in higher education is now increasingly intense, begetting various effects” (J. Kim 2011a, 112). 
Thus, for most South Korean universities, internationalization is not just an option that 
helps to make profit as in the case of Western universities, but an imperative strategic effort to 
enhance a university’s reputation and improve its profile as a high-quality education provider 
with top rankings and a requirement to survive domestically and globally. Ironically, however, it 
produces a circular argument: that is, universities should be internationalized in order to be 
ranked at the top of university rankings, and at the same time they should be at the top rankings 
in order to succeed in their internationalization, when, for example, they try to recruit excellent 
foreign students and scholars. 
 
II. Campus Globalizers: Internationalization of Self and Institution 
Responding to global and domestic challenges in higher education, South Korean 
universities have persuaded and put huge pressures on their faculty to play the creative and 
ardent role in the restructuring process and to fit into new, competitive environments. Faculty, 
particularly, with international pasts such as these geese-dad professors are mobilized to activate 
their own international networks in the service of the capitalization and globalization of their 
universities. Most of my informants, indeed, often engaged in the activities related to 
internationalization of their universities in various ways: working in international colleges, 
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developing international programs, teaching courses in English, or organizing exchange 
programs or international conferences and so forth. 
I found that, despite the sudden pressures and extra burden on faculty, most of my 
informants agreed that the internationalization of universities is necessary. Some professors 
showed their passion and pride for their role as agents of internationalization. For example, when 
I asked Professor Park (engineering, 49) about how he was involved with the internationalization 
of his university, he started expressing his thoughts in a confident manner: 
I believe that internationalization is the right direction to take. Actually, it is way overdue. 
My university is pushing forward various plans right now, but I still think the momentum 
is too slow. We need to pick up the speed for our [Korean] situation. As of now, it seems 
that internationalization is not a choice that we can make. Our country has no other 
option, we cannot wonder about doing it or not. It’s as if we’re like the seniors in high 
school (kosam haksaeng), they cannot have half a mind to study and definitely have to 
study hard. And we cannot hesitate either when it comes to internalization. How we 
approach it is the only issue. 
  
While he was talking, Professor Park suddenly stood up, went to his desk, took his name card, 
and presented it to me. The position on his name card told me that he, in fact, played an active 
role in one of his university’s globalization projects. The name of the institution that he served 
had the word “global” in it: “Global XXX Center.” He took the job because he thought he saw a 
potential to synthesize his ideas of internationalization with this job despite his usual dislike of 
this kind of administrative work. The projects of the center aim to raise engineering students “as 
‘global leaders’ (in English) with leadership, communication skills especially in English, and 
entrepreneurial ethics and spirit” through intensive training beyond a mere engineering-centered 
education. He thought that these efforts would eventually contribute to the paradigm shift of 
South Korean society toward a truly internationalized society, making students objectively see 
themselves and interact with foreign people and cultures; he was happy to play his part in this 
effort. I could understand where his confident manner came from. 
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Professor Yoo (social sciences, 47), who worked for the international program at his 
university, shared similar opinions with Professor Park, saying that South Korean universities 
could not resist the trend of internationalization in they were to survive because they had to 
compete with foreign universities. He acknowledged some existing “discomfort” surrounding 
internationalization and its accompanying pressures among professors, but he added that he felt 
that there also had been “significant changes” in the attitudes (e.g., from reluctance/resistance to 
acceptance) of the professor community toward it in recent years. He believed that if 
internationalization was solely dependent on the individual level, such as an individual 
professor’s passion and effort for publication in global journals or participation in international 
conferences, the internationalization of university would never be achieved. 
However, not all of my informants felt the way Professor Park and Yoo felt or shared the 
same confidence in internationalization. Their senses of fulfillment or frustration as campus 
globalizers were different depending on the degree of internationalization of their universities, 
the degree of their individual involvement, the characteristics of their disciplines, or their 
seniority as professors. Some more willingly complied with the requests of the university than 
others. Yet, from time to time, I found that many, even the professors who actively engaged in 
internationalization efforts, revealed certain degrees of discomfort with state-imposed 
internationalization and the follow-up actions of universities. It was not only because these were 
extra burdens, newly imposed upon them. They showed discomfort when they felt that these 
forces ignored the nature of their work, the differences between disciplines – especially when 
they ignored the differences between quality and real contribution of scholarly work, and 
associated the mission of international education with pervasive obsession with rankings, 
external systems, and performance and efficiency, based on quantified figures, as I discuss below. 
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A. Changing Nature of Professors’ Labor 
The strongest impact of globalization that most faculty in South Korean universities feel 
now is the abruptly shifting nature of academic labor. It includes the strong demand to 
internationalize the academic self. Western scholars have already observed that “the 
globalization of the political economy at the end of the twentieth century is destabilizing patterns 
of university professional work” with unprecedented changes (Slaughter and Leslie 1997, 1). 
South Korean professors are somewhat belatedly experiencing these changes in relatively 
contracted period but with stronger impacts at the beginning of 21
st
 century. 
The university professor has been broadly considered one of the most stable and 
unchallenged jobs in South Korea. In addition, professors have been considered one of the most 
symbolic and respectable professional and intellectual communities in society and have enjoyed 
this aura of respectability until recently as I discussed in chapter two and will discuss more in 
chapter six. Traditionally, identities of professors as professionals have been formed while 
valuing “the individuation and reputation within self-regulating knowledge communities” and 
also professors’ role has been centered on teaching (Henkel 2000, 250). Until quite recently, 
South Korean professors could maintain their habitus in a comparatively relaxed academic 
environment: once professors were tenured, they could teach until their retirement, usually 
without any rigorous performance evaluations or excessive pressures, unless they critically 
misbehaved. They also have been relatively successful at protecting their jobs when workers in 
other workplaces have been laid off as a consequence of the restructuring processes after the 
Economic Crisis.
58
 But, nowadays, most professors — the young and old together -- feel more 
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 However, the recent restructuring process of universities, along with the growing competitiveness of the academic 
labor market, has created the exacerbation of inequality in academic staff, for example, in contract status, workload, 
and salary. Universities have shown a tendency to hire more hourly-based temporary staff (sigan kangsa) with fixed-
term contracts than tenure-track academic staff on a permanent basis, focusing on the economical advantage of the 
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pressures in various ways in their profession than ever before and they are more likely to 
integrate both research and teaching as their central role. Furthermore, they have started to 
realize that research is no longer a private concern of the individual but has become a public and 
collective matter for the survival of institutions and the state (Henkel 2000, 254). Moreover, their 
individual internationalized levels of research (as well as teaching), e.g., their publications in 
international academic journals in English, are more critical to not only their own individual 
reputations as academics but also those of universities and the state than ever before. 
South Korean faculty has been put in increasingly competitive situations under the state’s 
restructuring policies.  For the internationalization of research, first of all, the MOE has set new 
rules of competition among universities for national research funds and a new evaluation system 
to measure the academic performance of universities, in order to achieve the goal of upgrading 
South Korean universities to the level of a global standard of excellence. Among the 
government’s internationalization policies, internationalizing research and academic staff has 
been one of the major agendas. Two major projects, the Brain Korea 21(BK 21) Project which 
was started in 1999, aiming to develop 10 world-class research-oriented universities, and the 
World Class University (WCU) Project, which was launched in 2008 to try to reverse “brain 
drain” and at the same time to attract prominent world-class scholars to South Korea, have been 
funded by the government as efforts to upgrade the research of universities and to nurture 
globally competitive researchers of the next generation (Byun and Kim 2011; T. Kim 2005). 
At the same time, to measure the excellence of academic research and also distribute 
academic funds, specific criteria for the evaluation of research productivity have been imposed: 
e.g., detailed guidelines for the number of articles to be published in scholarly journals listed in 
                                                                                                                                                             
practice. The rate of temporary academic staff among the newly hired has kept increasing in recently years, reaching 
38.2% in 2012 from14.9% in 2005 (Kyosusinmun 23 April, 2012). 
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the KCI (Korea Citation Index) within a certain time frame. The South Korean government has 
placed a particularly strong emphasis on worldwide visibility by demanding that research articles 
be published in globally acclaimed journals, as such as those listed in the Science Citation Index 
(SCI) or the Social Science Citation Index (SSCI), attempting to spur the advancement of Korean 
universities’ rankings in the international rankings of research universities (Byun and Kim 2011; 
T. Kim 2005).
59
 Moreover, research productivity within these specific criteria has become the 
most critical factor for academic staff appraisal systems which affects promotion and salary 
differentials.
60
 Professors who cannot comply with these new criteria of research recognition are 
“vulnerable individuals” in these competitive circumstances (Henkel 2000, 136). Although all of 
my informants acknowledged the significance of research to their professions and were in a 
relatively advantageous position to deal with this challenge as foreign doctorates, these 
professors often complained about these enforced, uniform policies and regulations of research. 
Compared to professors in the humanities and social sciences, who tended to express 
more of a critical stance toward the changes, it seemed that scientists (including professors in 
engineering) felt less of an impact on their work by these internationalization and research 
                                                 
59
 In fact, the articles published in international journals which are included in the SCI, jumped from 9,854 in 1999 
to 25,494 in 2007 (Byun and Kim 2011, 475). See Byun and Kim (2011) for an overview of changing patterns of 
Korean government policies for internationalization of the higher education system since the mid-1990s. 
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 In Western universities, more varied employment contracts with staff, which incorporated different salary 
structures and different working conditions, were already introduced as the system moved away from the norm of 
relatively low salary differentials in the academic profession, as one can see, for example, in the British case at the 
end of 1980s (Halsey 1992 , cited in Henkel 2000, 63). However, in South Korea, the introduction of the practice of 
a performance-based salary system in addition to the academic staff appraisal system is relatively new in universities, 
and thus it has only recently caused much anxiety in academia. For example, a Dong-A Ilbo article in 2008 reported 
the impact of an academic staff appraisal system on the tenure system in universities (4 March, 2008).  Also, a news 
article in 2012 reported recent changes in the salary system and the responses of professors: for example, a senior 
professor expressed his frustration about the fact that some of his junior colleagues received  almost twice his salary 
and confessed that his self-esteem was hurt. Korea University tried to adopt a new system that required professors 
(chŏng kyosu) to have at least one publication in a journal listed in SCI or SSCI for promotion in salary steps, in 
order to induce more production of research papers. (Kyosusinmun 22 October, 2012). 
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assessment policies. They felt that there was not much difference because these conditions were 
already embedded in their disciplines. Professor Chon (natural sciences, 51) spoke: 
 Well, in terms of internationalization, we are already internationalized. We publish many 
papers in English unlike humanities and social sciences, and that in itself is 
internationalization. We also consider it as the best way for internationalization. For 
example, in my case, I have kept publishing mine over one hundred. So in our 
discipline…well, I think, internationalization has been naturally accomplished. We 
present everything in English, so students also take it for granted while doing a research 
… so they naturally get used to using English, not by being forced. […] Therefore, 
uhm… it might be seen as a self-centered thought, haha [laughter]…I think that the best 
way to internationalize universities is more supports for professors…affording them 
better environment for research.  
  
It seemed that Professor Chon almost identified the internationalization of research and/or the 
academic self with the internationalization of university. Professor Chon was actually involved 
in other activities for the internationalization of his university as well: e.g., he was teaching 
graduate classes in English, and he had arranged a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) for 
an international project between his university and a state university on the east coast in the U.S., 
where his children attended when he was on sabbatical. However, interestingly, he described 
those efforts as not “critical” (in English) ones for internationalization but as a sort of “showoff” 
(in English). Professor Chon’s approach to internationalization was more individualistic, 
focusing on individual competitiveness of research, although he did acknowledge that there were 
disciplinary differences. He also did not resist the demand for articles published in journals listed 
in the SCI or the enforced research output criteria; he rather thought that the university had to 
support these individuals better to accomplish these things so as to eventually achieve 
internationalization. 
Yet, in contrast to Professor Chon, it seemed that the pressure and impact were stronger 
on the professors in the humanities and social sciences. Professors in these disciplines 
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complained about that these demands made them write many unnecessary short articles that they 
did not really think academically significant. Professor Cho (social sciences, 51) spoke: 
Although it’s no use, whenever I go to the meetings with MOE or National Research 
Foundation of Korea, I repeatedly talked about this issue…saying, “Please reduce the 
quantity of required papers in the cases of humanities and social sciences. Uh…basic 
characteristics [of disciplines] are different and we need to write papers and books which 
last longer. [In these disciplines] we still read writings, written one hundred, even two 
hundred years before. But now we write papers with one-year longevity. This is not a 
right way.” 
 
 Professor Cho’s remark raises the question of what is real productivity in academic work and 
reveals the negative impact and crisis that these policies have brought about. In a similar vein, 
Mary Henkel discusses, in her study (2000), how British research assessment exercises attracted 
criticism from academics because they ignored different forms of knowledge, especially “those 
who valued the more private, reflective conception of knowledge, primarily historians and 
English scholars. The concept of maturation was prominent in their thinking, and for most of 
them books were valued more highly than articles” (139). Many of my informants especially in 
these disciplines shared Professor Cho’s thoughts and expressed a sense of resistance against 
neoliberal systems and ideas that assumed that the productivity of academic work could be 
uniformly counted by external figures and by “endorsing bureaucratic definitions of quality” in 
an extremely competitive mode (Henkel 2000, 79). 
On top of this, the publication of articles in English is another burden, even to my 
informants who have U.S. doctoral degrees, and are seemingly in a more advantageous position 
than domestic doctorates. The demand to produce articles in journals listed in the SCI or SSCI 
does not just mean a pressure to write good articles in English, but it does in fact limit what can 
be thought, written, and researched to that which can be published in these mostly Western 
journals. By forcing and pushing academics to publish articles in Western journals regardless of 
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their own personal research agendas, the state/universities further, though probably 
unintentionally, make their academics take more for granted and succumb more readily to the 
First World’s power and knowledge, complying with “the parameters of knowledge through a 
series of ‘rules’ about what are acceptable and legitimate modes of knowing,” while at the same 
time ignoring the push for research to address the concern and needs of different geographical 
spaces or nations (Sidhu 2006, ix; Chu 2009; Kang 2009; Lin 2009). 
One of my informants confessed his embarrassment that he actually had a hard time 
writing research articles to meet the new standard after having spent several years devoting his 
services to administrative work for his university. He also was a proud teacher who had received 
recognition as a good professor by students; I witnessed the plaque for the “outstanding teacher 
award” in his office. However, now he was trying to reboot his academic desires as a researcher 
despite his senior position. There have been increasing demands made on competent 
professionals. Although there are differences in terms of the intensity of pressure and the level of 
acceptance of the change, it looks as if they are going through, to some extent, unsettling 
experiences, expecting that some changes to their habitus as South Korean professors will be 
made. Senior professors felt less pressure than junior professors, and yet it seemed that they all 
felt that they could not swim against the tide, no matter what they felt about it — whether it was 
positive or negative. 
 
B. Teaching English-medium Classes 
The importance of English in university research and teaching has increased more than 
ever as internalization has become a major agenda for enhancing the competitiveness of South 
Korean universities. There already has been an increased emphasis on English as the lingua 
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franca of higher education in general, but what is relatively new is the introduction of English-
medium programs in universities. Professors’ English skills are necessary and valued not only 
for publication in English as scholars, but also for lectures in English-medium classes (yŏng’ŏ 
kangŭi) as teachers in their universities. English-medium classes exist not only for foreign 
students but also for domestic students. Universities give incentives to professors for teaching 
English-medium classes to increase the number of these classes. Just as I had presumed, almost 
all of my informants who had studied in English-speaking countries, especially professors in the 
sciences and engineering, had experience teaching classes in English at their universities. These 
professors are the people who know better than others the importance of English. However, their 
personal responses to the implementation of English-medium classes varied. 
In our university, newly hired professors are unconditionally required to teach three 
English-medium classes for two years. Although most of them are foreign doctorates, 
there is no consideration of their individual English proficiency. It doesn’t make any 
sense because some cases, because of the characteristics of their majors, it can be difficult 
for them. But it is so-called internationalization, internationalization! Why? Because of 
the assessment of universities. Internationalization comprises a large portion of 
evaluation scores of universities. (Professor Ha, humanities, 52) 
 
Professor Ha was in a high administrative position at his university and was supposed to follow 
and execute the policies imposed by MOE and the university, but he revealed a critical attitude 
toward English-medium classes, especially of their uniformity. As he points out, English-
medium classes have been increasingly in demand as an evaluation criterion of 
internationalization. During the interviews, my informants often referred to the rankings and 
assessment of universities conducted by Joongang Ilbo, one of major news papers in South 
Korea, since 1994 and exposed their discomfort toward them. The degree of internationalization 
has been newly included since 2006 as an important criterion in the assessment of universities by 
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Joongang Ilbo.
61
 The indicators of internationalization in 2006 and 2007 were comprised of the 
proportions of foreign faculty (20%), foreign students who register for degree programs (15%), 
student exchange arrangements with universities overseas (10%), foreign study abroad students 
in the university (5%), English-medium classes among major courses (20%), and so on. In terms 
of curriculum, both the state and universities emphasize English-medium teaching and learning 
(Y. Kim 2009, 27-29; Joonang Ilbo 18 October, 2012). Most professors understood and admitted 
the necessity of the English-medium classes for internationalization, but they were also doubtful 
about the effectiveness of the current classes. 
Many professors felt that the English-medium program, in most cases, was hastily 
executed before content and meaning -- which they thought were more important -- could be 
well-prepared and delivered. Thus the classes had various practical and potential difficulties. In 
order for the program to succeed, professors should first be assisted to “pursue the aim of 
internationalization in their teaching practices, curricula and delivery of courses” (Liddicoat, 
cited in Sanderson 2008, 281). However, it seemed that it did not work this way at South Korean 
universities. The ironic situation of one of my informants, who was an English professor at an 
elite university, is a good example. Recently Professor Sohn (47) received a new mission to 
develop teaching methods for English-medium classes from his university. The program had 
already been running at his university and he understood that his mission’s ultimate goal was to 
further increase the number of English-medium classes. However, he told me that he personally 
opposed English medium-classes, especially the ones for domestic students. He opposed the idea 
primarily because he could predict the poor quality of the classes which he thought would lack 
depth. He argued that the improvement of the quality of the classes and university was the very 
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 The total assessment scores of universities by Joongang Ilbo are composed four elements: the condition of 
education (95), the degree of internationalization (70), research productivity (115), and reputation and employment 
of graduates (70) in 2010 (Joongang Ilbo 27 September, 2010). 
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first thing to do for internationalization rather than the increase of English-medium classes. He 
further thought that internationalization should move in the direction of making foreign students 
want to take high-quality classes in Korean at Korean universities while learning about Korean 
culture. Another professor expressed a similar thought. He said, “You know, as the food is 
scrumptious, the restaurant is packed with guests without any advertisement. Likewise, if the 
university is excellent with internal stability and substance, foreign students and scholars will 
seek to come here. They don’t come here just because of the number of English-medium classes.” 
Although some might not share same opinion, these professors’ thoughts might reflect other 
professors’ general criticism of the lack of preparation, content, and cultural meaning of 
internationalization at South Korean universities. 
Moreover, professors in lower-tiered universities often described the reality of English-
medium classes with a skeptical tone, saying, “Actually, both students and professors are not 
ready for those classes.” Their students had even more difficulties taking English-medium 
classes than students at top universities. It was not only a big burden for both students and 
professors, but it also sometimes had the unintentional effect of making the students more 
discouraged and dispirited. Professors at these universities felt relatively less pressure to teach 
English-medium classes, compared to professors at top universities. However, in the current 
atmosphere, as an informant expressed, professors who could not teach class in English often felt 
that they were “incompetent.” 
Yet, Professor Koo (business, 52) at a top university felt somewhat differently. He had a 
long history of teaching English-medium classes. He started teaching English-medium classes at 
his university when he was an instructor there in 1994 after he had returned to South Korea with 
his U.S. degree. At that time, there were two or three students who could speak English well 
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among about 30 students in a class and he taught the class in English with confidence. After 
taking several years off, he taught an English-medium class again a year ago at the request of his 
university. At that time, he voluntarily chose to teach the class although the university asked him 
to encourage other professors to teach English-medium classes. He said he did so because he felt 
sorry to make other professors do it. He soon noticed that there were only two or three students 
who spoke English worse than him among about 30 students. Most of them were exchange 
students or students who had lived abroad before. He spoke, “When they complained that they 
could not understand me, my voice became louder and louder, ha-ha [laughter]. Whenever the 
class ended, I had a pain in the back of my head because of tension.” He told me that he would 
never want to teach an English-medium class again. Every university has different requirements 
for English-medium classes and other international programs as well, but these requirements 
were often ignored. 
These professors did not just complain about their burden of teaching in English as non-
native speakers. In fact, a few professors expressed their enthusiasm toward English-medium 
classes despite their own practical burden and problems. Most of them, however, criticized its 
ineffectiveness and inefficiency in reality in both teaching and learning. Some thought that it was 
very necessary to first set up the system as quickly as possible and then they could gradually 
improve it by fixing problems. But more felt that these were only external systems that lacked 
content; they felt that it was a waste of the time and energy of professors and students. They 
suspected that the basic intention of this program was only to meet the evaluation criteria. Their 
ultimate target of criticism was the university and the state: short-term plans and practices 
without long-term goals and lacking the basic principles of internationalization, the program’s 
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unpreparedness, uniformity and so on. An informant described it cynically, “They 
internationalize in a Korean way.” 
 
C. Playing the Broker Role for Internationalization 
My informants’ activities as campus globalizers were not limited to participation in the 
internationalization of their own research and teaching English-medium classes. Many of them 
were involved in other diverse activities and willing to play the broker role for the 
internationalization of their universities, actively using their international networks and skills. 
Since 1997, some elite South Korean universities have opened international graduate school 
programs to train professionals to work for international organizations and trade. Following in 
quick succession, there have been openings of international colleges one after another. 
International colleges have been increasingly popular among South Korean universities as one 
strategy for internationalizing the university. Some of my informants, in fact, had worked or 
currently worked for these programs. Recently, a few elite universities, such as SNU and Yonsei 
University, have tried to expand their international colleges under so-called ambitious master 
plans with state supports, while building separate campuses such as Sihŭng or Songdo 
international business district. These projects were still controversial and there was uncertainty 
about the possibility of their success despite the universities’ efforts moving ahead, e.g., building 
their infrastructure at the time of the interviews. My informants showed both positive and 
negative reactions toward them. However, it is also clear that these universities needed even 
more support and contribution from their faculty. Not only did they need professors who would 
directly work for these international colleges at these elite universities but they also needed 
professors across the board who had enough international networks, skills, and experiences to 
182 
 
play a certain role for their universities. My informants were also playing that role, making 
academic connections with foreign universities -- for example, they would recruit foreign 
students and scholars, arrange international projects and cooperation with foreign universities, 
set up experimental video-conference-style classes with foreign professors and so forth -- while 
also accommodating with various on-campus, inbound, and outbound internationalizing efforts. 
All of my informants indeed hoped that their universities would successfully accomplish 
internationalization since they acknowledged the necessity for it in the face of globalization. 
However, this does not mean that they all spoke with one voice about how to go about doing it. 
Therefore they experienced different frustrations and hopes while respectively playing their role. 
Some found their own thinking evolving as they more actively participated in the role of campus 
globalizer. Professor Lee (natural sciences, 50) was an active globalizer for his university. He 
has not only taught English-medium classes for three years, but also organized many 
international symposiums and conferences. He told me that he now very well realized the 
importance of internationalization that he could not recognize in his study abroad years. The 
more he got involved in the work of internationalization, the more he learned from these 
experiences. He highly valued the joint work between domestic universities and foreign 
universities for internationalization: joint research, joint teaching/classes, and joint degrees etc.  
He thought these were the fastest and the most effective ways to be internationalized. He argued 
that the bilateral approach to trying to understand and learn from each other was really necessary 
for accomplishing “genuine” (chinjŏnghan) internationalization. What he was currently putting 
great effort into, at the time of the interview, was an arrangement of a dual degree system for an 
M.A. program between his university and a private university in the U.S., using his academic 
networks. He truly believed that the dual degree system had many advantages for both 
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universities and their students. According to him, it was a “win-win system” (in English) that 
both universities could benefit from and also equally learn from each other. 
However, what he acutely realized nowadays was how much the internationalization of 
South Korean universities leaned towards “showing off,” getting away from genuine 
internationalization efforts and finding easier ways. Professor Lee revealed his frustration caused 
by his own university. While he and his colleagues were pushing forward with the dual degree 
project, they met an unexpected obstacle. The headquarters of his university objected to the 
project because the counterpart was not a very renowned university in South Korea. His elite 
university wanted the U.S. counterpart to have a name value that reached the level of so-called 
Ivy League schools like Harvard University or MIT so as to match its own name and to have a 
positive return on the rankings. He said: 
The pride of prestigious university in South Korea was so strong that it became an 
obstacle of internationalization. Although we have meetings and sign the MOU with the 
university, actually, it’s not like we just work with the counterpart university, but we get 
opportunities working with the renowned scholars in that university, in the U.S., in the 
world. But those opportunities are going to be blocked.  
 
It was regrettable for him that his university was going to lose the good chance to substantially 
internationalize the university and to attract more excellent students in the future. He added that 
the pervasive and obsessive idea of “rankings” and “fame” really hindered the successful 
internationalization of his university and South Korean universities in general. His anecdote well 
represents the often shared frustration among professors who take internationalization seriously 
and are willing to contribute to it as campus globalizers. They were often disappointed by 
symbolic, ceremonial, and performative internationalization practices of their universities and 
“prevailing instrumental logic” (Sidhu 2006, 15). 
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The other side of the same coin was expressed by another informant. Professor Noh 
(natural sciences, 52) expressed his dissatisfaction with the current mode of internationalization 
saying, “First of all, I think it’s not right to take for granted that we are in an inferior, lower 
position in the process of internationalization.” He criticized the fact that South Korean 
universities were more than willing to pay a lot to bring foreign scholars to their universities, 
especially under the name of WCU, just to show off, as if they could not internationalize their 
universities without those foreign scholars. Further, in his view, these were not actually highly 
competent scholars because he thought that top-class scholars rarely wanted to come to South 
Korean universities; this view was largely shared by other informants. He did not like the attitude 
of South Korean universities that implicitly devalued South Korean scholars as mediocre. 
Professor Noh had pride in his own excellence as a scientist and a teacher. He had trained his 
students as the best scientists and sent them to prestigious graduate programs in the U.S. Because 
they had performed so excellently as superb scientists and received recognition while publishing 
their work in major journals such as Nature and Science, U.S. universities began to recognize 
that students from Professor Noh’s lab were very worthy to take on as graduate students. 
Professor Noh thought that although he did not sign any MOUs with these universities, he had 
established international trust and earned credit not just for himself but also for his university and 
country by raising internationally competent students and showing the excellence of Korean 
scholarship. 
As I presented in the cases of Professor Lee and Noh, every professor might have 
different thoughts, visions, and hopes for the internationalization of their universities, thus their 
experiences and approaches would be not same. Moreover, their activities and contributions as 
agents of internationalization were not always in accord with their own beliefs or preferences. I 
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already presented above the cases of Professor Sohn who had an unwanted obligation to develop 
the teaching methods for an English-medium class against his belief, and Professor Chon who 
concentrated his efforts at internationalization on his research and devalued other activities as 
“showoff,” but still played the broker role, successfully arranging the MOU between his 
university and a state university in the U.S. even during his own sabbatical. Fascinatingly, 
however, Professor Chon also gave a talk at that same state university during his sabbatical year 
while his children were in the audience watching him giving the talk, which made both himself 
and his children proud. At that moment, he might have shared his pride as a competent 
cosmopolitan and an internationalized professional with his children. 
Some informants were untiringly enthusiastic with a lot of confidence, some just played 
the role to follow the trend and adapt to the circumstances, but others became reluctant to play 
the role of campus globalizers when they realized that the practices did not match with their 
ideals. Yet, even the frustration, conflict, or confusion that my informants frequently expressed 
during the interviews might not be too different from the other side of their efforts to find a way 
to work towards “genuine” internationalization at their universities. They often showed their 
sincere concern for the way internationalization worked. As an informant described, “They [the 
university and the state] just want to paint a color first, rather than deeply think about how we lay 
the basis for it. And I am worrying about it.” They worried about the superficiality, the lack of 
philosophy, and the absence of long-term visions and plans for internationalization. 
 
III. Ambivalent Globalizers, “Genuine” Internationalization 
To a greater or lesser degree, most of my informants expressed pride as internationalized 
professionals. However, they also to some extent shared ambivalences about being campus 
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globalizers. There was a coexistence of will and reluctance. For some, the ambivalent or 
inconsistent attitude toward internationalization originated from personal inner contradiction, but 
for others it came from lack of confidence or discomfort with the modus operandi of 
internationalization and its implication. Through interviews with my informants, I found that 
there was an issue often bugging their minds as campus globalizers, although sometimes it was 
not clearly uttered or expressed. 
One of my informants elaborated this issue well. According to him, there were two kinds 
of approaches toward internationalization: First, there was the approach of trying to change 
people’s minds and thoughts in advance through such things as campaigns; second, there was the 
approach of setting up the system first and then encouraging people to fit themselves into it. And 
Professor Kwon (business, 55) thought that South Korean universities chose the second approach. 
He spoke: 
Because it takes long time to change people’s thought as if it takes long time to change 
the culture of a society. Well, our society is not yet reached to that level [to choose the 
first]. Changing system can be done faster and it is an advantage…, but isn’t changing the 
way of thought more important? Having open minds is more crucial [for 
internationalization] than having foreign professors and students on campus or speaking 
foreign languages well. 
 
Professor Kwon, who was one of deans of this university, well understood the circumstances that 
made universities prefer the second approach to the first. However, he felt sorry for about the 
decision because he thought that only people who had an open mind and wider perspective could 
learn and accept the diversity of life when they contacted foreign people, languages, and cultures. 
I sensed that the internationalization efforts of the university often did not meet the cosmopolitan 
criteria of some of my informants, even if it could meet the criteria of the state. 
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A. Cosmopolitan Teachers: a Fundamental Building Block for Internationalization   
In this vein, the case of Professor Hyun (engineering, 52) is very intriguing. His story 
brings my discussion of professors’ role as agents of internationalization to another dimension, 
i.e., to a bit more of a philosophical dimension. Professor Hyun confused me with many honest 
but contradictory comments and attitudes during his interview. In his attitudes toward 
internationalization, passiveness and activeness were both mixed. He told me that his life as a 
professional was “already” and also “inevitably” internationalized because of the characteristics 
of his discipline. He proactively taught English-medium classes before others did when they 
were requested, because he thought this would be the irresistible future direction. In addition, 
whenever the university requested his cooperation with things related to internationalization, he 
always tried to actively comply with it because he thought that he should do it anyway. However, 
interestingly, he confessed his feelings this way: “Actually, I want to live resisting ‘globalization’ 
(in English), hahaha [laughter]. That’s my honest feeling. Although internationalization is an 
irresistible trend and we should get ready for it, anyway, I feel the less [internationalization] the 
better.” He was explicitly ambivalent about internationalization. He had an especially reluctant 
attitude toward inbound polices of internationalization. He went on to say that he did not mind if 
foreign students took his classes, but he did not like having foreign students in his lab. He spoke: 
Why should I educate foreigners? Why should I put my energy and time for them? I 
know, it will eventually helpful for their countries and somewhat for our country. 
But…maybe I am so Korean. I want to teach only Korean students. I had studied in 
England with their help though, to be honest, I don’t like to have Indian students in my 
lab.” 
  
Surprised, I asked him again if this is really how he felt, reminding him that he was raising his 
children to have an international education in Canada. He awkwardly laughed for a moment, but 
soon he confirmed that that was his honest feeling. He thought that outbound internationalization 
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by which Korean students could learn from developed countries was more desirable than 
inbound internationalization through which more students came from underdeveloped countries. 
I was somewhat shocked because his remarks, to some degree, reflected South Korean 
popular sentiments toward recent multicultural changes in South Korean society.  These were 
also the last words that I expected to hear from my informant who had a cosmopolitan yearning 
for his children, especially when considering that his children were also minorities in Western 
society. In fact, as the numbers of incoming foreign students in South Korean universities have 
increased and recently reached about 100,000 students, some issues have been floating around. 
First and foremost has been the discrimination of foreign students, especially non-white students, 
on campuses and in society in general (Dong-A Ilbo 21 November, 2011). It is also shocking 
because, through the internationalization of education, both international students  and domestic 
students are supposed to “develop the international perspective and cross cultural sensitivity that 
are essential attributes of the effective citizen of the 21
st
 century, and which gives us the skills 
and personal capacity to respond positively to globalization” (Yerbury, cited in Sidhu 2006, 1-2). 
And if these attributes are required for the students, what about the professors? 
Although some informants emphasized that the internationalization of professors was 
more urgent than that of students, from the case above, it is suggested that internationalized 
professors are not necessarily cosmopolitan teachers. Terry Kim (2005; 2008) points out that 
although academics with U.S. doctoral degrees have become a part of the tradition of the South 
Korean university, this does not necessarily lead to the internationalization of South Korean 
higher education. In her studies, she often points out the lack of bi/multi-cultural attitudes of 
South Korean academics even among professors with foreign doctoral degrees. She argues that 
“The overall character of university academic culture is homogeneously Korean” and “culturally 
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the internal sociology of the contemporary university in South Korea is still very local in practice” 
regardless of the official emphasis on internationalization (2005, 93-94). In spite of their pride as 
internationalized professionals, their study abroad experiences by which some informants are 
hugely impacted, and even more the experience of raising children abroad, it seems that some 
professors still do not want to move beyond their own habitus and boundaries and have 
somewhat failed to gain intercultural or cosmopolitan perspective and sensitivity. 
Yet, Professor Hyun does not represent the thoughts of all of my informants. Other 
professors shared more cosmopolitan ideas of the internationalization of the university.  For 
example, Professor Noh (natural sciences, 52) spoke: 
Although we have to compete with developed countries in the era of globalization by 
raising competent students, we should not forget other thing too, the contribution to the 
world community. I believe we have dual responsibility. Our country is not a poor 
country anymore, you know. We have to educate and train the capable students in poor 
countries such as uhm… Pakistan or Nepal… so they can contribute to develop their own 
countries. I believe so. 
 
Many other professors echoed this notion in different words: “We should pursue 
internationalization from the point of view of seeking how we contribute to the world, the global 
community. If our students don’t have that kind of mindset as global citizens, they in fact don’t 
have competitiveness”; “Open mind, attitude, and ethos are prerequisite of internationalization. 
Korean society needs maturation than development”; “I sent my children abroad because I 
wanted them to be educated in the society based on pluralism. Likewise, I want my student to 
experience pluralism through internationalization of university. Internationalization does not 
mean just making them do English well. It is regrettable our university doesn’t have a systematic 
long-term plan with this perspective” and so forth. They revealed their hope in cosmopolitanism 
for the “true/real/genuine” internationalization of their universities. For some, they had at least a 
personal, emotional motivation to be a cosmopolitan teacher with more empathy, creating a more 
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accepting environment, as Professor Yim (social sciences, 54) said: “You know, there are foreign 
students coming to our university. Those children cannot speak Korean well. I often think that 
I’m going to treat them well, taking care of them [because they remind me of my children].” 
According to the OECD (Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development) 
definition of internationalization, it is “the process of integrating an international/intercultural 
dimension in the teaching, research and service of the institution” (Knight & de Wit, cited in 
Sidhu 2006, 2). Obviously, it is not just about having foreign professors, foreign students, 
English lectures, or new buildings or campuses. Gavin Sanderson (2008) pays attention to the 
experiences of teachers and their roles and responsibilities in the internationalization of 
(Australian) higher education and emphasizes the importance of the “cosmopolitan teacher” in 
higher education. And he argues that a university that “encourages its teachers to engage 
positively with diversity is going to be better placed to take advantage of the opportunities 
brought by current global flows” (301), while making an “opportunity for humanistic 
advancement in the face of present neoliberal, neoconservative, and implicit neoimperial agendas 
influencing politics, economics, education, and culture” (302). Also, as Konrad Gunesch (2004) 
argues, cosmopolitanism could constitute an alternative to or complement for international 
education; the “desirable individual outcome” of international education has to be “rooted in the 
concept of cosmopolitanism” (253). In this vein, it seems that the internationalization approach 
of South Korean universities is far from the ideals that the scholars above suggest because not 
only did it start as a instrumental survival tool in a global competition, but also because, by and 
large, South Korean universities have been obsessed with external development and dominated 
by rankings and economic considerations. 
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As shown in the first section above, the goals of the internationalization of higher 
education are more instrumentally associated with “neoliberal and hegemonic imperatives” 
(Sanderson 2008, 296). Therefore, as Matthews and Sidhu argue, “In the absence of concerted 
efforts on the part of educational institutions to sponsor new forms of global subjectivity, flows 
and exchanges like those that constitute international education are more likely to produce a neo-
liberal variant of global subjectivity” (cited in Sanderson 2008, 296). As I showed, my 
informants experienced struggles as campus globalizers who enacted international policies and 
strategies through their own teaching, research, networks, and administration services. This 
might be more because of the relatively immature phase of internationalization at South Korean 
universities. The gap between ideas/hope and practices/frustration often led to ambivalence in 
my informants, making them feel that something fundamental was missing -- principles. I do not 
mean to suggest that all of my informants are active globalizers or cosmopolitans. However, 
what I found was that, for some of these geese-dad professors, cosmopolitanism was one of the 
most crucial principles of the internationalization of universities. 
 
B. Ambivalent Globalizers: Struggles for the Real Agents’ Role  
Globalization has had strong impacts not only on my informants’ private lives, but also 
on their professional lives, although the perception of this impact was somewhat different 
according to professors’ seniority, discipline, and university. The intense internationalizing 
efforts by the state and the university have affected the nature of their work, and one result was 
that they played the role of campus globalizers as part of a new mission. Although my 
informants, mostly as the U.S. doctorates, had a relatively advantageous position to deal with 
challenges related to internationalization, the ways that they responded to their given mission 
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were not identical. As shown above, I observed some trends shared by certain groups of 
informants, e.g., the difference in the responses to the demand of internationalization of the 
academic self between scientists and humanist/social scientists. However, it is also impossible to 
group the trends of my informants with clear-cut demographic demarcations, e.g., saying that 
most senior professors, for example, in social sciences at top universities showed certain 
tendency toward internationalization, since each demographic factor does not work 
monolithically, but all factors rather complicatedly intertwine with each other depending on 
different issues. 
These professors’ individual relationship to international activities is very different. They 
either assimilated to the logic of trend because they could not go against it, or stayed away 
somewhat because they did not want to be swayed by the trend. Some professors thought that the 
internationalization of the academic self, mostly involving getting recognition for research, was 
the more urgent and effective way of internationalization. But some enthusiastically participated 
in institutional efforts of internationalization and ardently played their role since they believed it 
was more effective and faster. However, most of them were more likely to be caught in-between 
in the process: they were either actively or reluctantly playing the requested roles for 
internationalization, but also had to in some way deal with the nagging issues of the gap between 
ideals and reality, expressing that South Korean universities and more broadly South Korean 
society was not realizing “genuine” internationalization. Thus, they often showed reluctance “to 
simply ‘go along with’ the globalization agenda” presented by their institutions and the state and 
“to assimilate globalization practices, almost through unconscious osmosis” (Currie 1998, 6 and 
11). Sometimes, the institutionalized globalization efforts did not match well with their own 
cosmopolitanism or vicarious cosmopolitanism. 
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Concluding the chapter, I would like to introduce A. Campbell’s interesting analogy of 
people being either frogs or snails when dealing with other cultures, cited in Sanderson (2008, 
299): 
The frogs are happy to jump headlong into the cultural pond and let diversity and 
difference wash over them. […] The snails, however, carry their houses (their culture) on 
their back wherever they go, hardly exposing themselves to other cultures at all. 
 
Although they might have felt that they were internationalized, I think most of my informants 
were probably people who were “snail-like” in their study abroad period, except a few who were 
distinctively impacted by their experiences, as I explained in chapter four. Indeed, one of my 
informants said, “American culture had had no influence what so ever on me during my study 
abroad period, except in an academic aspect.” He was a “snail.” However, currently he was 
educating his son in the U.S. and he expected his son to jump into the pond and swim there. In 
addition, he himself also worked for the international college at his university. These certainly 
have been transformative experiences for him. In another example, when asked about why he 
sent his daughter to the U.S., Professor Ahn (social sciences, 48) answered me that it was 
primarily because he was internationalized, thanks to his study abroad and other international 
experiences in foreign countries. His daughter was affected by these experiences as well, 
although to some extent he was influenced by his friends who had already sent their children 
abroad. He said that unless people spend time in other countries, they cannot really know about 
themselves and their own culture because they cannot objectify themselves. “That’s why I sent 
my daughter there,” he said. Indeed, during the interview with him, my impression was that he 
really accepted his daughter’s becoming a “frog.” Likewise, he said that what was lacking in the 
internationalization of South Korean universities was the consideration of how we would 
eventually contribute to the world through internationalization. He also wanted to raise his 
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students as cosmopolitans who would contribute to the world regardless of where they were, 
even if they could not have abroad experiences. Most of these geese-dad professors did not want 
their next generation to live just as snail-like people. 
In this chapter, I asked and also tried to unravel the paradox of theses geese-dad 
professors: how they dealt with the plausible ontological irony of being campus globalizers and 
at the same time fathers who sent their children abroad for international education. Intriguingly, 
it was not just an irony, contradiction, or a conflict at all: certainly, these geese-dad professors 
have continued to become more cosmopolitan through their vicarious experiences, and the 
cosmopolitanism was also reflected in their profession to a greater or lesser degree. Many of 
them were the critical or cynical consumers of the university’s rationales and techniques of 
globalization, knowing that the realization of the ideals could not be soon achieved for their 
children in the present imperfect systems of the universities. However, on the other hand, this 
very awareness also keeps motivating them to seek more genuine internationalization efforts in 
their role as campus globalizers. 
I put the excerpt (Sanderson 2008) at the beginning of this chapter because I think it 
shows well what it has meant for South Korean professors to be agents for the 
internationalization of the university. As Sanderson points out, professors are “a fundamental 
building block” for internationalization and need to internationalize their personal and 
professional outlooks as cosmopolitans to become the real agents of internationalization. I 
interpret my informants’ struggles above, to a large extent, as their desire to contribute to the 
“genuine” internationalization of their universities, while working as a “building block.” Further, 
we may wait and see how things turn out:  if these geese-dad professors provide the cultural 
space and environment with intercultural acceptance and cosmopolitanism for the 
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internationalization of their universities and South Korean society; if they may foster 
cosmopolitan perspectives of students and further change South Korean university cultures.  
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CHAPTER SIX 
NOSTALGIC INTELLECTUALS, AUTONOMOUS PROFESSIONALS  
Foucault argues that through practices that he dubbed ‘technologies of self’ we are 
capable of assuming or rejecting particular subjectivities ahead of others. Our words and 
deeds in everyday life are opportunities to choose and to overcome particular expressions 
of personhood. Foucault also suggests that there can be a contingent dimension to the 
subjectivities that we inhabit and, furthermore, that the subject positions available to us 
are not fixed but ever shifting as circumstance change (Sidhu 2006, x) 
 
“What a difference it was!” Professor Chung (humanities, 42), who was recently hired as 
an assistant professor, expressed the surprise that he felt right after he finally became a professor 
(kyosu). He confessed that the treatment he got from others -- no matter what kind of social event 
he was attending -- before and after being hired as a professor was tremendously different 
although he was the same person with the same clothes and the same car. He spoke: 
For example, the husband of my wife’s older sister is a manager of one of famous 
conglomerates. He has a nice job, right? He is younger than me, but I call him hyŏngnim 
(older brother). He had always felt sorry for me before [I became a professor], even if he 
didn’t think of me pathetic. Then, after I became a professor, our positions were 
completely reversed. Whenever I met him, he expressed his own mixed feeling of 
enviousness, jealousy, and frustration [on himself]. I often felt same kind of feelings from 
others too. I keenly realized, ‘Ah, this is the social perception of the professor. What a 
privileged occupation the professor is!’ 
 
Professor Chung told me that he sometimes felt he was overlooked when he was a lecturer 
(kangsa). However, after experiencing the reality of two different statuses firsthand, these days 
he has really felt sorry for academics who cannot become professors because he knows that there 
is not such a big difference between professors and lecturers in their knowledge and character, 
and he feels that gaining the professor position was due in part to luck. 
Professor Chung’s account shows to what extent South Korean professors still sustain 
high social status in terms of honor and respect even though it is said that the status of professors 
have been gradually lowered and devalued due to the rapid increase of the number of professors 
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and colleges. According to Hong Tusŭng’s study, the professor’s social prestige index of 
occupation (sahoejŏk chikŏp wisin chŏmsu) was second  only to the judge’s in South Korea in 
2006 (2010 64-67). It could be said that the prestige and privilege of professors in South Korea is 
still much higher than that of professors in Western countries, especially in the U.S, where 
professors are mostly likely treated as just academics. 
 
I. Disruption of Habitus and Nostalgia for Intellectual Aura 
However, my informants also frequently talked about the differences they perceived 
between professors in the past and in the present. As I already pointed out in chapter five, there 
has been increasing demand on professors to change their habitus. Professors Cho (social science, 
51) spoke, “I have been a professor for fifteen years. At the time when I was junior faculty, one 
senior professor told me that the good old days for professors are already gone, hahaha (laughter). 
I think he was right.” Many others echoed the idea, saying that the “myth” of the professor was 
gone -- both the profession as an envious stable occupation and the professor as a respectable 
social figure. I often sensed my interviewees’ mixed feelings of acceptance and frustration 
towards the change. I discussed in the previous chapter the kinds of challenges South Korean 
professors have recently faced in their profession and how these challenges have transformed the 
nature of academic labor. Many informants pointed out that the changes in the environment and 
culture of South Korean universities reached an extent that professors two or three decades ago 
could never imagine. 
Bourdieu, in Homo Academicus (1988), analyzes the tensions in French higher education 
at specific historical juncture of 1968 during which some critical transitions took place because 
of grave changes in university demographics – the great increase in students and the 
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corresponding growth in the demand for professors -- and the economic needs of society. Despite 
the gap of several decades, the challenges and circumstances that French academics faced at that 
time are somewhat similar to those that South Korean academics today face, especially in the 
fact that the tensions and challenges in South Korea have been caused by changing demographics, 
economic trends, and increased desire for socio-economic advancement/social mobility through 
education. Bourdieu reveals the ways in which French academics tended to react to these shifts 
and pressures on higher education and how the mechanisms of reproduction of faculty members 
operated in this transition. This dissertation does not analyze this subject as in-depth as Bourdieu 
does. In addition, the reactions of academics in Bourdieu’s time in France and those in South 
Korea today are not identical due to their different chronotopes and cultural traditions. However, 
his study still gives insight into understanding the struggles that South Korean academics now go 
through in responding to changes in the academy by taking a look at how habitus works in the 
midst of the changes and how different academic generations are formed through the process. If 
there are significant differences between the Bourdiean case and mine, they are, first, that South 
Korean universities have already passed through the stage of expansion, unlike the French case 
in Bourdieu’s study; second, who has more “globally” recognized cultural capital has become 
even more important in reproducing faculty members and shaping the university culture in South 
Korea today in the face of globalization than it was in Boudieu’s study. 
Through changing expectations from both inside and outside of academia, professors’ 
habitus was disrupted and it brought new tensions to their lives. That is, the words, “the good old 
days for professors are already gone” reveal the ethos of professors in this transition. This 
transition and the accompanying tensions affect the subjectivities of professors not only as 
academics but also as intellectuals. In a sense, South Korean professors are double-burdened in 
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this moment: they have to adopt themselves as academic professionals to rapidly changing new 
environments in the face of globalization, as academics in other countries have started to do as 
well, but at the same time they have to decide to what extent they will hold fast to their 
traditional roles and given expectations as South Korean intellectuals, which were discussed in 
chapter two. It seems that, on the one hand, they are experiencing a crisis of identity, but on the 
other hand, they have an opportunity to redefine the role of South Korean professors. 
Through the interviews, I noticed that these professors themselves were somewhat 
confused by the changing demands on professors and subsequent shift of the location of 
professors in society. Nonetheless, they tended to adopt themselves to the trend. Professor Choi 
(humanities, 56) expressed his acceptance of the change: “Professors, like in other professions, 
are objectively evaluated according to their ability these days, rather than unconditionally 
respected as they were in the past. But I rather think of it positively, since I interpret it as the 
evidence that our society begins to fall into place.” Yet, when I asked him if this was general 
perception among professors, he said, “Ah….actually [we] don’t feel all right. Yes, somewhat 
frustrated or …so to speak… missing spring days, already passed (chinagan pomnaldŭl)? The 
past was better for us, but it has to be in this way and it can’t be helped.” But he also thought that 
professors were still respected in general. Professor Min (education, 48) also showed a positive 
attitude toward the change. He spoke, “It is only fair to demand a professor to research hard and 
evaluate him… it makes sense to me. I rather criticize some senior professors who gave up on 
research at a certain point, usually after they got promoted.” He further thought that these 
ongoing changes could break the old university culture which tended to keep vested rights and 
tight hierarchy by hiring junior faculty based on personal connections (inmaek). He went on, 
“Young professors these days are more “liberal” (in English) and reasonable and do not accept 
200 
 
the old culture. It is not just because of evaluation, but they have aspiration for research. They 
have a high self-esteem and want to be recognized in their field.” 
These professors often thought that professors in the past maintained the aura of socially 
respectable intellectuals better than now. Yet, they said they lived in a different era. “In the past, 
for example during the democratization period, some professors were especially more respected 
even though they were not actually excellent scholars. It was because they had more courage [to 
resist the power] than others, you know. In terms of that aspect, professors these days might be 
less courageous, but the era that we live in is different,” Professor Sohn (humanities, 47) said. He 
said that he wanted to contribute to society with his professional knowledge rather than directly 
making a social critique. These professors tended to think that they were obliged to contribute to 
society since they still enjoyed more honor and respect as professors than people in any other 
occupation. Especially, senior professors and professors in humanities and social sciences more 
often expressed nostalgia for the aura of socially responsible intellectuals that professors in the 
past enjoyed. “Of course, who I want to be is the professor who has the aura of intellectuals, but I 
don’t think I myself have that aura. It is not easy…going in that way…although I wish…,” said 
Professor Moon (social science, 47). Even professors who used words like “sense of duty” or 
“social responsibility” felt that young/new professors might feel differently from them since they 
were increasingly being pushed to reach certain academic criteria (as I discuss in chapter five) 
and struggled with fulfilling these new requirements. In fact, Professor Chung (humanities, 42), a 
junior faculty, whom I introduced above said, “Honestly, I am not in the position to discuss 
social responsibility as an intellectual since my life is too hectic as a newly hired professor.” 
They agreed that the trend had already started changing the culture of universities and that it 
would be difficult to go against it regardless of how ambivalent they were about it. 
201 
 
A generational difference was also frequently recognized during the interviews. The 
professors in a middle position of seniority in particular more often expressed their conflicts as 
the sandwiched generation between the old and new generations. For instance, Professor Park 
(engineering, 49) spoke: 
More and more we focus on producing knowledge with a functional consideration, 
because… when the university hired professors, they do not expect us to be a man of 
virtue like sŏnbi (literati) or a Renaissance man of broad knowledge, you know. 
Universities see their depth of professional knowledge and scholarship, no matter how 
narrow it is, and then keep evaluate them to make them productive. It is their expectation. 
That’s the reality, but only our society is still confused about it, demanding, so to speak, 
the higher moral standard and social leadership from professors.” 
 
I asked him, “If society is confused about it, how about yourself?” He immediately answered, “I 
am confused too…really I am.” He went on to say, “Oh, I don’t dare to have an aura of the 
professor who is respected as the so-called intellectual and moral exemplar. However, it 
probably subconsciously keeps affecting me, even now.” He added that even professors in 
younger generation might not be totally free from these social expectations which were subtly 
working. 
Recent changes in higher education consequently have formed “different modes of 
‘academic generation’” among professors.  The “academic generations” do not simply mean age 
groups, but different groups of academics, whose expectations, attitudes, and outlook on the 
given changes in universities are considerably different (Bourdieu 1988, 147). “Unlike us, it 
seems that most young professors take for granted the changes of expectations [created by the 
restructuring process],” a senior professor said. The new academic generation has to be 
academically more productive and better equipped with cultural capital like English skills and 
transnational networks in addition to professional knowledge. They develop their own 
expectations of their job. In contrast to the old-generation academics in Bourdieu’s study, who 
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were frightened by the interruption of “the rhythm of the old university life-cycle” and feeling 
that they were relatively deprived of “the benefit of the expansion of the universities,” the 
younger generation of South Korean professors these days, rather, feels that they are 
comparatively disadvantaged by “the new rules of the game” which have become stricter and 
more demanding than those of the older generation (156). Recognizing on-going changes, not 
only the new generation, but both old and new generations think that calling for intellectuals to 
play the same role as they have in the past, creating social consciousness and appearing as moral 
exemplars, is not realistic anymore.  However, whether or not they think society demands this 
kind of role of professors anymore, they still cherish their role as intellectuals. 
 
II. Autonomous Professionals and Different Intellectual Pursuits 
Interestingly, despite the generally shared nostalgia for the aura of intellectuals and the 
different degrees of impact of the change to different academic generations and disciplines, most 
of my informants wanted to be recognized first and foremost as the professional. It seems that 
they echoed Foucault’s post-modern notion of intellectuals. Foucault argues that “the specific 
intellectual” who uses specialized knowledge for social purpose is the appropriate example for 
our time (1991b). These professors felt that professors had become just another professional job. 
They thought that if they fulfilled the role of the professional who produces and teaches 
knowledge, it was sufficient. And if they thought they had to have moral leadership for society, it 
was more likely because they were teachers, and not because they were intellectuals. They rather 
wanted to have leadership and authority through the excellence of their scholarship and 
professional knowledge. In fact, according to a survey of 550 professors by Kyosu Sinmun in 
2012, 81.8% of respondents answered that the most important quality of professors is 
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professionalism. At the same time, 19.5% professors answered that the quality that was the most 
lacking from professors was also professionalism (17 April, 2012). This, to some extent, reflects 
professors’ awareness of the crisis and the reality that professional knowledge is no longer the 
exclusive property of professors these days. 
This perception of themselves as professionals might make some professors think outside 
the box. Professor Noh (natural science, 52), for instance, elaborated this in a more extraordinary 
way: 
Uh… I am…I didn’t think it at the beginning of my professor career, but a few years later 
after I became a professor, I wanted to show a different image of the professor to students. 
The image of the professor, who stays late and researches all night long, but doesn’t take 
care of his family and drives an old used car, is not the only image of the professor. I 
wanted to show that the professor can drive a Mercedes or Porsche and contribute to the 
university by earning money through his excellent research work and good inventions. 
[…] There are many professors who share these similar ideas.   
 
In a sense, it looks as if Professor Noh wanted to break the image of intellectuals who are distant 
from or transcend materialism or the wealth of the real world. To some extent, it also reflects the 
mode of “academic capitalism” in universities today (Clark 1998; Sidhu 2006; Slaughter and 
Leslie 1997; Slaughter and Rhoades 2004). Actually, during the interview he also emphasized 
the social responsibilities of the professor as teacher and an exemplary social figure. It seemed 
that these different lines of thinking did not create a conflict at all in his mind. Professor Noh’s 
case might be somewhat exceptional although he did say that there were others who shared his 
ideas. Honestly, I do not know whether I should interpret this as an example of an identity crisis 
or a case of building up a new identity. However, I take his case as a sign of on-going changes. 
Decades ago, Daniel Bell welcomed the “rise of the new elites based on skill,” who share 
“norms of professionalism” that “could become the foundation of the new ethos for such a class,” 
rather than who are “bound by a sufficient common interest to make them a political class” (Bell 
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1976 (1973), 362). Some may consider these changes the so-called “death of the intellectual,” as 
I introduced in chapter two. What is certain is that, with changing environments – both 
economically and politically -- and concomitant new modes of professional life, it seems that 
these South Korean professors are newly defining the professoriate role and at the same time 
being liberated from the constraints of the collective identity of intellectuals. They defined 
themselves as professionals who could enjoy more individual autonomy, freely pursue their own 
individual goals, and make individualized decisions. The images and roles that were traditionally 
associated with the collective identity of Korean intellectuals did not just operate as a normative 
guide for intellectuals’ actions, but was also a prominent source of authority, status, prestige, and 
the respectable aura for intellectuals. In other words, the role of the intellectual allowed them 
hegemony in a particular way. However, it seems now that these professors are replacing their 
source of hegemony with a different kind of authority – professionalism. They operate in society 
as professionals, contributing to society with their specific professional knowledge. As an 
informant emphasized, most of these professors felt that they were “still intellectuals, but 
intellectuals as professionals.” By defining themselves as professionals, they take different 
responsibilities, while seeking for “different kinds of intellectual pursuits” (Barber 1998). 
“Identity is no longer experienced as a natural, coherent and unchanging attribute of the 
individual, but as the uncertain and fractured result of personal decisions and plans” (Rose 1996, 
302). Clearly, the tradition of or collective identity as Korean intellectuals has become less 
taken-for-granted for these professors and yet they still have more questions (Heelas et al. 1996). 
These professors’ subjectivities as South Korean professors were shifting. Even so, they 
were not totally free from the expectations and responsibilities that were traditionally given to 
professors. To put this in other way, they were caught between nostalgia for the yesteryear 
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professor who enjoyed the aura of respectable, privileged intellectuals and new ideals of the 
autonomous professionals who were unrestrained by the imagined collective identity. And here I 
argue that the shift from the intellectual to the professional and their development into vicarious 
cosmopolitans are not separate processes, but a correlated, enmeshed process that their current 
chronotopes created. In chapter two, I asked in particular if the geese-dad professors’ 
transnational educational practices betrayed the mission of South Korean intellectuals. I also 
showed in chapter three that it was professors’ inner conflicts as intellectuals that made them 
mask their privileges and motivations of ESA with the rhetoric of inevitability. I also revealed 
that these professors were unexpectedly developing post-national thinking and rather nurturing 
their own cosmopolitan liberal yearnings through the experiences of raising their children abroad, 
in chapter four. In chapter five, I presented how their transformation as fathers, who came to 
have a cosmopolitan outlook, was reflected in their profession as they played the role of 
internationalization agents at their universities. I suggest that when the experiences of 
globalization in both personal and public realms are conjoined, they boost the transformation of 
these geese-dad professors as fathers and intellectuals through a paradigm shift. In turn, this 
transformation also mitigates their inner conflicts, tensions, or agonies which could arise from 
their different but concurrent subject positions. Trying to answer the question previously raised, 
here I introduce an account of one of my informants. Professor Hyun (engineering, 52) spoke:  
“Although we are faced with stronger and urgent demands to perform better in our profession 
than to play a broader social role as intellectuals, I rather think it is still better to ask professors to 
have higher moral, ethical standards. But, for me, the early study abroad is certainly not the case 
to judge professors, in terms of whether professors fall short of those standards or not. It is only a 
matter of personal choice and decision. It’s not relevant at all.” In his account, he displayed his 
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confidence that his geese-dad practice was not against collective weal and did not betray the 
mission of professors/intellectuals. 
My informants probably did not have any strict, absolute definition of intellectuals in 
their minds, but during the interviews I sensed that their nationalist sentiment, one of the salient 
characteristics and legacies of Korean intellectuals – also many scholars have recognized 
intellectuals as catalysts of nationalist ideologies and movements (Anderson 1991; Hobsbawm 
1990; Smith 1971; Sunny and Kennedy 1999) -- had become attenuated. And as I discussed in 
chapter four in particular, it seems that their transnational experiences as geese-dads have 
accelerated this process of change – they have been transformed as fathers and intellectuals, 
especially because they want their children to have more autonomy and freedom even if they 
move beyond the national framework. Based on the traditional paradigm, South Korean society, 
especially the mass media, still considers professors collectively as the group of intellectuals 
which is supposed to hold fast to existing tradition. South Korean society and media call for the 
responsibility and aura of intellectuals, and thus criticize their lack of leadership in making the 
zeitgeist. However, these professors have started making a new zeitgeist in a different way with a 
different outlook, seeking alternative roles, creating new identities, and making new traditions as 
a new time and space emerges in front of them and their children. 
 
III. Some Insights for Cultural Phenomena in Globalization Era 
This dissertation started as the study of intellectuals’ actual practice, focusing on a 
cultural phenomenon of geese-dad professors, a symbolic group of South Korean intellectuals. 
While I explored the subjectivities of geese-dad professors by paying attention to two ways in 
which geese-dad professors were experiencing globalization – both personal and public realms -- 
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I have been especially intrigued by the transformative qualities of the experiences of my 
informants. As I stated in chapter one (Introduction), I as a researcher as well as the goal of my 
study have continuously evolved over the course of my research. I already mentioned that I shied 
away from taking an evaluative position toward the geese-family phenomenon by not using the 
prevailing analytical lens of a monolithic neoliberal framework. Rather, I treated and understood 
their practices as revealing cultural phenomena, which illuminate certain paradigm shifts and 
cosmopolitan liberal yearnings within society, rather than as objects of social critique. 
This study allows us to appreciate that there is no cultural phenomenon that can be 
completely understood, by affording another different interpretation of the geese family 
phenomenon. I suggest that the geese-dad professor phenomenon should not be simply 
understood or judged as a moral hazard or the giving up of noblesse oblige of intellectuals for the 
sake of social reproduction. I admit that, in this dissertation, I have shown readers a lot of 
contradictions and ambivalence that my informants revealed. But I believe that this rather proves 
that they were going through a very challenging moment. As I tried to reveal in both chapters 
three and four, the relation between the father’s own study abroad experience and the children’s 
is crucial. To people who have not studied abroad or had any transnational experiences for 
themselves, these geese-dad professors’ practices might seem unnatural and somewhat 
scandalous. Yet, for my informants who have accumulated transnational/global experiences from 
their own study abroad and by keeping in contact with foreign cultures and scholarship, to a 
large extent their children’s ESA is more likely to be executed through the inertia that naturally 
comes from their habitus. These professors are the generation who spent their youth under 
authoritarian regimes and mostly became professors after the democratization of South Korean 
society. In a sense, they are the generation who spent their youth in a controlled society, but 
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tasted and were impressed by freedom and the atmosphere of a democratic developed society 
through their own study abroad. However, within their own chronotopes, their study abroad 
opportunities were often embedded in conversations about Korea’s strength, about making a 
contribution to building the nation both as intellectuals and professionals. That is, “Ideas of 
autonomous self-development and collective imperatives of responsibility to the nation may be 
incorporated into a single subject position without causing personal turmoil” (Hoffman 2010, 98). 
However, as geese-dads, they began to realize that their children’s experiences were not identical 
to theirs despite the fact that most of them started this transnational educational project for their 
children by imaging similar or even better results than those from their own study abroad 
experiences in the past. 
No doubt my informants had more opportunities to be self-reflective and self-aware as 
fathers, teachers, and intellectuals, while raising their children abroad. Their transformations as 
vicarious cosmopolitans might have been achieved through these repeated self-reflections. These 
geese-dad professors did not all share the exact same motivations from the outset, but they often 
shared the same kind of transformative experiences as fathers. Whether a father who started ESA 
for his children with his own ideal values as an intellectual or a father who started ESA with the 
very naked practical reasons of social reproduction, many of them experienced unintended 
transformations when they adjusted their expectations of their children and shifted their own 
paradigms, trying to respect and accept their children’s own life goals, chronotopes, and natural 
growth abroad while also hoping that their children’s own liberal cosmopolitan dreams could be 
achieved. 
They have probably repeatedly gone through “self-reflection within the framework of 
[their] value system and that of [their] national and social culture” (Sanderson 2008, 288) 
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through big and small quotidian struggles with their children abroad and likely often fought inner 
conflicts. Yet, their intercultural contact mediated by their children’s abroad experiences, in turn, 
might have stimulated them to have a more inclusive cosmopolitan framework to understand 
broader human society and accept more possibilities for ways of life beyond their own. Also 
“critical reflection and self-reflection on the basic assumptions of one’s own culture and 
worldview can facilitate a transformative process, which can result in greater self-awareness and 
self-acceptance” (Cranton, cited in Sanderson 2008, 283). As evidence, we saw in chapter five 
how these transformations often influenced these professors’ positions and caused them to 
struggle as both cynical consumers and critical players of the internationalization of South 
Korean universities. At the same time they also sought more genuine internationalization, not 
wanting to be passive compliers who unconsciously assimilated globalization practices. 
Insights from this study also have the potential to reveal the broader contours and impacts 
of cultural phenomena related to the on-going transnational practices and increasing 
cosmopolitan yearnings in South Korean society, which have become more and more common, 
especially among young Koreans. In a sense, this study informs us that the appearance of new 
people has already started, the appearance of people who are not afraid of boundary-crossing and 
who are willing to take up new paradigms, as we saw in the experiences of these geese-dad 
professors and their children. Their experiences well show how South Koreans, and their broader 
contemporaries, make an effort to grope for their own way of life – sometimes nurturing their 
cosmopolitan yearnings, while also responding to globalization. As I mentioned in previous 
chapters, we do not know yet whether these trials or experiments will be successful or not; we 
need to wait to see how they will turn out. These questions may be answered by future studies. 
However, I am certain that this study also gives us an opportunity to reflect on what the ideal 
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way of responding to globalization can be, by applying the lens of cosmopolitan liberal yearning, 
rather than a neoliberal framework of survival in a global economy, in order to look into human 
motivations in a globalized world. Even if globalization is an irresistible force for us, to 
assimilate it or to choose expression of personhood by “rejecting particular subjectivities ahead 
of others” depends on our individual decision (Sidhu 2006, x). Even when most people make the 
same decisions, there are some who make different decisions. Regardless of how small the trial 
is or how small the number of the people who experience it is, these things may also start to 
change the culture and the direction of society. Further, imaginably, these geese-dad professors’ 
practices as a cultural phenomenon can be seen as one of the catalysts for this change and might 
have already caused a watershed moment for change. 
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